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This dissertation is an attempt to contribute new insight to the
understanding of 2 Corinthians 3, In Chapter One, the general problem of
interpreting written texts, especially ancient ones, is discussed, with
special attention given to the differences between speaking and writing.
Then the particular problems of interpreting 2 Corinthians 3 are presented,
and the interpretation theory of Paul Ricoeur is proposed as a method to be
utilized for the present investigation.
In Chapter Two, the notion of the 'world of the text', the central
category of Ricoeur's hermeneutics, is displayed as a starting point for a
contemporary interpretation of the text. Then the 'world' of the text and
some its 'characters' - God, Paul, the Corinthians - are described.
Certain aspects of Norman Petersen's concept of 'narrative world' are
implemented in order to help define the roles, relations, and actions of
the characters of 2 Corinthians 3, as they appear in the text.
In Chapter Three, Ricoeur's contribution to the theory of metaphor is
presented. Then his theory is applied to the interpretation of several
metaphors which occur in the text. The metaphors of 'letters', 'glory',
and 'life and death' are analyzed in terms of Ricoeur's tension theory of
metaphor. This theory has its classical foundations in certain passages
from Aristotle, and it receives its modern elaboration from the impetus of
I. A. Richards. Ricoeur expands the contribution of Richards, in one way,
by proposing the concepts of 'split sense' and 'split reference' as
attributes of the living metaphor. The employment of Ricoeur's theory is
intended to spell out more of the surplus of meaning which lies dormant in
potentially powerful biblical metaphors.
The results of these investigations are summarized and correlated in
Chapter Four. The text of 2 Corinthians 3 does project a world. It is a
world in which the living God has created all things. This biblical
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CHAPTER ONE. 2 CORINTHIANS 3 AND INTERPRETATION.
INTRODUCTION.
This dissertation is an attempt to interpret 2 Corinthians 3 by refer—
ring to the interpretation theory of Paul Ricoeur. Nowhere in his writings
does Ricoeur exegete or interpret this passage, but reference is made to
him because two features of his theory of interpretation are applicable to
this passage: his notion of the 'world of the text' and his theory of
metaphor. The objective is to explain these two theoretical notions and
then apply them to a real text. Chapter One defines some key terms, takes
notice of some of the difficulties of interpretation, and presents the
method and purpose of this investigation. Chapter Two presents an
exposition of Ricoeur's notion of 'the world of the text' and its
application to the text of 2 Corinthians 3. Attention will be given to the
characters of this world and to their roles and relations. Chapter Three
discusses Ricoeur's theory of metaphor and then treats three metaphors
according to the principles of that theory. In Chapter Four, the results
of the study will be summarized, conclusions will be drawn from the present
research, and areas for further research will be suggested.
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SECTION A. DEFINITIONS.
Interpretation is the process of expounding the meaning of a text. 1
This provisional definition suggests that interpretation is a process and
not an act. It is a process in relation to the interpreter in that it
involves a combination of mental activities across a period of time. It is
a process in relation to the text in that new meaning and significance can
arise in each new interpretation, and the cumulative effect of these
previous interpretations exerts an influence on future attempts. The
ultimate and definitive interpretation of 2 Corinthians 3 has not yet been
attained. Nor will this study achieve such finality, because 'now we see
in a mirror dimly', and now we know only 'in part' <1 Cor 13. 12). 2 But
this is an attempt to disclose some of the meaning and contemporary
relevance of this text.
Interpretation is also a process in that a text is complex and intri¬
cate. It "... may well include such a variety of data that no one auditor
will grasp all of the message.'3 As new readers encounter it and as new
scholars research it, new meanings will emerge. Also, as new evidence is
discovered, such as the papyri and the Dead Sea scrolls, and as new methods
are developed and applied, such as form criticism and sociological analy¬
sis, new significance from the text will arise.A The process of interpre¬
tation, then, involves the reappraisal and perhaps revision of older
attempts as well as the assessment and integration of newer methods.
Interpretation calls for 'expounding', which, according to Ricoeur,
is constituted by the dialectical process of understanding and explana¬
tion.6' 'Understanding' QVerstehen, in the German hermeneutic tradition) is
applied primarily in the human sciences (.Geisteswissenschaften), and it
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functions by means of the principle of empathy, 'the transference of
ourselves into another's psychic life.'® Understanding seems to be an
appropriate method in the human sciences, because they are concerned with
events and experiences inscribed in texts by other minds similar to
our own.'7 'Explanation' <Erkltiirung, also a technical term arising in the
same tradition), on the other hand, is the method of the natural sciences,
and it refers to the processes of accounting for the phenomena of nature by
means of empirical methodology. 'In explanation we ex-plicate or unfold
the range of propositions and meanings, whereas in understanding we compre¬
hend or grasp as a whole the chain of partial meanings in one act of
synthesis.'®
In the provisional definition offered above, 'meaning' is perhaps the
key word. For what meaning is and where and how it is found are crucial
elements in any theory of interpretation. J. M. Soskice, though at vari¬
ance with Ricoeur at several points, does distinguish between some key
terms in a way which is compatible with Ricoeur's approach. Her defini¬
tions, summarized below, will be followed in this dissertation,^ The
'sense* of a word refers to its lexical value in its ordinary, everyday
usage. Its 'denotation' is that object, thing, or state of affairs which
it designates. At the level of the sentence, 'meaning' is not the sum of
the senses of the words in a sentence but rather the message which the sen¬
tence conveys, or has the potential to convey. 'Reference' is that func¬
tion of the sentence in which it says something about reality. More pre¬
cisely, it is speakers who refer, but they refer by means of sentences. So
meaning, then, is the 'what' of the sentence, and reference is the 'about
what' of the sentence. Thus, 'meaning' and 'reference' are functions of
sentences, whereas 'sense' and 'denotation' are characteristics of words.
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The issue of meaning in relation to biblical texts and modern
hermeneutics is discussed briefly in a recent article by W, H. Kelber.10
Though he focuses particularly on the gospel narratives, his comments may
be applied equally well to the interpretation of other forms of biblical
discourse as well. He stresses that narrative is a human construction and
that life is not 'narrative-like' until a narrator imposes a narrative
pattern upon it. Rather than a photograph of a little slice of life,
narrative is more like an 'artistic production.'11 The key question is
this: 'How does one come to terms with narrative for what it really is: a
poetic emplotment of incidents and agents into a temporal configuration?'12
Kelber suggests that current gospel interpretation offers five
options, the first of which is to view 'meaning as reference'. This is the
option taken up by scholars using the historical critical method. Their
underlying presupposition is that the meaning of the narrative exists
separately from the plot, and it can be expressed in terms of historical
sequence, theological dogma, or ethical counsel. Thus, the narrative
framework is a dispensable vehicle, for its purpose is to point beyond
itself to the real referents: persons, ideas, events. The failure of
historical critical scholars to grasp the 'inescapable 1inguisticality of
human understanding'13 led them to underrate the value of biblical
narrative itself.
A second option is to view 'meaning as narrative'. This choice is a
reaction against the limitations of the historical critical method, and the
critics who have made this choice employ literary criticism instead. Their
method is to '... dispense with all extraneous questions of authorship and
historical origins... and simply attend to the text.'1,1 They seek meaning
in the text itself and not in any reference it may make to a reality which
4■
transcends the text.15 Kelber cites three weaknesses of the 'meaning as
narrative' approach to interpretation, (1) It started with a cultural
bias, because its canons of criticism were derived from studies of Anglo-
American, French, and Russian novels written in the eighteenth, nineteenth,
and twentieth centuries. These norms were then applied anachronistically
to literature generated in a completely different cultural setting. (2>
Its notion of a 'stable, self-referential narrative' is increasingly
difficult to defend in light of recent critiques.16 (3) No narrative is
pure and innocent, because all have been mediated through a tradition which
has influenced both its form and content during the transmission process.
The third option, 'meaning as consciousness', is adopted by reader-
response criticism, which "... views all texts as bundles of rhetorical
strategies aimed at persuading recipients, and as communications affecting
hearers' or readers' expectations.'17" The underlying thesis is that
readers, not texts, make meaning. This approach must be credited with
emphasizing the role of the reader as a subjective participant and with
examining the effect of the text on its reader.'1® Reader-response
criticism has "... rediscovered the communicative sensibilities of ancient
texts.'1® Its demerit is its tendency to overemphasize the role of the
reader and to neglect the role of the interpretative tradition in guiding
the formulation of meaning.
Structural analysis presents a fourth option, 'meaning as system', in
which meaning is related more to patterns than to plots. 'The structural
analysis of narrative discloses both a gradual manifestation of opposites
through their repetition, replacement and transformation, as well as their
progressive mediation toward a point of mythic integration. '2:0 In a
radical departure from the historical critical method, structuralism finds
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meaning in bundles of relations and in pairs of oppositions narrated in the
text.20 For example, in one structural analysis of the gospel of Mark, the
pairs of sacred space/secular space and order/chaos are identified as the
two primary systems of opposition, and their ultimate mediation occurs in
the passion narrative.22 In this way, '... meaning is constituted on the
basis of this complex interplay which involves the whole of the text.'23
For structural analysis, the events on the surface level are less important
than the relations and oppositions on the depth level.
The fifth and final approach to narrative, 'meaning as deferment', is
exemplified by J. Derrida in his philosophy of deconstructionism.2A
'This philosopher's frustrating and obtuse language is
designed to show that all linguistic elements in a text
are potentially equal... and that there are no stable
signifieds to which the chain of signifiers could lead
us. The resultant horizontal interplay of words postu¬
lates a space of difference and conflict, of postpone¬
ment and play, never permitting the many meanings to be
gathered up into one meaning...CThus] meaning as defer¬
ment postulates the inherently incomplete and fragment¬
ary nature of all writing, including narrative texts.'
Though deconstructionism has some strengths, such as its openness to new
meanings in texts and its tolerance of multiple interpretations, it has not
yet been widely applied to biblical exegesis. This is possibly a result of
its reluctance to engage with the historical and referential aspects of
texts and of its insistence on textual indeterminacy.25
The five options summarized by Kelber - meaning as reference, meaning
as narrative, meaning as consciousness, meaning as system, and meaning as
deferment - are certainly distinct, but they are not necessarily mutually
exclusive. None of them is fully able to account for the production of
meaning. Rather, each one, with its own strengths and weaknesses, can con-
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tribute something to the interpretative process. In the present research,
however, only the first three options will be utilized. It is possible to
correlate these three conceptions of meaning in a way in which they will
complement and balance each other.
To think of meaning as reference preserves the notion of transcend¬
ence, which prevents the text from becoming a 'solipsistic artifact. 12:6
The stories told about Jesus in the four gospels are indeed stories about
Jesus. They point beyond themselves to the person who gave rise to them.
Whatever the degree of one's historical scepticism about the gospels, one
must acknowledge at least that Jesus of Nazareth lived and died and influ¬
enced some of his contemporaries, and that these gospel stories are
attempts to recognize Jesus as the catalyst for their religious experi¬
ences. The stories presuppose an extra-textual referent. Likewise, Paul's
talk about God and the God-man relationship consists of language that
points beyond the text to external (in the sense of extra nos, at least)
realities. While one must recognize the 'inescapable 1inguisticality of
human understanding', one should also remember that language names and, in
some ways, reveals the world but does not create it. It is true, though,
that language does contribute to the meaningful 'manifestation of the
world'.27 Language mediates reality, but does not constitute it. The
notion of meaning as reference, in addition to safeguarding the idea of
reference and transcendence, also keeps the critic in touch with the author
who encoded the message in the text. Although the author is no longer
present in or with the text, the concerns of the author - his situation,
his purpose, his intention, to the extent that these can be recovered or
reconstructed - must not be ignored.
To think of meaning as narrative draws attention to the text itself.
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It balances the push toward transcendence with a pull toward immanence.
The critic is reminded that the narrative is important for its own sake -
the content is bound up with the form. Furthermore, the quest for the
historical factors which lie behind the text is displaced by the equally
valid quest for the narrative logic within the text. Thus, the rights of
the text itself are defended.
The third member of the triumvirate, meaning as consciousness, is
called in to preserve the rights of the reader. The reader of a biblical
text is not a neutral observer working in a purely scientific manner on an
autonomous object. He is a person fully immersed in a cultural situation.
He has his own concerns and interests in reading the text. The results he
gets will be guided by the questions he asks and the presuppositions he
holds.2® The reader affects the meaning of a text. The text invites a
'practical collaboration' with the reader,2® and the result is that meaning
is seen as the ' coproduction' of both writer and reader.30 But Barthes
overstates the point when he maintains that the reader is the sole master
of meaning.31 Rather, the text may be seen as a source of potential
meaning , while the task of the reader is to construe an actual meaning.
The reader, in addition to guiding the meaning of the text, is himself
directed by the text and its agenda. The message encoded in the text is
armed with rhetorical strategies which aim to persuade the reader. In this
way, interpretation is seen as a debate between text and reader, and
meaning is a result of that debate.
Thus, meaning as consciousness underscores the role of the reader;
meaning as narrative guards the rights of the text; and meaning as
reference recognizes the concerns of the author. Since author, text, and
reader are all essential to the interpretation process, the status of all
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three must be maintained, and this can be achieved by embracing the
threefold conception of meaning - meaning as reference, narrative (text),
and consciousness. This triumvirate of meaning will guide the remainder of
this investigation.
The final segment of our definition of interpretation concerns the
notion of 'text.'32 There is a debate in hermeneutic circles today about
the status of a text. Is it an 'object' or a 'work'?33 As 'object', a
text is seen as a 'thing' in the natural world, something to be analyzed
and explained by means of cause and effect or other appropriate
methodology. As 'work', a text is viewed as a human expression which
mediates a meaning and which beckons for a person to read and understand
it. The text may indeed be both object and work, depending upon one's
perspective, but the preference of this writer is to see it as work. This
choice for text as work accords well with our understanding of meaning as
originated by an author, mediated by a text, and actualized by a reader.
In summary, then, interpretation is regarded as an ongoing process
which involves the contributions of both past and present readers. This
process of expounding is characterized by the dialectical relationship
between explanation and understanding. Expounding the meaning entails a
regard for the contributions of author, reader, and text, A text may be
viewed as an object to be explained, but it must also be seen as a work to
be understood and then interpreted. The next section explores some of the
difficulties of interpreting an ancient text like the Bible.
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SECTION B. THE DIFFICULTY OF INTERPRETING AN ANCIENT TEXT.
In considering the difficulty of interpreting an ancient text, such as
the Bible, it will be helpful to consider the problems of interpreting
texts generally.
Texts are written documents. That seems obvious, yet many biblical
critics have been unaware of the differences between oral communication and
written communication. 1 They have proceeded with the interpretation of a
written document as if they were involved in a dialogue with its author.
The problem with the dialogic model of Romanticist hermeneutics is that the
author is no longer present. He is neither in the text nor with the text.
He has finished his discourse and departed from the scene. The human voice
is silent, and only material marks remain to convey the message. 2 The
author is not available for questioning, as in a live dialogue between two
persons. In oral discourse, the hearer may question the speaker in order
to determine his content and intent. The speaker may reply by using a
number of techniques - amending, supplementing, omitting, elaborating, and
illustrating - in order to clarify his meaning. But these options are not
available for the elucidation of written discourse. The text is a com¬
pleted ' production' . 3 If the author is dead, then the text is an orphan,
with no one to speak up for him and defend his rights and arbitrate the
disputes he engenders. When the reader asks him a question, he just keeps
on giving the same answer. A
In relation to the Pauline corpus in particular,® two points may be
added. CI) The objection may arise here that, though Paul himself is no
longer available for questioning, the question may be answered by reference
to his other epistles. Or, Paul can answer through his other writings.
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This is partially true. For example, the meaning of an obscure word in an
ambiguous context can be sometimes illuminated through a use of that word
in an unambiguous context. But it is also true that cross-referencing
within the corpus can leave the question unanswered or, in some cases, make
matters worse.e On the other hand, seeking answers from elsewhere in the
corpus is not really an appeal to the author himself, for any such query is
addressed to but another orphan text. This process widens the scope of the
problem but does not necessarily solve it. (2) It is possible that the
first recipients of an epistle would have received amplification and clari¬
fication of its contents by the one who delivered the epistle.7 Paul, in
sending the letter by means of a colleague instead of the postal system,
could have instructed his messenger to elaborate on certain points which he
had left enigmatic while writing. If there was indeed some elaboration by
the courier, then this extra information may have been helpful to the first
readers. But, on the other hand, one must reckon with the possibility that
the letter carrier could have forgotten some of Paul's oral instructions or
failed to report them clearly and accurately. In any case, today's reader
has no recourse to such a messenger. He must deal only with the written
text.
A second but related difference between oral and written communication
is in the nature of the medium itself. In oral dialogue, the speaker, in
addition to the words themselves, may employ non-linguistic factors to
assist him in his delivery. Some of these devices include gestures, facial
expressions, tone of voice, and the accentuation and intonation of certain
words to indicate emphasis, irony, humour, etc. The writer, it is true,
can 'add supplementary distinctive signs such as quotation marks,
exclamation marks, and question marks to indicate the physiognomic and
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gestural expressions, which disappear when the speaker becomes a writer.'®
Yet the full force and range of orality can never be transferred to a text.
Something is lost in the transition from oral to written.
In the case of the New Testament writings, though, it must be noted
that none of these 'supplementary distinctive signs' are in the original
text. These are a later invention and were not available to the biblical
authors. Other modern devices such as paragraph divisions, periods, and
spaces between words were not employed in the earliest manuscripts either.
So the inscription of discourse in Hellenistic times was indeed a more
radical transformation than it is today.
A third difference between oral and written communication relates to
the hearer/reader himself.
Human consciousness is structured into thought by avail¬
able forms of communication. Thinking is indebted to
the medium through which knowledge is acquired. The oral
medium, in which words are managed from mouth to ear,
handles information differently from the written medium,
which links the eye to visible but silent letters on
the page.®
Whereas orality often employs 'rhythm, catchword, and succinct phrasing' in
order to maintain the listener's attention and to function as mnemonic
devices, textuality applies a principle of linearity, which serves to
organize the randomness of orality '... by creating the illusion of orderly
succession.'10 So textuality tends to dissipate the power of personal
presence in orality and to substitute instead the logic of linear sequence.
When one considers that in the ancient world there was some suspicion of
things written and that much of the ancient literature was intended to be
read aloud and thus heard by its audience, it becomes apparent that
something is lost by only visualizing the text and contemplating its
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sequence of thought instead of hearing it and feeling its power and
rhythm.11 Martin Luther,12 and more recently Johannes Weiss,13 advocated
the reading aloud of Scripture so that it might be heard in all its aural
force.
But the 'writtenness' of a text is only one area of difficulty in
interpretation. Another area is language. The New Testament was written
in koine Greek, the lingua franca of the first century Greco-Roman world.
The modern day scholar is at a disadvantage here. If he reads a
translation of the New Testament in his first language, then he is already
reading an interpretation and not the text itself. If he learns Greek and
reads it in the original language, then he is one step nearer. But even
then he would not be reading the text as would one whose first language is
Greek. Thus he will not have the fluency of understanding that the authors
and first readers would have had. He will stumble occasionally over the
translation of obscure words, idioms, and constructions. This can be
partially overcome by intensive study of lexicons and grammars, but the
barrier still remains.
A final area of difficulty in interpreting an ancient text is the
problem of distanciation, which refers to "... the actual spatial and
temporal gap between us and the appearance of such and such work of art or
discourse.'1 A There is a cultural gulf between first century Corinth, for
example, and twentieth century Fort Worth. These differences can be
expressed politically, socially, economically, religiously, and in other
categories of analysis. As the modern reader encounters an ancient text,
he may be surprised and perhaps somewhat baffled by some of the customs,
manners, structures, thought forms, and world views of ancient society.
Distanciation refers also to the text as already detached from the
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author and as not yet 'owned' or 'personalized' by the reader.15 The text
is estranged from the reader because of the 'otherness' of the person who
wrote it. He inscribed his ideas using his words in his ways. This
distinctiveness of style and expression is exactly what individualizes and
thereby alienates the text. Furthermore, as a printed text, it has become
a public text. To become meaningful, the process must be reversed. The
publicized text must become privatized or internalized by the reader.
But how is this distanciation to be overcome? It is the work of the
interpreter to deal with this issue. At least three strategies have been
proposed. The Romantic hermeneutic sought to eliminate the distance by
means of a "congenial" coincidence with the "genius" of the author.'15
H.-G. Gadamer, recognizing the difficulty of achieving such an intercourse
of psyches, suggests instead a reduction of the distance by means of a
Horizontverschmelzung, effected by the overlapping of features common to
both the world of the text and the world of the reader.17 Ricoeur proposes
that the interpreter recognize and maintain the distance and then
appropriate it productively.163 Appropriation, then, the making of one's
own that which was once foreign, is the solution for distanciation which
will be employed in this interpretation of 2 Corinthians 3.
In turning now to the difficulty of interpreting 2 Corinthians 3 in
particular, it will be helpful to remember these three areas of difficulty
in the interpretation of ancient texts in general - their writtenness,
language, and distanciation.
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SECTION C. THE DIFFICULTY OF INTERPRETING 2 CORINTHIANS 3.
The document known as 'Saint Paul's Second Epistle to the
Corinthians' is an ancient text that has been preserved and passed down
through the centuries by the Christian church. It was written by the
Apostle Paul in the middle of the first century to the group of Christian
believers known as 'the church of God which is at Corinth' <2 Cor 1. 1).
Why is this document still of interest today? Several reasons may be
cited. It is one of only 27 documents of the early Christian era to be
made canonical by the church, and it is therefore an authoritative document
for its members. As a part of the canonical New Testament, 2 Corinthians
helps to describe the nature of early Christianity and to constitute the
rule by which the orthodox Christian faith was identified. Also this
document contains some information, both explicit and implicit, about the
origin and early development of the church. This information can be useful
in understanding the historical setting of the early church. Finally, this
document is interesting because it reveals much about its author and his
religious experiences, and so it can help to shape one's knowledge and
experience of God today. For these and other reasons, 2 Corinthians in
general (and 2 Corinthians 3 in particular) continues to interest
contemporary readers.
Even though the letter is interesting, it is not easily understood.
The modern reader, even if he is a serious student of the New Testament,
will encounter difficulties in trying to understand this text. In this
section, some problems of interpretation will be mentioned. The chapters
which follow will attempt to elucidate and illuminate the text by
suggesting solutions for the difficulties associated with the text.
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In order to establish a starting point, it is assumed that Paul wrote
2 Corinthians, and that the epistle as it appears today in the Greek New
Testament (Nestle-Aland 26th. ed. ) is a literary unity. This was the view
of all scholars until the eighteenth century, and some still hold to this
position today.1 The date of the writing of 2 Corinthians is not generally
agreed upon, but for this project the date which will be accepted is AD 57,
or approximately six months to a year after the sending of 1 Corinthians.
The place of writing is thought to be somewhere in Macedonia.2
Though there are many valid areas of enquiry into 2 Corinthians 3, the
primary area of difficulty to be discussed in this project is the
linguistic one. Difficulties in this category include lexical, syntac¬
tical, semantic, and contextual problems. The phrase, 'lexical
difficulties', refers to the basic problem of translation - finding
suitable English equivalents for the Greek words in the text. This
suggests that most translating involves one-for-one correspondence,
although the denotations and connotations of a word in one language rarely
overlap exactly with those of its counterpart in another language. Even
so, this is the approach that will be adopted here toward the translating
of 2 Corinthians 3, although there are certain instances in which a single
English word is either inadequate or non-existent for the Greek word in
question. For example, Ctt07ioi£a> (v. 6), is a compound of and rcoi£m.
It is intended to contrast with ocTroxTEfvco, but there is not a suitable
English equivalent. The RSV and NIV render 'gives life'. The Elizabethan
term, ' quickeneth', is a fair translation, though it has fallen out of
current usage. £Qonoxia conveys the idea of calling dead persons to life
or making alive that which was dead.3 'Makes alive' is probably the best
translation, because it is concise. Its brevity, though, axes off part of
16
the meaning. It is situations like this in 2 Corinthians 3 which call for
the work of interpretation, to elucidate further the sense of words which
cannot easily and adequately be translated from Greek into English.
Another type of lexical difficulty is deciding which sense of a word
is intended by the author. Most Greek words have more than one meaning,
and the translator of 2 Corinthians 3 must determine which one of the
possibilities Paul contemplated when he wrote the epistle. It is
conceivable, though, that occasionally more than one sense of a word is
evoked at the same time, or that one sense emerges as primary while others
recede without altogether vanishing.
One such example is 56£oc. Derived from Sox6®, it originally meant
'opinion' and then 'reputation'. By New Testament times it had acquired an
exclusively positive connotation with regard to 'reputation' and could thus
be translated 'honour' or 'praise' or 'fame' or 'renown'.'1 Of objects, it
means 'brilliance' or ' radiance'.E People can also have 56£a in this
sense of 'brightness'. In Matthew 6,29, Solomon's 56£oc suggests the
dazzling splendour of his clothing, wealth, and palace. Some day all
Christians will be gloriously radiant when they appear with Christ before
God ev 56E;t) (Col 3.4). When applied to God, 5o£a evokes notions of his
'glory, majesty, sublimity, power, and might (Rom 6.4>'.e
Now which of these possible meanings does Paul intend as he writes
56£a eleven times in 2 Corinthians 3? Or does he mean more than one, or
even all of them? Surely Schmiedel and Windisch are on the right trail
when they say that 56£a incorporates more than one nuance in this passage.7
2 Corinthians 3 contains, at the very least, allusions to Exodus 34. In
that Old Testament text, it is reported that Moses' face shone when he came
down the hill after talking with God. The radiance of his face is
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generally thought to be a reflection of the brightness of the 66|oc 9so0.
So in 2 Corinthians 3,7, 13, at least the notion of brilliance or radiance
is conveyed. But there is more, Moses' face was shining because he had
been talking with God, Because he had been privileged to talk with God, he
was a man of respect. He became famous. He was an illustrious person. He
was a brilliant lawgiver. He had 56£a. But the source of Moses' So£a was
God and his 56£a. So now the 'divine' aspects of 56|a are summoned into
the connotations of the text. The God of Israel, for Paul, was the most
prestigious of beings, and was not only radiant in appearance but also
majestic and powerful. Bultmann holds that S6£a 9eo0, in Paul, always
refers to the mighty manifestation of the power of God,e Whereas for Old
Testament writers, this 66£a was manifested outwardly, as on the face of
Moses and in the pillar of fire, for Paul it is now manifested in the
weakness of believers, who are being transformed by the power of God.9 So
in this way, the one word 66£oc does not have just one sense, but rather a
wide array of connotations. Paul has supercharged his text with meaning.
A third example is xocTorcxptCm, v. 18. Translators and commentators
alike are divided on the translation of this word.10 All agree that it is
related to xdxoTixpov, a mirror. The problem concerns the verb form. Does
it mean 'to reflect as a mirror does' or 'to behold as in a mirror, to
contemplate'? It is a hapax legomenon in the NT and appears only rarely in
classical and koine texts.
Since there are few parallels and since they are not convincing either
way, one turns next to the context for clues to determine its sense. Sense
contributes to context, and context sometimes determines sense. Thus,
reference to context would ordinarily cause one meaning to appear more
likely than the others. But in this case there are so many problems
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associated with the context and its train of thought that the appeal to
context is not decisive. Here, though, are three of the options.
First, verse 18 may be read in the light of verse 12; 'We are very
bold, not like Moses, who put a veil over his face.' In this case
xoctoTCTpfwould have the sense of 'reflect'. When Moses was veiled (Ex
34. 33-36), he no longer reflected the glory, or, at least, the Israelites
no longer saw the reflected glory. But we Christians do not wear a veil.
We are always reflecting the glory of the Lord. Or, rather, since we are
not veiled, anyone can look and see the glory of the Lord which we are
reflecting. This interpretation is consistent with Paul's contrasting of
the two ministries in verses 7-11. But it puts Moses in a bad light, which
is not at all the emphasis of the Exodus text. To hold to this positon,
one must, along with Paul, re-interpret (or mis-interpret?) the underlying
Pentateuchal passage.
Second, verse 18 may be interpreted with respect to verse 16: 'But
when a man turns to the Lord the veil is removed.' There is debate as to
who is the subject of the verb eicicrTp^cpsiv. But it is not totally
unreasonable to view Moses as the subject, or at least as the prototype of
whomever the subject might be. According to Exodus 34.34, 'whenever Moses
went in before the Lord to speak with him, he took the veil off, until he
came out.' Moses always wears a veil outside the holy tent. But whenever
he is inside talking with the Lord ('face to face', Ex 33.11), he removes
the veil and thus can 'behold' the Lord. In this case, the Christian is
compared, not contrasted, with Moses. When the Christian turns to the
Lord, the veil is removed, and he beholds the Lord, face to face, just as
Moses did. This view accords well with the following section (2 Cor 4.1-
6), which talks about Christians seeing the glory of God. But such a
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favourable comparison of Moses with the apostle is quite out of character
with the polemical tones of chapter 3, in which the two ministries are set
in opposition to each other.
A third option is to link verse 18 with verse 15: 'Yes, to this day
whenever Moses is read a veil lies over their minds.' In this situation,
xaxonxptC© would again be translated 'behold'. The believing Christian is
contrasted with unbelieving Israel, The Christian reads the scriptures.
He sees Christ in them. He trusts in Christ. The veil of darkness and
unbelief is lifted. He now can see the S6£a xupiou. But the unbelieving
Israelites are blinded and hardened. They are unable to see Moses speaking
of Christ. They are unwilling to believe in Jesus as messiah. They are
veiled. This approach is agreeable with the polemical cast of the
preceding verses. But it requires xuptoq to be understood as 'Christ'
instead of 'Yahweh'. Such a translation is not impossible, but a number of
weighty objections have been raised against it, not least of which is that
56£a xopfou (v. 18) is parallel to xfjq 56£qq xoO 0eoO (4.6).
So there are lexical difficulties with xaxorcxpi £<», no matter which way
one turns. This illustrates the problem of trying to clarify the meaning
of a word with reference to its context. In order for this procedure to
work successfully, a rather clear context is required. But in the case of
2 Corinthians 3 there are several contexts to choose from and there are
different ways to interpret the thrust of the chapter. The solution
proposed here is to accept the ambiguity of xcxxoTtxpiCm and translate it as
'behold/reflect'.
A second type of linguistic difficulty is syntactical. This concerns
mainly the structure of sentences and the function of their various parts.
For example, in 2 Corinthians 3.1, does the adverb TidtXxv modify'apx6p.e6a or
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CTuviatdcverv? Should It be translated, 'Are we again beginning to commend
ourselves' or 'Are we beginning to commend ourselves again?' According to
the former, which is generally accepted, to commend one's self is regarded
as an unsavoury practice in which Paul would not participate. Paul's
remarks may be construed by some as the commencement of another boast,
Paul fears that his detractors in Corinth may raise this charge against
him, so he defuses them before they have a chance,11 In favour of the
latter translation, Hickling suggests that Paul thinks the situation in
Corinth may have deteriorated so badly that it is time to start all over
again. He and the Corinthians have become as strangers and need to be re¬
introduced and get re-acquainted with each other.12 Perhaps it makes
little or no difference,13 but a sensitivity to the slight variation of
emphasis may affect one's interpretation of Paul's argument in the chapter.
It might also point to underlying tensions in the relationship between Paul
and the Corinthians.
The appearance of <pocvepoupevov (v.3), a passive participle, is also
somewhat puzzling. What is its antecedent and how does it function? It is
not abundantly clear why it is present in the sentence nor why a finite
verb was not used instead. Also in verse 3 there is the troublesome triple
dative nXa^iv xocpStaxq aapxtvcnq, which has evoked more than once the
suggestion that a glossator has been at work here,1*
One wonders further whether ToiauTqv <v.4) points back to the
preceding paragraph (vv.1-3) or to the remainder of the paragraph at hand
(vv.4-6). Also, the noun that goes with ■ypftppoetoq and rcveupocxoc; in v. 6 is
not certain. Is it 5iocx6vou<;1 s or 5ia8fjxqq1e?
And finally, verse 18 is a long and bulky sentence, with a rather
awkward structure and word order. It also contains a curious construction
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in xr}v ccuxfjv sxxbva pExapopcpoupsSa, a passive verb apparently linked with
an accusative. A construction such as pexapopcpobpsSa siq xf|v auxf|v exxbva
would have made a much more natural reading, and would have made this
clause parallel in construction to similar clauses in Philo (for example,
p.sxajj.opq>oup.evoc, ei<; 7rpo(p^xr)v, De Vita Mosis, Book I, paragraph 57).
A careful investigation of these and other syntactical difficulties is
an important part of the interpretation of the chapter. Some of these
problems, though, just cannot be resolved to the satisfaction of everyone.
A third area of linguistic difficulty is semantics. Semantics, the
science of sentences, is to be distinguished from semiotics, the science of
signs, a distinction noted by Saussure and endorsed by Ricoeur.17 Even if
all of the lexical difficulties noted above could be resolved with
certainty, the reader would still not necessarily have perfect
understanding of the text. For meaning is conveyed primarily by sentences,
not by signs or words. One may know all the definitions of all the words
in the dictionary, yet still not grasp the meaning of a text.1® Even
though a sentence is composed of words, its meaning is not simply the sum
total of the definitions of the words it contains. The meaning of a
sentence cannot be analyzed into the meaning of its constituent parts.
Rather, it is a construct or synthesis, in which both the sense and the
function of the words are integrated into an irreducible whole. Semiotics,
the science of signs, is only partially effective in helping the reader to
grasp the meaning of a sentence.1®
For example, when Paul uses metaphors, the meaning may not be clear
initially. 'You are our letter' (v. 2) is one example of metaphor from 2
Corinthians 3. One may know the definitions of all the words in this
sentence and still not understand the sentence. The same is true of xf|v
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56£otv toO rcpoadmoo (v. 7) and xdXojipa eni tf|v xapSiav ocotgW xstxai (v. 15).
Paul Is not using language in its ordinary descriptive sense. He has
become 'a kind of poet',20 using language artistically to verbalize reality
and convey truth. Such statements cannot be verified empirically, but they
may still be true nonetheless. Metaphorical statements are examples of
expressive or depth language, as opposed to descriptive language.
Metaphors, though different from ordinary or literal language, nevertheless
'really mean something, make a kind of transsubjective reference.'21 To
understand 2 Corinthians 3 one must be able to identify metaphors and other
figures of speech. Having recognized Paul's metaphors, it then becomes
necessary to investigate what they signify and to what they refer. Is Paul
merely ornamenting speech which could otherwise state plainly the nature of
religious realities? Or is he conveying truth which can only be expressed
metaphorically? These are but some of the questions about semantics which
arise in an attempt to explain fully the meaning of 2 Corinthians 3. The
work of Ricoeur, along with others, will be utilized to formulate
understandings of language which may begin to answer these questions.
The final aspect of linguistic difficulty relates to the contextual
problem. The issue here is primarily a literary one. What are the proper
limits of the literary unit in which 2 Corinthians 3 appears? The
following suggestions have been offered. H6ring treats the entire chapter
as a literary unit. Barrett marks off 3.4-18 as a section. Bultmann
treats 3.7-18 as a unit; Bachmann, 3.4 - 4.6; Furnish, 3.7 - 4.6; and
Hughes, 3.12 - 4.6. This diversity is an early indicator of the difficulty
of the structure and the sequence of thought in the passage.22
Following Stephanus, Hiring, and Hickling.the decision has been made
to consider 3. 1-18 as a unit for consideration in this dissertation. The
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other commentators are certainly correct to notice that chapter 3 is
related very closely to the end of chapter 2 and the beginning of chapter
4. But to take chapter 3 as a whole does provide an appropriate beginning
and ending, as well as furnishing ample material for applying Ricoeur's
interpretation theory. Other Pauline writings will be surveyed, though, as
needed.
In reading through 2 Corinthians 3, one is struck by the diverse
concatenation of images which Paul has assembled.2:3 He begins by
discussing letters of recommendation, proceeds to distinguish between two
covenants, then contrasts two types of ministry, develops a metaphorical
and allegorical interpretation of the veil of Moses, and concludes by
affirming a glorious transformation for Christians. What is the point of
this metaphoric 'montage'?3'4 What is the train of thought which leads Paul
from the beginning to the end of this block?
Hans Windisch first proposed the midrashic nature of chapter 3 in
1924.35 He called it a Christian midrash on Exodus 34 and suggested that
it could be removed without any damage to the apostle's argument in this
section. Schulz and Georgi, among others, have modified and expanded
Windisch's initial proposal.3e They see in the passage a midrash
originally composed by Paul's opponents in Corinth. Paul got hold of it,
expanded and corrected it and then sent it back. His revised version is
approximately what appears in the epistle today. Some contemporary
scholars, including Dunn, Hanson, and Fitzmyer, accept the general notion
that 2 Corinthians 3 is a Pauline midrash on Exodus 34, though they may
disagree on some particular points.
For example, Fitzmyer, calling 3.7-18 "... one of the few passages in
the New Testament which is clearly midrashic,' sees the text proceeding on
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the basis of a running commentary on Exodus 34 with allusions to other Old
Testament passages as well.27. The key to understanding this text is to
recognize the rabbinic mode of argumentation which Paul uses here:
What is operative here... is the free association of
ideas which runs throughout the entire passage. The
association is caused by catchword bonding, in which
one sense of a term suggests another, and so the
argument proceeds.213
According to Fitzmyer, there are six key words which form the basis for the
flow of thought in this passage: ^miaToXf), -yp&ppa, 56£oc, Siaxovta,
x&Xuppa, MwiioTjc;. Each of these terms occurs in the text with a certain
meaning which then suggests another possible meaning and finally gives rise
to a related theme. So rather than rigourously exegeting a given Old
Testament passage, Paul, by means of a play on words, is instead com¬
posing a text of his own.2S>
Another variation on the midrash theory is proposed by Young and
Ford, who employ rhetorical criticism in order to find a basis for the
structure.30 They defend the integrity of the epistle as a whole. They
contend that it is a literary unity and that it is in the genre of an
apologetic epistle. They note that the organization of 2 Corinthians
corresponds closely to the structure of an apologetic epistle of
Demosthenes.
The model apology, as discussed by the ancient rhetoricians, would
have consisted of an introduction, narrative, proofs, and peroration.
While Young and Ford do not present an outline of the rhetorical structure
of 2 Corinthians, it would probably look like this, based on the comments
and suggestions they do make:
I, Introduction (1.1-7),
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II. Body, consisting of narrative and proofs
mingled together (1.8-9.15).
III. Peroration (10.1-13.14).
Next they identify the Paul's purposes in writing the epistle.31
... Paul's fundamental intention... Cis! ... to persuade
the Corinthians that their doubts about him are unfound¬
ed, that he really is an apostle called by God, and that
their reaction to him is of life and death significance.
The whole epistle, then, and each of its parts relates to this apologetic
motif. Chapter 3, then, is indeed a midrash but a midrash with a
rhetorical purpose. It was not conceived independently of its epistolary
context and then conveniently slotted in here later. Rather, Young and
Ford maintain that Paul constructed it quite self-consciously in order to
vindicate the greater glory of his covenant and ministry.
The midrash is about Paul's ministry, but it is also
about the mutual dependence of the apostle and the
community he addresses, and the dangers of not re¬
sponding to his appeal.3e
The train of thought, then, in 2 Corinthians 3 is not guided so much by
'linear logic' as by an 'explanatory progression' of points related to his
apology.33 As Paul lays out his case for the defence, he puts forth
several ideas in a loosely connected arrangement, which becomes apparent
when each part is related to the overall purpose which is guiding the
structure of the letter. Chapter 3, then, is Paul's attempt to develop
some ideas which form part of the 'proofs' section of the apologetic
epistle.
Opposing Windisch's thesis of the midrashic nature of 2 Corinthians 3
is Furnish.He rejects two of Windisch's notions: (1) that 3.7-18 is a
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Christian midrash; and (2) that 3.7-18 is a passage that is not connected
to its context and can be removed without endangering the force and flow of
Paul's argument. Furnish believes that in 2 Corinthians 3 Paul is not
interpreting Exodus 34, but rather he is 'appealing'3S to the OT passage to
support his own argument. This explains why Paul is selective in his use
of citations from the Old Testament text and why he is rather free in his
application of them to his present situation. 'It is not the story in
Exodus 34 but his own remarks in 2.16b - 3.6 that are the focus of Paul's
attention in vv. 7-11.'36 Furnish proceeds to demonstrate that the purpose
of 2 Corinthians 3.7-11, far from being a Christian midrash on Exodus 34,
is rather to illustrate and expound Paul's conviction that "... the
ministry of the new covenant is superior to that of the old.'3:7 The
following verses, developing other motifs found in Exodus 34, further
assist Paul to affirm the sincerity and validity of his apostolic ministry.
The chapter concludes with 'the grand affirmation of 3.18 in which all the
themes of 3.7-17 are impressively integrated.'33 By following 'the
internal development of the argument' and 'without resorting to any of the
special hypotheses', Furnish attempts to make sense of the train of thought
in 2.14 - 4.6.33 His conclusion is:
The passage as it stands, interpreted with reference to
its own context - as an exposition of the new covenant
(v.6) - and with reference to Paul's thought generally,
yields a completely plausible meaning.AO
Furnish has developed a cogent alternative to the Windisch-Schulz-Georgi
hypothesis, and he has shown how Paul could have composed this chapter on
his own initiative. But he has failed to account for the midrashic
elements in the text and for the remarkable similarity of 2 Corinthians 3
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and Exodus 34. Furthermore, it appears that he has collapsed two positions
into one, in that he appears to be arguing at the same time against both
the midrashic theory and against the pre-Pauline tradition theory. It
could be, however, a reasonable and coherent view to accept that Paul
composed the passage and that he utilized midrashic methods to do so. That
he 'appealed' to it in support of his own individual argument does not
preclude the possibility that, in appealing to it, he employed midrashic
procedures to enable him to apply it most effectively to his case.
Another alternative to the midrash theory of 2 Corinthians 3 is of¬
fered by Lambrecht. A1 His thesis is that the passage exhibits a cyclic or
concentric pattern of argument, rather than a linear train of thought.
This section should not be viewed as one tightly knit argument which pro¬
ceeds from verse to verse by means of strict logical syllogism or the even
looser method of rabbinic argumentation. Rather, Paul introduces a theme,
then he develops a second, and finally he returns to the first, though
restating it in different language. So if one reads 2 Corinthians 3 as a
straightline argument, the passage will appear to be incoherent, containing
non sequiturs.A2 But according to Lambrecht, the key to understanding 2
Corinthians 3 is to be aware of its cyclical structure, which proceeds
along the pattern of an A - B - A' style. By doing so, the structure and
unity of the section becomes apparent.
According to Lambrecht, Paul's purpose is to defend his apostleship.
The cyclical structure of his defence proceeds thus:
A - Christian Ministry 2.14-3.6
B - The Two Ministries 3.7-18
A'- Christian Ministry 4.1-6.
Within these three divisions Lambrecht detects further subdivisions which
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also exhibit a. cyclical pattern. He then goes into great detail to
demonstrate this structure. The weakness in Lambrecht's proposal is that
it is unlikely that Paul would have developed such an intricate pattern
before writing his letter. But the more important point to note here is
that Lambrecht believes this passage (2.14 - 4,6) is a unity, and that this
unity is based on a common theme, Paul's defence of his apostolate, which
recurs throughout the section. Viewed in this way, the central section,
3.7-18, is an integral component of the passage. Thus the passage exhibits
a unity of theme rather than a linear unity based on a series of
propositions that follow in logical order. The immediate value of
Lambrecht's contribution is the freshness of his approach. It affirms the
thematic unity of the passage by means other than a strictly straight line
progression of thought.
Three options have now been presented which attempt to explain the
sequence of thought in 2 Corinthians 3:
1. It is a Christian midrash on Exodus 34 (Windisch).
2. It is not a midrash, but it is an argument which
leads to a conclusion (Furnish).
3. The structure is cyclical or concentric (Lambrecht).
There is indeed a 'conflict of interpretations' at work here.43 While it
may be impossible to decide which one is right or superior, it is possible
to note here that it is the text itself which gives rise to these many
suggestions. It is true that each scholar brings his own interests to the
text and that this in some measure influences what he finds there. Yet it
is the text which provides the raw material for his analysis and the
constraints which limit and guide what he can reasonably conclude. It is
also true that as each scholar brings different methods (historical,
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literary, rhetorical) to his study of the text he will thereby draw
different conclusions.
It is not surprising that there is no widespread agreement about what
is going on in 2 Corinthians 3 and that new suggestions are constantly
being proposed. This is a difficult text. It has been variously described
as 'complicated','exceedingly complex',and 'unsystematic and
spontaneous'.,ae Furthermore, it is not unusual to find an occasional
excursus in Paul's epistles.'17' To compound this, the text of 2
Corinthians reveals the presence of 'Wucherungen, Interpretamente,
Verdeut1ichungen, und Uberladungen'.48 So it is not surprising that this
passage yields so many interpretative options. What kind of a text is it
that can give rise to such differing theories? One answer is that it is a
text full of metaphor and images, a text that is loaded with potential
meaning and interpretative possibilities. There is no need at this point
to declare that one interpretation is correct and to reject all the rest.
Rather, the present writer will draw water from all of these wells in order
to spell out a fuller meaning or offer a possibly fuller reading of the
text. In this way, the problems of interpretation become opportunities for
new insight.
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SECTION D. A NEW PROPOSAL.
As noted in the previous section, there are a good many unresolved
difficulties relating to the interpretation of 2 Corinthians 3. This in
itself is sufficient reason to justify yet another attempt. But there are
other reasons also. There are new methods to be applied and new questions
to be asked. Since the possibility of new and valid interpretations always
exists, it is worthwhile to initiate a new interpretative effort.
Most of the recent work on 2 Corinthians 3 has been dominated by one
of these three concerns: general exegesis,1 as part of a larger commentary
on the epistle; the structure or sequence of thought in the chapter; 2 or,
the opponents of Paul in Corinth. 3 There has been little work done that
takes notice of current developments in literary criticism, hermeneutical
theory, and linguistic analysis.A These are the primary concerns of this
present writing.
First of all, this dissertation is not meant to be a commentary. It
does not go into introductory questions of date, integrity, and occasion
with which the standard commentaries are engaged. It does not outline the
epistle as a whole nor chapter 3 in particular. Nor does it discuss every
word and every verse in order. The interest here is rather (1) with the
text of 2 Corinthians 3 and the picture it depicts and also (2) with only
some of the key words which appear therein.
Secondly, this interpretative attempt is not overly concerned with
the psychologizing approach, advocated by Schleiermacher. For him, the aim
of hermeneutics is '... the reconstruction of the mental experience of the
text's author,'6 and to achieve this the interpreter tries to re-enact or
re-experience the creative processes and peculiar genius of the author.'5
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The strength of Schleiermacher's method is that it regards the text as a
work, a human production, and it recognizes the importance of the author's
personality and historical situation for the production of meaning. Its
weakness is that it overlooks the fact that, if interpretation is to be
modelled as dialogue, then it is a dialogue with the text and not with the
author of the text. As noted earlier, when Paul died, his writings became
orphans. Dialogue with Paul is no longer possible, and access to the mind
of Paul is restricted to a consideration of his epistles. The concern in
this present work is not recovering the mind of an author, Paul, but rather
with discovering the meaning and significance of a text, 2 Corinthians 3.
The concern is less about what went on in the mind of Paul that caused him
to write as he did than with what he actually produced, the text which lies
before the reader. To investigate the mind of Paul and his train (or
'cycle'> of thought is a valid endeavour, but it is not the endeavour
contemplated here.
Finally, the problem of historical reconstruction is also a valid
endeavour, but it too lies outwith the scope of this work. Scholars who
are Interested in historical reconstruction view interpretation as a
treasure hunt. They search through the text for clues to lead them to the
buried riches, that is, 'what really happened'. In this way, the text is
less a passageway into the mind of the author than a window through which
one can see the past. Scholars using the text in this way reconstruct the
chain of events that transpired long ago which caused Paul to write 2
Corinthians. They discover the identity and theology of the opponents
against whom Paul was polemicizing.7 These attempts are, of course,
legitimate, but they are of secondary importance in this dissertation.
All of the endeavours mentioned above can be worthwhile and fruitful.
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But they are not the primary pursuits of the present writer, whose interest
is rather in examining and applying the interpretation theory of P.
Ricoeur. Ricoeur has written extensively on the subjects of interpretation
and hermeneutical theory. ® He has also written on the theory of biblical
interpretation, implying that his work is as applicable to biblical as it
is to other types of literature.® The purpose of this dissertation is to
expound the theory of interpretation proposed by Ricouer; to examine it by
referring to others who have offered critiques; to apply it to a particular
text, 2 Corinthians 3; and then to appraise the results.
As the attempt at interpretation begins, two questions emerge which
will guide the investigation. The first is: 'What is there about 2
Corinthians 3 which makes it meaningful and significant for the
contemporary reader?' Or, 'Why and how is 2 Corinthians 3 a meaningful and
significant text for the contemporary reader?' A discussion of this
question will form the focal point of Chapter Two. The discussion will be
guided by Ricoeur's notion of the 'world of the text.' This aspect of
Ricoeur's theory has been chosen because it takes special notice of the
hermeneutical problems associated with the writing and reading of texts. 2
Corinthians was written by Paul in the first century to the Christian
congregation at Corinth. This letter was specifically addressed to first
century Corinthians. But it has been read and used by Christians of other
times and places as if it had been addressed to themselves. Why is it
valid to read someone else's mail? How can one justify using in one
situation a document which was intended for another? By means of his
notion of the 'world of the text', Ricoeur has aimed at providing a
validation for this process of appropriating a biblical text by an audience
other than the original one. To support his theory at this point, he
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develops the concepts of the autonomy of the text, distanciation,
appropriation, decontextualization, and recontextualization. These
concepts will be explored in Chapter Two as the notion of the 'world of the
text' is expounded. This is followed by an investigation of the 'world' of
2 Corinthians 3 and the roles and relationships of three of its primary
characters: God, Paul, and the Corinthian church.
The second question which will guide the investigation is this: 'What
is the meaning of the language that Paul used to describe his relationship
with God?' It is immediately apparent that his language is religious in
that it is concerned with God and his dealings with man. It is also
figurative in that a literal interpretation is unacceptable. It is also
conditioned in that it is directly related to the social and cultural
conventions of the times. Above all, Paul's language abounds with
metaphor. Metaphor is an appropriate means of talking about God, and
Ricoeur's theory is a valid way of interpreting the cognitive content of
metaphor. In Chapter Three, Ricoeur's theory of metaphor will be
presented, critically examined, and then applied to the interpretation of




CHAPTER TWO. 2 CORINTHIANS 3 AND THE WORLD OF THE TEXT.
SECTION A. PAUL RICOEUR AND THE WORLD OF THE TEXT.
In the writings of Ricoeur, the relationships between the world and
the text are expressed in three different phrases: 'the world of the
text', 'the world behind the text', and 'the world before the text'. In
this section, these relationships will be discussed by comparison and
contrast with each other. In the next section, the notion of 'the world of
the text' will be applied to the interpretation of 2 Corinthians 3. This
application will proceed by examining the roles and the relations of three
actors - God, Paul, and the Corinthians - who inhabit the 'world' of that
text.
In order to understand the relationship between world and text, it
will be helpful to see the different ways in which these words are used.
Ricoeur employs the word 'world' in several different senses. In the first
case, it means simply the universe or, more particularly, the earth, as an
empirical object: 'But the very meaning of this truth-claim is itself
measured by the limiting network which rules conventional descriptions of
the world.'1 In this passage, 'world' refers to planet earth in its
objectivity, something to be analyzed and quantified. This usage is
neither common nor significant in the writings of Ricoeur.
A slightly different sense of the word occurs in these two
representative passages from Fallible Man. 'My body [is] an originating
mediator between myself and the world' ; and "... the whole movement of
objectification tends to set a world over against me...'.2 Here 'world'
includes both earth and the things upon the earth, with the greater
emphasis upon the latter. World here is something like the bundle of
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materiality which man encounters in his daily existence.
A third meaning of 'world' contains both senses mentioned above along
with the added notion of 'humanity'. This more inclusive usage also occurs
in Fallible Man. 'The ethical vision of the world lis! our continual
effort to understand freedom and evil by each other'.3 There is a major
transition here, though, because world as planet earth and world as a
collage of physical objects recede in importance and the human factor comes
to the fore. World here is not just a physical environment but a
distinctly human and personal environment. In speaking of 'freedom and
evil', one might think that Ricoeur is using 'world' exclusively as a
synonym for 'humanity', but this is not quite the case, because for him the
appearance, experience, and description of evil is to some extent mediated
by the natural world. This is the most inclusive meaning of 'world' to be
found in the writings of Ricoeur, and it occurs more often than the first
two.
'World' can also denote 'mankind' or a 'particular part of mankind'.
In this respect, Ricoeur refers to the English-speaking people as a subset
of humanity: 'This displacement has been completely misunderstood by those
so-called existentialist interpretations of Heidegger that have especially
flourished in the Anglo-Saxon world. ' ■"■ In this case, 'world' has both an
anthropological and a geographical reference, denoting the men who have an
opinion and the place where that opinion is held.
The final and most significant sense of 'world' for Ricoeur is that of
'the arena of human experience'. Such usage also occurs among the ordinary
men in the street when, for example, one asks, 'What's new in your little
world?', which is roughly equivalent to, 'How are you doing today?' The
concept that immediate human experience can constitute and be called a
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'world' is a basic presupposition in the interpretation theory of Ricoeur.
Consider the following excerpt:
If language is closed in upon itself, discourse is open
and turned toward a world which it wishes to express and
to convey in language. If this general hypothesis holds
and is significant, the ultimate problem raised by meta¬
phor is to know in what respects the transposition of
of meaning which defines it contributes to the articula¬
tion of experience, to the forming of the world.®
It is clear from this passage that 'world' no longer refers to any
objective realities 'out there' in the world but rather to the composite
structure of one's encounters with such realities. This can be seen in
several phrases. 'To express' a world is a self-conscious attempt to speak
about one's experience of reality. This is different from 'describing' an
object, which is rather an attempt to talk about that which is 'out there'.
To be sure, description is affected by one's perception, which is itself an
experience. Still, the distinction can be and must be maintained between
an intention to talk about an object and an intention to talk about my
experience of that object. In passages like the one quoted above, Ricoeur
is aware of such a distinction and is defending it. Also, it is important
to notice that the phrase 'a world ... to express' is closely paralleled by
the apposite phrases, 'the articulation of experience' and 'the forming of
the world'. The world to be expressed, for Ricoeur, is just that
continuous stream of immediate experience which calls for an articulation.
It is by articulating experience that one forms a world. In this sense,
the world is bounded by the horizon of one's experiences of it and by one's
ability to speak about these experiences. In the context of the above
citation, Ricoeur is eager to prove that metaphor provides a tool with
which to formulate language about experience and reality. But, whether the
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language is literal, metaphorical, or conceptual, underlying this
discussion about metaphor is the presupposition that 'world' is formed
linguistically, by the competence to generate an articulate and
intelligible discourse about experience.
This use of 'world' as 'arena of human experience' is the most common
and characteristic for Ricoeur. Its meaning is further elucidated by
another quotation from his writings.
For me, the world is the ensemble of references opened
up by every kind of text, descriptive or poetic, that I
have read, understood, and loved. And to understand a
text is to interpolate among the predicates of our
situation all the significations that make a Welt out
of our Umwelt. It is this enlarging of our horizon of
existence that permits us to speak of the references
opened up by the text or of the world opened up by the
referential claims of most texts.e
The world, for Ricoeur, is no longer an Umwelt, a milieu composed of things
and persons around him. Nor is it simply a Lebenswelt, 'the prereflective
world of lived experience'.7 Rather, the world has now become a Welt, an
'ensemble of references', surrounding him and integrated into his
existence. World, in this sense of 'horizon of existence', is closely
related to language and text, because, for Ricoeur, it is through the
interpretation of texts that one's horizons are expanded and one's
orientation toward life is examined and perhaps altered.
Ricoeur should not be accused of linguistic solipsism though. He is
not asserting that language is everything nor that nothing exists outside
of language. Examples cited above of his other uses of 'world' are
sufficient to discharge that claim. Furthermore, the notion of 'extra-
linguistic reality' is explicitly endorsed in the paragraph cited below:
This origin of the text in discourse must be re-
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called because it is discourse which simultaneously
raises the question of the reference forward to an
extra-linguistic reality, the reference backward to a
speaker, and the communication with an audience, Lan¬
guage or discourse has a speaker, a world, and a vis-
d-vis. These three traits together constitute dis¬
course as an 'event' in a threefold sense: the speak¬
er is brought to language; a dimension of the world
is brought to language; and a dialogue between human
beings is brought to language.®
'World', as used here in its most characteristic Ricoeurian sense, makes
clear that Ricoeur acknowledges the existence of reality outside of
language. World is distinct from and other than language. But Ricoeur's
primary concern is with an understanding of experience as it is articulated
inside the horizon of language. For him language is a mediation between
lived experience and reflection on that experience. Thus the under¬
standing of existence '... is always understanding through language'.3
Another line of defence against falling into a linguistic solipsism is
provided by Ricoeur's appropriation of Frege's distinction between sense
and reference.10 Frege wrote that one is not content to know the sense of
discourse, that is, what it says. One is compelled also to know the
reference, that about which the discourse is speaking. Language as system,
as langue, refers only to other entities in the system. But language as
discourse, as parole, breaks out of the system. It says something about
reality, about something in the world. Ricoeur points out some of the
consequences of this distinction:
But the dialectic of sense and reference is so
original that it can be taken as an independent guide¬
line. Only this dialectic says something about the re¬
lation between language and the ontological condition
of being in the world. Language is not a world of its
own. It is not even a world. But because we are in
the world, because we are affected by situations, and
because we orient ourselves comprehensively in those
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situations, we have something to say, we have experi¬
ence to bring to language.11
By emphasizing and taking seriously the distinction between sense and
reference, Ricoeur avoids the position of those structuralists, who find in
language 'the absoluteness of a closed system'.12 As noted earlier,
language can label the world and can even lead one to discover new aspects
of the world. But language, as Ricoeur states above, is not the world nor
does it create the world, though it is the means whereby existence in the
world is articulated.
Having seen the range of senses in which Ricoeur uses the word
'world', it is now possible to explore briefly its particular meaning in
the phrase, 'the world of the text.' In this metaphorical expression,
'world' does not at all mean the earth, the physical environment, humanity,
or even any combination or composite of these. 'It is not therefore the
ordinary world of everyday language.'13 It relates most closely to the
fifth meaning mentioned above, 'the arena of human experience,' though in a
modified way, for it refers to possibilities of human experience proposed
by a text based on the actualities of human experience in the past as
described in that text. The world, in 'the world of the text', is a
potential world, the way in which life could (and, according to the text,
should) be oriented. This will stand as a provisional meaning, for, before
more progress can be made, it is necessary to look at 'text'.
What is a text? This question forms the title of an essay written by
Ricoeur in 1971, 'Let us call a text every utterance or set of utterances
fixed by writing. 11/3 This definition presumes that a text was first a
speech, if only potentially. The psychological and sociological priority
of speech to writing is not doubted. But, whether or not the text was
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actually spoken before it was written, it is a message which under dif¬
ferent circumstances would have been spoken but which was written because
it could not have been delivered orally. 'One writes precisely because one
does not speak.'1® That is certainly the case with 2 Corinthians. The
reader feels the urgency in the text and senses that the author would have
preferred to deliver his discourse in person. Since that was not possible,
it was written instead. It is this fixation in writing that gives birth to
a text.1e
It is significant that Ricoeur calls a text 'an utterance fixed by
writing' or 'an instance of discourse'.1'7 A text is a discourse or
message, but 'it is not an instance of dialogue',1® because "... dialogue
is a world consisting of two persons' talking to each other.19 Reading a
text is not a conversation between two or more parties. Reading is not
analogous to speaking. Reading is not an example of asking a question and
receiving a reply, because the writtenness of a text introduces a
disjunction into the dialogical model. 'The reader is absent from the
writing of the book, the writer is absent from its reading.'20 The reader
is unable to question the writer, and the writer is unable to answer. The
text, then, is discourse in that it is the record of the message of the
author. But it is not dialogue, because it is a not an instance of a two-
person communication.
The distinction between discourse and dialogue is basic to Ricoeur's
theory of the text. The radicality of the disjunction of text from living
speech is basic to all of his subsequent theorems, including autonomy of
the text, distanciation, double-reference, and appropriation. This will
become clearer as these topics are discussed later. For now, though, it is
sufficient to mark the distinction.
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Having clarified Ricoeur's use of 'world' and 'text', it is possible
to discuss the relationship between the two. The 'world behind the text'
refers to the situation of the composition of the text. It includes the
author, his intention, his biography, and his genius. It also includes the
original addressees, their relationship (if any) with the author, and the
way that they would have understood the text. The world behind the text is
pursued by scholars working with the historical-critical method. They seek
to reconstruct this world. One disadvantage of this method is the
possibility of falling into 'the trap of circularity: the text is used to
reconstruct the situation and then the situation is used to interpret the
text.'21 Though Ricoeur generally has an anti-historicist orientation, he
does not dispense with the necessity of doing basic historical-critical
work,22 But he maintains that this is preparatory to interpretation, not
interpretation itself. He wants to go on from explanation to
appropriation, which occurs in the 'world in front of the text.'
The world in front of, or before, the text is the world of the reader.
It is the place in which real people perform real actions. It is whither
the text projects its meaning. The world of the text has '... a sort of
transcendence within immanence that is precisely what allows for the
confrontation with the world of the reader.'23 It is in the world in front
of the text that the reader actualizes the potential meaning of the text by
applying it to his situation. This is what Ricoeur means by interpolating
the significance of the text into one's own world. If the world behind the
text is related to the initial stages of interpretation, then the world
before the text is linked to the final stages of interpretation. In
between one finds the world of the text, the central category of Ricoeur's
hermeneutics.
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'The world of the text' Is an example of two big words 'coagulating'
to form a single phrase.2A The meaning of the phrase is related to the
denotations of the words within it, but it is not simply the sum of these
senses. This phrase, or its equivalents, occurs repeatedly in Ricoeur's
writing on language, and is rightly called a 'key concept' in his theory of
interpretation.25 It suggests that not only the author and the reader have
a world, but that the text has one also. This is a little shocking at
first, because the primary sense of world for Ricoeur is 'horizon of
experience', something related directly to the concept of living persons,
not to inanimate objects such as texts. The shock may be ameliorated by
remembering the preliminary proposal that 'the world of the text' relates
to a proposal for human existence and not to a description of human
existence.
The task of understanding the meaning of the phrase, 'the world of the
text', is the challenge of grasping the meaning of these words when they
are used in a metaphorical expression such as this. Because this phrase is
an amalgamation, the senses of its components are intertwined and the
overall meaning is thick. In order to gain an understanding, the phrase
will be examined as it appears in several contexts. In this way, perhaps
the sediment will settle to the bottom, and the solution itself will become
more lucid.
Hermeneutics, for Ricoeur, is little concerned with discovering the
intention of the author or re-experiencing his creative genius. In fact,
it is not much concerned with understanding others at all. Rather,
following Heidegger, Ricoeur sees the aim of hermeneutics as helping the
reader to understand himself: '... the text is the mediation by which we
understand ourselves, '25 Ricoeur's programme is designed not to recover
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meaning in its original milieu but to provide a rational clarification
of human existence in the world.'27 So then what is to be interpreted is
not the author, his mind or intention, or his cultural or historical
situation. These factors, along with all the other data connected with the
writing of the text, constitute the 'world behind the text'. That world
is, to a large degree, inaccessible and irretrievable. Even if it were
recoverable, it would be mostly irrelevant to the contemporary reader.
Ricoeur's method of interpretation is not primarily concerned with such
historical and psychological issues. Any such information arising during
the course of one's investigation of a text would be regarded only as a
contribution toward interpretation and not as the goal of interpretation.
The text, the kind of classic text with which Ricoeur is dealing, is
concerned with more than a description of the everyday world of ordinary
language. Such texts have more than a literal or first order reference.
Their concern is greater than the particular historical situations in which
they are written. These classic texts of the past, including the Bible,
operate with a second order reference, that is, a ' non-situational
reference' which outlives and outdistances its original setting.20 They
present a discourse with a 'non-ostensive reference',23 a message which is
not bound by spatio-temporal limitations. They talk about the world not
only as it is but as it could be. When properly understood, these texts
show the reader how to organize his own life-world, how to understand his
situation in the world, and how to orient himself toward the world.
Actually, what is to be interpreted in a text is a pro¬
posed world, a world that I might inhabit and wherein I
might project my ownmost possibilities. This is what I
call the world of the text, the world properly belonging
to this unique text.30
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This world is not immediately apparent on a first 'naive' reading of
the text because it is often presented indirectly in symbol, myths, and
metaphors.31 The interpreter is to 'disentangle' the threads of the text,
to make explicit the 'implicit project' of the text, and to reveal the
'indirect proposition of new modes of being'.3:2 The interpreter has
completed his task when he has enabled the reader to see, hear, and
understand this new world which the text offers to him. The requirement,
then, is ' . . . to unfold the text, no longer backwards towards its author,
but forward toward its immanent meaning and toward the sort of world which
it discovers and opens up.133
To perceive the world of the text requires understanding. This is not
the comprehension of bare facts about objects. Rather, it is the ability
to grasp the possibilities which are opened up in the text, to detect our
own potentialities as revealed by the text. Understanding a text, then, is
not the discovery of an ' . . . inert meaning which is contained therein.
Rather it is to unfold the possibility of being which is indicated by the
text,'3'1 Understanding a text is intimately related to understanding life,
At this point, 'the world of the text' may be summarized as something like
a possible way of life depicted by the text or the sum of world proposi¬
tions projected by the text.
The notion of the 'world of the text' in the writings of Ricoeur can
be distinguished from that of Palmer.33 In Hermeneutics, he uses the term
to refer to the world view prevalent at the time of the author as revealed
in the text. He gives two examples. The Bible is a difficult book to
translate and interpret because it portrays a "... world distant in time,
space, and language, a strange world which we must interrogate....'33 It
assumes a cosmology which is completely unacceptable to modern man, and it
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must be demythologized if it is to become a believable book. According to
Palmer, then, it is the responsibility of the biblical scholar to mediate
between two different worlds, the world of the text and the world of the
reader. The second example is the Odyssey, which also presents obstacles
to understanding for much the same reason. It is based on assumptions,
perceptions, and a world view which are no longer tenable. These produce a
'clash' and a 'tension' for the contemporary reader.37 Nevertheless, this
text can become meaningful if one grasps 'the underlying sense of reality'
which it conveys.30 But, for Palmer, this significance for human existence
is not 'the world of the text'. Rather, the world of the text is the world
view implicit in the text. When one reads ancient documents, 'there are
always two worlds, the world of the text and that of the reader, and
consequently there is the need for Hermes to "translate" from one to the
other.'33 Whereas for Palmer, the world of the text is the antiquated
world view held by the author and implied in his text, for Ricoeur it is
the essential subject matter which can be appropriated by the reader.
Ricoeur's expression, 'the world of the text', can also be
distinguished from the literary notion, 'narrative world', used by Petersen
in Rediscovering Paul: Philemon and the Sociology of Paul's Narrative
World. For Petersen, all worlds are artificial worlds, made by humans. A
narrative world is the construction of a narrator. It is the world as it
is represented in a narrative. The narrator inserts actors into this
world, narrates those actions of theirs which are relevant to the story,
and informs (either directly or indirectly) the reader of the relationship
between the actors. The narrative world is the space in which the narrated
events are played out.
The narrative world is that reality which the narrator
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bestows upon his actors and upon their actions, a real¬
ity into which he authoritatively invites his audience,
whether he is telling a fairy tale, a spy story, or a
great novel 1stic adventure.AO
There are at least three points of difference between Petersen's
'narrative world' and Ricoeur's 'world of the text'. First, Petersen
starts with an author who fabricates a world and then confers reality upon
it. Ricoeur, however, starts with a text, and he already assumes
(especially in the case of the Bible) that it depicts a real world, though,
perhaps, not the empirical world of scientific description. Second,
Petersen views the narrative world as the author's invitation to enter into
the text. The reader leaves the 'real' world and engages temporarily with
the narrative world. For Ricoeur, however, the text projects itself toward
the reader, and proposes, not different ways of looking at a past event,
but rather new ways of orienting himself toward the future. Third,
Petersen explores the narrative world for the purpose of better
understanding the actors who live there and the actions which they perform.
. h
Ricoeur, om the other hand, maintains that the purpose of the world of the
text is not to understand others but better to understand one's self.
Petersen's 'narrative world' is a useful way of looking into a text.
His notion will sometimes be employed in the remainder of this chapter.
But 'narrative world' is concerned primarily with explanation. 'The world
of the text', however, is a broader notion, for it encompasses, in addition
to explanation, the concept of application also, which challenges the
reader to incorporate the propositions of the text,
What are the preliminary factors which lead Ricoeur to propose the
world of the text as the 'central category for hermeneutics'? They may all
be summarized in the one word 'distanciation'. Distanciation disturbs the
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relationship between (1) the text and its author; (2) the text and its
original situation; and (3) the text and its first or intended readers.
The distanciation of the text from its author forms the basis for the
semantic autonomy of the text. The distanciation of the text from its
original situation opens the way for a second order reference. The distan¬
ciation of the text from its first readers permits a decontextualization
and a recontextualization of the ideal meaning of the text. The effect of
the distance on the text will now be discussed with reference to each of
these three factors.
The distanciation of text from author is a phenomenon which has its
roots in discourse itself. Discourse is a dialectic of event and meaning,
which are the two 'abstract components of a concrete polarity'.*1
As event, discourse brings into actual existence the words in language
which have only a virtual existence in a dictionary. Yet as event, it is a
fleeting item. Once completed, it passes into the continuum of history and
vanishes. The intention of the author in writing a text may be considered
an event because it is an action which he performs. When he has finished
writing, he has also finished intending. The intention is gone. Only the
text remains. What rescues discourse from evanescence is its meaning pole.
Meaning refers to the content of the discourse, a content which is
preservable because of its ideational character.Meaning itself, for
Ricoeur, results from the intertwining of the singularity of an
identification and the universality of a predication. The subject singles
out a particular thing or group of things, and the predicate says something
about it.
This dialectic of event and meaning is summarized thus by Ricoeur:
'If all discourse is actualized as an event, all discourse is understood as
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meaning,'"13 The significance of this dialectic is that it provides a basis
for distinguishing the event from the meaning. The event pole requires a
speaker, but the meaning itself can have a life of its own. The message,
when transmitted orally, no longer needs its originator. The message, when
preserved in writing, henceforth needs no author. A text is born. An
important change is underway. The event side of the dialectic is
suppressed and then surpassed by the meaning side. This supremacy of the
meaning pole of discourse tends to liberate it from the time and space
factors which bind the event pole. This is fully realized in writing.
The writing of a text separates it from the author in a very physical
way. The discourse he would have delivered orally to a listening audience
is now inscribed with pen and ink on paper. There is now no dialogue - no
speaking and listening, no asking and answering. The only remnant of the
act of communication that endures is a piece of paper (or papyrus, in the
case of Paul). The voices are silent, and only the text remains.
With writing, the verbal meaning of the text no longer
coincides with the mental meaning or intention of the
text. This intention is fulfilled and abolished by the
text, which is no longer the voice of someone present.
The text is mute."1"1
This disjunction between the original mental meaning of the author and
the verbal meaning of the text paves the way for Ricoeur to declare the
'semantic autonomy of the text.' The text means what it means, not what
the author intended it to mean. If the author wrote well, then that
intention is already encoded in the text, and the verbal will correspond to
a greater or lesser extent with authorial intention. But authorial inten¬
tion can no longer be a guide to interpretation.
W. K. Wimsatt and M. C. Beardsley state the case quite clearly in
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their essay, 'The Intentional Fallacy'. They hold that '... the design or
intention of the author is neither available nor desirable as a standard
for judging the work of literary art.'4S A poem, for example, is indeed
the result of an author's creative purpose. But the purpose is to be found
nowhere but in the poem. An appeal to the author or to his intention is
beyond the scope of the literary critic, for whom the task is to study the
work and not any factors external to it.
The notion of authorial intention as a guide to interpretation raises
other problems. First, many works give no clear evidence as to how they
are meant to be interpreted.4S In the absence of any clear signal, the
reader would have to be prepared to assume that he can and does know what
that intention was. Since any assumption would have to be acquired from or
confirmed by the text, it would really be a verbal or textual intention and
not an authorial intention which is governing the interpretation.
Another problem is that '... a knowledge of authorial intention would
not necessarily clarify the text. An author may intend one thing and
achieve another.'47 When this happens, how does one arbitrate the dispute
between the rights of the author and the rights of the text? Does the
interpreter delete the statements which contradict the intention? If he
did so, this would be something other than textual interpretation. To give
priority to authorial intention over verbal intention would be authorial
interpretation and would introduce methods which could easily become
arbitrary and overly subjective. As Scalise has noted, '... it is
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to interpret the author's
intentions without psychologizing on the one hand or falling prey to
historical or cultural determinism on the other.'4®
When there is a conflict between the intention of the author and an
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effect of the text, between what was intended and what was produced, then
there is a need for interpretation.Ricoeur would arbitrate in favour of
the text every time. The meaning is to be sought in the work and in the
work alone. The verbal intention always prevails, because it is the text
and not the author which is the object of the enquiry.50
One final point may be advanced in favour of autonomy of the text over
authorial intention. Many texts, including biblical texts such as Job and
Hebrews, are meaningful and significant even though the identity of the
author is not known. It would be strange indeed to assert that one knows
the intentions but not the identity of these authors, and that these
intentions must be the determining principle for interpretation. It would
be much more sensible to state that these texts are precious because of
what they say rather than because of what their unknown authors intended
to say. They were preserved and passed on, not because the author's name,
personality, and situation were known and because these added to the
meaning of the text. They are treasured, rather, because the text,
although the product of an anonymous author, was yet an articulate
expression of God's ways of dealing with man and a proposal for a proper
response to God.
This priority granted by Ricoeur to autonomy of the text over
authorial intention is grounded in his opposition to the Romanticist
hermeneutics of Schleiermacher and the historicist hermeneutics of
Dilthey.51 Authorial intention is part of the world behind the text and is
therefore of lesser consequence in interpretation. In affirming the
autonomy of the text, which is properly a function of the world of the
text, Ricoeur is viewing the text as an atemporal object, which has,
so to speak, cut its ties from all historical development.'52 As an
atemporal object, the text is not closed in upon the world of the author,
but rather it is opened up to the world of the reader. In this way, the
text (not the author) can question the reader, challenge his assumptions
and behaviour, and offer him a new mode of existence in his situation. For
these reasons, Ricoeur can affirm that '... the concept of the world of the
text has taken the place of the author's intention.'53
The distanciation of text from situation is similar to that between
author and text described above. But whereas 'meaning' was the key term in
that discussion, 'reference' will be the key word in this. At this point,
Ricoeur relies upon the essay 'On Sense and Reference' by Frege.54 The
thesis in that work is that the reader is not satisfied to find only the
sense of a statement, but that he proceeds to seek the reference also. The
sense is what the text says; the reference is that about which it says
something. 'The sense correlates the identification function and the
predicative function within the sentence, and the reference relates
language to the world. 'BS
Reference itself has two directions, as noted earlier (page 39). It
points backward to a speaker and forward to a world. Discourse points back
to its speaker by means of pronouns, which distinguish the speaker from
those he is addressing and from those who are outside of the dialogue. It
points forward to a world by means of verb tenses, which refer to actions
or states of being in terms of their linear sequence, and by adverbs, such
as 'now' and 'then' and 'here' and 'there', which further serve to ground
discourse in a particular temporal-spatial matrix. The demonstrative
adjectives locate the speaker in this matrix with respect to other
identifiable features in the context which are common to both speaker and
hearer.
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But reference is also another name for discourse's claim to be
true,'5,7 It serves not only to situate a speaker in a context and a
context in a world. It also relates to the truth of what is said. It is
here that Ricoeur makes an original contribution to hermeneutics, with his
concept of second order reference.
Many written works, including poetry, literature, and the Bible, have
an explicit first order reference. They speak of people, times, and places
which are for the most part either fictitious or in the distant past or
both. They refer to 'familiar objects of ordinary discourse.'Ee The sense
of these texts is tied to their reference to distant or imaginary
situations and is not necessarily relevant or applicable to the situation
of today's reader. Ricoeur proposes to suspend the referential function on
the first level, or the level of ordinary discourse, and to take it up
again on a second level of personal or existential concerns. This is
necessary because the sense calls for a reference, and the first order
reference, the original situation, is either non-existent or vanished. The
only options available, according to Ricoeur, for these great works of
literature are to follow the structuralists and abandon the question of
reference altogether, or to posit a second order reference, in which '...we
may imaginatively actualize the potential non-ostensive references of the
text in a new situation, that of the reader.'These non-ostensive
references include the 'aporias of existence'^0 and other existential
concerns. By opening up an alternative reference for discourse, the sense
of the text can become significant for the contemporary reader.
This approach to interpretation locates sense and reference not in the
original situation of discourse, nor in that of the author or of the first
readers. They are not to be found in the 'world behind the text'. That
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original situation has vanished, lost in the dim past of history. If
reference is related to that original situation and if the sense is related
to that reference, then the text is only meaningful for its original
addressees, and it has no abiding value or enduring significance. But to
affirm that the sense and the reference of a written discourse lie in front
of the text and not behind it is to salvage that text for the edification
of future generations. It is the distance between a text and its original
situation which makes this second order reference possible. This new
proposal for the question of reference makes a radical shift in the focus
of interpretation:
What has to be understood is not the initial situation
of discourse, but what points towards a possible world,
thanks to the non-ostensive reference of the text.
Understanding has less than ever to do with the author
and his situation. It seeks to grasp the world-propo¬
sitions opened up by the reference of the text,*51
By acknowledging the concepts of the semantic autonomy of the text and the
second order reference of the text, interpretation turns away from the
author, his historical situation, and the world behind the text, and it
turns toward the reader, his contemporary situation, and the world in front
of the text.
The next item on the agenda is the distance between the text and the
reader. This discussion will focus on the twin concepts of
decontextualization and recontextualization. Reading is the counterpart of
writing. As mentioned above (see page 41), written discourse presents a
particular problem because, in most situations, the writer and reader do
not interact with each other - the reader is not present at writing, and
the writer is not present at reading. They do not share a common situation.
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In oral discourse, "... the problem Cof reference] is ultimately resolved
by the ostensive function of discourse ... [which is] the power of showing
a reality common to the interlocutors.1But this is impossible in
written discourse. Because author and reader do not share the same
situation and because they can not interact, they are no longer able to
resolve difficulties. The author is unable to communicate his intended
reference, so the reader is guided only by the text. Since the text has
been liberated to produce a second order reference, the reader now relates
the meaning of the text to the non-ostensive reference set free by the
text.
Without a doubt it is this abolition of the demonstra¬
tive or denotative characteristics of reference that
makes possible the phenomenon which we call litera¬
ture where every reference to the given reality may be
abol ished. e;3
When discourse is inscribed, this original contextualizat ion is
effaced. The world of the text escapes from the world of the author and
from the world of the intended readers. The text is no longer bound by
the intentions of the author nor by the hypothesized feelings and judgments
of the original addressees. This atemporal object is free to seek a new
home elsewhere. It is like a freighter loaded with cargo, stopping in at
various ports so people can inspect her merchandise.
This process of breaking away from the original situation is what
Ricoeur calls 'decontextualization'.ss The text is no longer directed only
to its original readers. It is addressed potentially to anyone who knows
how to read and to anyone who can gain access to the document.GS Its
significance is not limited psychologically by the mental intention of the
author nor sociologically by the circle of the original addressees. It is
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a free text, decontextualized now and awaiting a reader.
Those people who find the text and read it are, by implication, free
to adopt it and give it a new home. As they seek to grasp its meaning and
apply its propositions in their own situation, they are 'recontextualizing'
it. The text is agreeable to this process because, according to Ricoeur,
its meaning is omnitemporal.67 It is relevant to anyone grappling with the
perplexities of human existence, because it is bringing what is
essential in the past into our personal present.'es Genuine understanding
of a text always goes beyond enjoyment and involves application, because
the great works of art require participation and not just observation in
order to yield up all their meaning. As the reader appropriates the text,
he comes to a full understanding of it.e3 The text is agreeable to
recontextualization for another reason also. Its reference is non-
ostensive. The second epistle to the Corinthians is no longer addressed to
them alone. It is also addressed to you and me.70 Its reference is no
longer intertwined with the Christian congregation in first century Corinth
- with the intruders, the opponents, and the rebellious factions there.
This letter, according to Ricoeur, is for anyone who can read because it
projects a world which anyone can embrace for himself. One need not know
the original contextualization of the epistle in order to grasp and apply
the world-propositions which it utters. It has been decontextualized, and
it can be recontextualized by the contemporary reader.
The process of decontextualization and recontextualization is made
possible by a consideration of the text as a 'work', as a product of human
labour. As a work of art, it belongs to a genre of literature, and it is
the genre of a work which contributes to its decontextual izat ion and its
recontextualization.71 Because a discourse is generated according to
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certain rules, it can be better understood and remembered by its audience,
and it escapes the fate of a vanishing speech-event. Because it conforms
to a generic code, it can be written down and thereby protected under the
umbrella of its genre. This genre confers both a closing and an opening
upon the work. It closes the work to any further distortion of its
content, and it opens it to new audiences and thereby to new
interpretations.22
The genre establishes the first contextualization, but,
being at the same time a virtual decontextualization of
discourse, it makes the subsequent recontextualization
of the message possible.73
Of course, the process of decontextualization and recontextualization,
being such an open-ended mechanism, can be applied widely and also
irresponsibly. One can make the text say almost anything about anything.
The door is open to wholesale eisegesis. An example of careful scholarship
in the use of these categories may be found in the work of Schneiders.7*
She has applied them to the foot washing pericope in John 13, showing that
humble service is the model of Christian discipleship, and to a group of
texts which seem to be oppressive of women, showing how their narrower
perspective on the role of women is superseded by the wider perspective of
liberation proclaimed in the New Testament. Her results may not be
universally accepted, but she has made a reasoned attempt to decontextual-
ize certain biblical texts and recontextualize them in the twentieth
century.
The distance between the text and its original addressees also makes a
contribution to the development of the concept of the 'world of the text1.
The distance between the text and its contemporary reader is just an
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extension of the distance between the text and its original addressees.
This distance was initiated at the time of writing, when the author and the
reader did not share a common situation. The distance increased as the
text moved out of its original spatio-temporal network. But the
distanciation can become productive. Because the written discourse is
produced in conformity to a genre, it can be decontextual ized and then
recontextualized. In this way, distance as a factor between author and
reader can become productive and help to establish the world of the text.
Distanciation, as an interpretative category, then, lies at the base
of Ricoeur's development of the world of the text. The distance between a
text and its author, original situation, and first readers allows the text
to be liberated from any purely psychological or historical interpretation.
Because its meaning is omnitemporal and its reference is non-ostensive, the
text becomes an atemporal object which is then available for
decontextualization and recontextualization.
What, then, are the consequences of making the world of the text a
category for biblical interpretation? Ricoeur himself has discussed this
in his essay, 'Philosophical Hermeneutics and Biblical Hermeneutics',7®
First, the requirement to unfold the world of the text is a
counterbalance to a premature emphasis on existential appropriation of the
text. As a necessary stage between the objective analysis of the content
of the text and the personal appropriation of its essential message, the
laying out of the world of the text mediates between these other two
processes. 'The first task of hermeneutics is not to arouse a decision on
the part of the reader, but first to allow the unfolding of the world of
being which is the "thing" of the biblical text.'76
Second, the locus of revelation is transferred from the inspiration of
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the author at the time of writing to the presentation of the issue of the
text at the time of reading.7"7 The Bible is revelation as it reveals its
propositions to the reader. 'Revelation, in short, is a feature of the
biblical world proposed by the text.'7®
Third, the world of the text, as a world, involves the whole community
of faith and allows no room for a purely individualistic relation between
man and God. The believer does not stand alone, but rather he becomes part
of the people of God. Their texts become his texts. The 'world' of these
texts is not a one-man production, but rather it is the result of the
creative and cooperative labour of all the members. Because of the texts
(among other things), the believer is linked to the traditions of the past
as well as to the interpretations of the present community.73
Fourth, the world of the text bursts through ordinary experience to
project a mode of being which transcends daily reality.30 Because it
operates on a different level, it breaks down old ways of seeing things and
opens up new visions of truth and reality for the Christian. The power of
a biblical text is not so much its descriptive content or its didactic
function but rather its power to bring into view a new vision of the world.
All of the biblical texts point to God as their ultimate referent and as
the originator of the new creation which is brought into view by these
texts.31
Finally, the world of the text challenges the reader to develop his
most unique and personal possibilities. When the text announces that the
'Kingdom of God has come', the text implies that this is a kingdom which
comes from God and not from the reader. By responding to a summons from
outside himself, he can become what he was meant to be.3:2
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In summary, the world of the text is a unique hermeneutical category
developed by Ricoeur, By 'world', he means the arena of human experience.
By 'text', he means a group of utterances fixed by writing. When these two
words coagulate into the phrase, 'the world of the text', the result is
semantically thick and dense. The world of the text is a mode of being
which unfolds itself before the text. It is the sum of the world-proposi¬
tions opened up by the text. It provides the reader with a new way of
seeing things, with a new way of orientating himself in the world, with a
challenge to develop his 'ownmost possibilities'.
The text has both a closure and an opening.33 The closure refers to
the configuration of its structure. But the text also
... opens onto a world, like a 'window" that cuts out a
fleeting perspective of a landscape beyond. This open¬
ing consists in the pro-position of a world capable of
being inhabited.
This opening is the 'outside' of the text, in which the text projects it¬
self towards the reader and offers itself to his 'critical appropria¬
tion. ,es The world of the text is a world which the reader may inhabit, in
which he may . receive the claims of the text, and project his new
existence. The world of the text projected by the Bible is called the new
creation, the new covenant, the kingdom drawn near. Underlying the phrase,
'the world of the text', is the concept of 'distanciation'. there is a
distance between the text and its author, the text and its original
situaton, and the text and its origin readers. The Bible is just such a
distanciated text. It has escaped the intentional horizon of its authors,
their situations, and their original readers. Because of its omnitemporal
meaning and its non-ostensive reference, it is an atemporal object which
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may be appropriated by the contemporary reader, by decontextualizing and
recontextual iz ing "... the truth which has been incarnated in it by the
poetic function,'se Thus, for Ricoeur, the notion of the 'world of the
text' becomes a key concept of interpretation theory and the central
category of biblical hermeneutics.
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SECTION B. GOD AND THE WORLD OF 2 CORINTHIANS 3.
'The world of the text', a notion of Ricoeur discussed in the
preceding section, will now be applied to a particular text. The world of
2 Corinthians 3 will be investigated by examining the roles, relations, and
actions of the characters in this world.1 A role refers to a position
within a social structure or institution, such as a father in a family or a
chairman of a committee. It describes the place of a person in his
organization. A role is characterized by the actions typical of the one
who plays that role. A father disciplines his son; a chairman calls for a
meeting of his committee members. A relation, on the other hand, refers to
a comparison of one role to another, and it may be expressed as superior,
equal, or inferior. In the family, the father is superior to the son. But
all men are equal in the eyes of the law. Relations describe the structure
and explain the basis on which persons interact with one another. By
examining the roles, relations, and actions of the characters in a text,
the world of the text can be brought to light.
The characters of 2 Corinthians 3 to be examined in Chapter 2 are God,
Paul, and the Corinthians. Each section of the chapter will be devoted to
a study of the roles, relations, and actions of one of these three
characters. Investigating the actions and interactions of each of these
actors will clarify aspects of the essential meaning of this passage.
Since many of the actions of a character are carried out only in relation
to another character, some overlap is unavoidable. But the emphasis in
each section will be upon the character, the actions he initiates, and the
actions of which he is the object.
While our investigation is centred primarily upon 2 Corinthians 3,
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reference will be made occasionally to other biblical texts, in order to
clarify the roles and relations of the characters, and to gain a more ade¬
quate understanding of their actions, If the model of concentric circles
were used, 2 Corinthians 3 would be the smallest circle, for it is at the
heart of the study. The next circle would be the whole of 2 Corinthians,
followed by the Pauline corpus, and then the rest of the Old and New
Testaments. For the discussion of the actions of the characters, though,
the focus will be upon 2 Corinthians 3, since it is what they do in this
text that is the subject of the present inquiry.
Furthermore, this will not be an exhaustive listing of all the roles
of these characters. The roles which are presented in each part are
limited to those which are either explicitly indicated in the text or are
implied by means of a relation or action which is mentioned in the text.
So the discussion will focus only on those roles which are relevant to the
text at hand.
In this section, the roles, relations, and actions of God which appear
in 2 Corinthians 3 will be examined.
In the Pauline corpus as in the Bible as a whole, God is regarded as
the 'ultimate actant'.2 He is the one who begins human history, by
creating heaven and earth (Gen 1). He is the one who brings human history
to its grand finale (Rev 22). And he is the one who guides all that
happens in between. The faith of Israel includes the idea that God is
either the direct or indirect agent of all that transpires in the arena of
human affairs.
The two most dramatic examples of God's activity are the Exodus and
the Resurrection, In the first, it is Yahweh, Israel's covenant name for
God, who leads the children of Israel out of bondage in Egypt and into
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freedom and prosperity in the Promised Land. Moses and later Joshua were
the human leaders of this campaign, but it is Yahweh who is credited with
bringing them out 'with a mighty hand and an outstretched arm' and with
giving them the 'land flowing with milk and honey' (Dt 26.5-11). The early
Israelite confessions understood Yahweh to be the one who intervened on
their behalf to make all of these good things possible.
In the second example, the early church believed and confessed that
God raised up Jesus from the dead. It was the letter which had put Jesus
to death, in that he had broken certain laws and had to be penalized for
the breach. But it was the Spirit, the Spirit of God, which had made him
alive, for it is the work of the Spirit to bring to life that which was
dead (2 Cor 3.6). There is, of course, much debate about exactly what
'resurrection' means. But however one decides on this issue, it is clear
that the first believers attributed this mighty event to God. Whatever
happened, God had done it. By his mighty power, he had somehow intervened
in a situation hopeless and forlorn and had brought victory when defeat had
seemed certain <1 Cor 15).
The mention of these two examples is sufficient to suggest how it was
that Paul and his Christian contemporaries considered God to be the
ultimate actant. Now it is time to develop this notion by citing further
instances from 2 Corinthians 3 and its neighbourhood which depict the
action of God as it appears in the text.
The notion of God as creator is dominant in the Old Testament, and
Paul alludes to it in 2 Corinthians 4.6:
For it is the God who said, 'Let light shine out of
darkness,' who has shone in our hearts to give the
light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the
face of Christ.
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In this verse, Paul draws the conclusion that God brings light where
darkness once reigned. In the creation, the light dispelled the darkness
of chaos (Gen 1.3). In the salvation of believers, God sheds his light in
order to overcome the darkness of sin and unbelief. 'The Creator God of
the Old Testament is one and the same with the Re-Creator God of the New
Testament.'3 Belief in God as creator was foundational to the Christian
faith, and creation as an activity of God is certainly a background feature
of the landscape of the world of this text.
'Creation' here has at least two senses. It refers to the making of
the sky and the earth. The Israelites use a fabrication metaphor to
express their belief that Yahweh gets the credit for the production and
existence of the natural world. 'Creation' also refers to God's making of
Christians. By means of Christ, God has performed a new creation (see,
e.g., 2 Cor 5.17). With God it is possible for persons to have a new
personhood, God creates and re-creates. He sets things right.
Another role of God is that of governor of human history. This is a
recurring theme in the Old Testament, and it is taken up by Paul in 2
Corinthians 2. 14:
T^ 6£ 9eS ndtvxoxe SpiapBetiovxx qpaq
Iv xSS Xpiaxffi xai xf|v oapf|v xffc; yv&oeo>q auxoO
cpavepoOvxi 5i' qpSSv ev ixavxi xbTcm.
The exact translation of Qpiocppeum is uncertain. The RSV preserves rather
than resolves the ambiguity, by not specifying the role of 'us' in relation
to the triumph: 'But thanks be to God, who in Christ always leads us in
triumph. ' That SpxapPsbo) is a metaphor based on the celebrations accorded
to Roman conquerors can hardly be doubted, but its exact significance is
not clear. At least six possibilities have been suggested: (1) causes us
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to triumph; (2) leads us in triumphal progress, as if we were conquering
soldiers following the general in his celebration march; <3> triumphs over
us; (4) leads us about as captives in a triumphal march; (5> displays us or
makes us known; (6) displays us as captives, with shame and humiliation as
attendant circumstances.* But, for the purpose at hand, it makes little
difference whether the status of 'us' is that of persons conquering,
persons conquered, persons on display, or persons continually humiliated.
The important point is that God is portrayed as the great general, who has
just won a major victory. The metaphor conveys the idea that God is the
great strategist who can outsmart and overcome his foes. Whether 'we' are
the conquering army, following in his train, or the vanquished opponents,
being paraded as a spectacle to the world (cf. 1 Cor 4.9), the focus is
upon God who conquers and who leads. He leads Paul (taking upaq as an
apostolic plural) in his triumphal march. It is God, not Paul, who
determines the route of the march. It is God who decides the itinerary of
the true apostle. The apostle might formulate tentative plans, but the
final orders come from headquarters. As a person led around in the train
of the great conqueror, Paul does what the general tells him to do, not
what he himself decides. He follows where God leads him.
Young and Ford see Paul as a conquered soldier, being paraded around
and humiliated by the conqueror.s As a defeated soldier he has become a
slave, and so he is not responsible for his actions. He goes where he is
led and does what he is told. Therefore, he should not be criticized by
the Corinthians for not fulfilling his travel plans (2 Cor 1.15-22). His
plans are always subject to revision by God, who is the great general and
dispatcher of ambassadors (2 Cor 5.20).
So much emphasis has been placed on the role of Paul in the triumph
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that the role of God has not been fully appreciated. If 9piapPeuci) is a
metaphor, referring on the literal level to a Roman triumph and perhaps
alluding also to the triumphs of David and the Maccabees, then the role of
God in the triumph is without doubt that of conqueror. He is the general
who has executed the successful campaign, the tactician who has won the
battle. Whether Paul is viewed as a conquering soldier or as a conquered
soldier, he is nonetheless a soldier, and God is the general. Thus God's
relation to Paul is one of superior to inferior. Though Paul may have
counted others better than himself (Phil 2.3), he always counted God best
of all. The military metaphor SpiapPeuo) is but one way that Paul expresses
God's superiority.
Because God always (ndcvxoxe) triumphs, he will win all of his battles
and defeat all of his foes. 'We do not yet see everything in subjection to
him' (Heb 2.8; cf. 1 Cor 15.27), but Paul's hope is in God nonetheless
(xoiocuxqv eXrcfSa, 2 Cor 3.12), and he is confident (xovauxqv Ttenot9qaiv, 2
Cor 3.4) that God will eventually win the day. Because God will someday
conquer all of his foes and because Paul himself has already witnessed that
conquering power, God may be regarded here as the leader of human history,
and Paul, for one, has already acknowledged him as emperor.
In addition to creator of the universe and governor of human affairs,
Paul also refers to God as father. In the greeting of all seven authentic
Pauline epistles (and the other six epistles of the traditional Pauline
corpus as well), Paul recognizes God as father. The mention of father
brings up the notion of family. Father is a relational term, implying the
existence of children. It is the birth or adoption of children which makes
a man a father. In the writings of Paul, these children are always sons,
with the one exception of 2 Corinthians 6.18:
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xod £cropax upiv exq rcax£pa xax upelq £aea8£ pox exq
uxouq xax Suy0^?0^» xupxoq Ttavxoxp&xmp.
Both the authenticity and the integrity of 2 Corinthians 6,14-7.1 are
controversial issues, with no general agreement on its status. Furnish has
summarized the arguments and concluded that it is at best 'only marginally
Pauline* in content and an 'enigma* as to its location in the epistle.'5
2 Corinthians 6.18 appears to be a revision of God's promise to David
concerning his descendants:
syd) ^oopax auxtt exq nax6pa,
xai auxdq '£axax pox exq x>\6v <2 Samuel 7.14).
But the mention of 'daughters' in addition to 'sons' does not affect the
direction of this discussion. The point here is that in a family all of
the children, both boys and girls, are subordinate to the father. The
father, in first century Judaism, was the accepted authority figure in the
family, and he held a position superordinate to the children.
In the epistles of Paul, the concept of kinship is a dominant model
for describing the relationship of God and believers.7 As noted above, all
of the Pauline epistles open with an acknowledgement that God is our
father. This is underlined in 1 Corinthians 8.5-6 when Paul writes:
although there may be so-called gods in heaven or
on earth - as indeed there are many 'gods' and many
'lords' - yet for us there is one God, the Father,
from whom are all things and for whom we exist.
Paul is using the language of human relationships to talk about divine
affairs. For believers, there is only one God. He is known to them as
'father', and they are his children. Unlike ordinary human society, there
is but one family and one father in Paul's 'symbolic universe'.® A person
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is either in or out of this family, and, if he is in, he is subordinate to
the father and equal to all other siblings in the family (Gal 3.28), Human
fathers, who are subordinators in their earthly families, become subordi¬
nated to God in the heavenly family and coordinated with their own sons in
the family of God. Roles are revised and relationships are reconfigured
when, by trusting Christ, a person becomes a member of the family of which
God is the father. Thus, in addition to creator of the universe and
governor of history, Paul also regards God as father of the family of
believers.
The other major role which Paul envisions for God is that of xupioq -
lord or master (2 Cor 3.16-18). It is true that the early church confessed
that 'Jesus is Lord' (Rom 10.9), but that does not conflict with the notion
of God as Lord. For God is the 'ultimately authoritative master' of the
universe.'3 It is God who, declares Paul with reference to Jesus, has
'highly exalted him and bestowed on him the name which is above every name'
(Phil 2.9). It is the prerogative of superiors to confer titles and
honours upon inferiors, not vice versa. This clearly implies that if Jesus
is a lord, then God is a greater lord.
This may be confirmed in two ways. First, the lordship of Christ is
temporary, and therefore lower than the eternal authority of God. Paul
writes that Christ will reign until he has abolished every other authority,
and then he will hand over the kingdom to God the Father (1 Cor 15.24-5).
In considering the political order, there may be a hierarchy of power, but
there is always someone at the top. There may be many lords and nobles in
the kingdom, but just one king. So it is that in the God-man arena. Paul
says that every one will bow his knee to Jesus and confess that Jesus is
lord (Phil 2.10-11), but this lordship is not forever. It is only until he
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delivers it to God. God is king, ultimate authority, lord of all.
Second, the role of Jesus as lord is paralleled by that of Jesus as
son. As son, Jesus is subject to the father. Though he is subordinate to
the father, he is not portrayed as equal to the other sons. He is the
'first-born among many brethren' (Rom 8.29), and therefore in a position
superior to that of the other sons. Jesus is not a son in the way others
are, because he was a son before 'being born in the likeness of men' (Phil
2.7). Also, he is a born son, and all of the other children are adopted.
But though superior to the rest of the brethren, he is still a son and
therefore subject to the father (1 Cor 15.28).
That God is lord or master is a common theme in the Pauline epistles.
The role of lord or master implies the role of slave, just as the role of
father presupposes that of son. The master is the one who owns the slave
and the one (ideally) to whom the slave is obedient and before whom the
slave is humble. Paul sings a song about Jesus, a slave who 'humbled
himself and became obedient unto death, even death on a cross' (Phil 2.8).
Those who believe in Jesus are repeatedly exhorted by Paul to become
obedient and humble to God. He urges them to imitate the example of Jesus,
'the ultimate model of humility and obedience'.10 More implications of the
master/slave relationship will be noted as the investigation focuses on 2
Corinthians 3.
The master/slave relationship is implied in 2 Corinthians 3.1:
>Apx6ps8a rc&Xxv lautouq (Tuvxatavexv; If pf|
Sq xxveq auo-uatxxSSv ItucttoXoW npoq upaq ?f upSW;
The question of self-recommendation was a point of controversy between Paul
and the Corinthians, as suggested by the rcdtXxv. 1 1 The question of
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commendation is raised by Paul at least seven times in 2 Corinthians, in
3.1; 4.2; 5,12; 6.4; 10.12; 10.18; 12.11, The issue seems to revolve
around the proper source of recommendation. There are some who commend
themselves, and Paul regards them as being 'without understanding' (10.12).
There are some who are commended by the Corinthians, as suggested by 2
Corinthians 3.2, and Paul is not happy about this either, If the
Corinthians are going to commend anyone, then they should be commending
Paul, not someone else (12.11).
The potential solution of the conflict can be found in 10.18:
ou Y&p o eocutdv ouvioxdvoiv, exetvbq ectxiv 5oxipo<;,
a\\& 8v o xupioq cruvto"rr)aiv.
A person is not approved just because he commends himself. In order to be
properly commended, he needs the recommendation of a superior. In 10.18,
Paul is recognizing the Lord as the one superior who is competent to
commend and approve him. If the one who recommends is a lord, then the one
who is recommended is a slave.Thus, Paul is implicitly referring to his
role as 'slave' and the role of God as 'lord', in order to establish the
proper criteria for recommendation. Paul is a slave, and the
recommendation which matters is that of God, his heavenly lord. It is the
Lord who judges Paul, and therefore he is not concerned about the judgments
and opinions of men (1 Cor 4.4). Their opinions matter little, because a
slave stands or falls in the judgment of his master (Rom 14.4). It is the
condemnation or commendation of the master that determines the status of
the slave.
If the questions of 2 Corinthians 3.1 are rhetorical questions, then
Paul is saying that he does not recommend himself and that he does not need
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letters of recommendation to the Corinthians or from them.13 Since Paul
denies that he is commended either by himself or by others, the implication
is opened up that he is commended by God. Though this is not explicitly
stated, it is implied by the elimination of all the possible candidates but
one. The text opens up a gap in its texture, and the reader is invited to
fill in the blank.1*1 God not only commissions Paul, He also commends
Paul. The apostle does not depend upon himself or upon other men for his
recommendation. This comes from God alone, Paul is a slave, and God is
the lord who commends. God is both commissioner and commender.
God is also an author. According to 2 Corinthians 3.3, he writes
letters:
ipavepoupevox Sxx eax£ STUcrxoXf) XpxoxoC 8iaxov^9eiaa
V rjpSv, SY'yeYpocjijJ.^vr] ou p.£Xavx aXXbc rcveupaxi 0eoC
CaWxoq, oux £v TtXa^iv XiQfvotiq aXX' ev rcXa^tv xap5iat<;
aapxfvoac,.
These letters are not everyday letters, because they are written not with
ink on ordinary surfaces but with the Spirit on hearts. The characters of
this letter are not traced by ink but are outlined by the Spirit. The
finished product is not a manuscript but living persons. Anyone can chisel
letters on stone or write ink documents on papyrus. But to write a living
letter is of a completely different order. It is to create characters and
not merely to write them. God does things which men are unable to do. He
is one of a kind. He is not just an author, but the ultimate author. The
ultimate actant has acted on the Corinthians. On them he has written a
letter like no other.
The realm of letter writing also reveals other aspects of the
relationship of superiority/inferiority, The writing of Moses and of Paul
72
is of one kind. It leaves its mark on inanimate objects. These marks and
the documents which they constitute are perishable. But the writing of God
is of a superior order. God makes his mark on living persons, by means of
the power of the Spirit, There is a stark contrast 'between the abiding
illumination of the Spirit and the perishable blackness of inanimate
ink.'1s God, then, rather than Ronald Reagan, should be called the 'great
communicator' , because his messages are superior to anything that man can
generate.
But it is true nevertheless that Paul envisions God's writing on stone
also. He alludes in 2 Corinthians 3 to the narrative in Exodus 34
concerning the giving of the ten 'words'. Moses is told to go up on the
mountain and to prepare two stone tablets on which God could write the
commandments (Ex 34.1). In 2 Corinthians 3.7, Paul writes:
Ei 5b rj 8kxxovioc xot> Qavaxou sv yp^ppocaiv evxexuumpbvr}
\(6ox<; Iysv,1®t1 56£tj,....
Because of the Exodus narrative, the passive participle evxexuTtcopbvr) may be
regarded as a divine passive, in which God is understood to be the one who
engraved the letters on the stones. Even though Moses himself actually
took up the chisel and hammer, God is still regarded as the 'Engraver',
because he is the commissioner of the engraving and Moses is his agent,
For Paul, it is God who decides that a certain person will perform a
certain task. In Paul's symbolic universe, '... the Lord is over all forms
of service and God is behind everyone's actions (1 Cor 12.4-6).'ie So it
is easy to see why Paul implied here that God, whether directly or
indirectly, carved out the old covenant on the two stones.
In addition to the divine passive, there is another indicator in 2
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Corinthians 3 that Paul believes that the old covenant was of divine
origin. He acknowledges that it 'came with splendour'. The glory of God,
often associated with a dazzlingly bright light, is tantamount to the
presence of God. God was there on the mountain during the writing of the
law. He showed his presence and approval by revealing his glory to Moses
and the people, Paul agrees with this point, even if only reluctantly.
It is precisely here that a problem arises. For Paul, the old
covenant is a temporary phenomenon linked with the administration of death
and condemnation (vv. 7, 9, 11). The new covenant, based on Christ and
proclaimed by Paul, is an enduring alliance bringing life and
justification. How can Paul affirm 'the divine origin of the law'17 and
affirm that it brings death and condemnation? And how can Paul state
consistently that God devised such a death-dealing arrangement and that God
later inaugurated another that produces life and righteousness? For Paul,
the issue was simply this: God had done something new in Christ which
superseded the old thing he had done at Sinai. The question of Paul and
the law is beyond the scope of this dissertation.10 It is a question which
Paul himself never fully and adequately answered, and it is still a
controversy on which there is no general agreement. The purpose here is to
investigate how Paul handles the issue in 2 Corinthians 3.
It is clear that he fully affirms that the law had divine approval.
It was written and glorified by God (vv, 7-10). If it conflicted with the
new thing God was doing, then the conflict must be arbitrated in favour of
the new thing. Paul does this in two ways. First, he affirms the glory of
the old way, but insists on the greater glory of the new way. Three times
in 2 Corinthians 3 (vv. 7-11) Paul employs the a fortiori argument to
demonstrate the superiority of the Christian ministry over the Mosaic
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ministry.The scene on Mount Sinai was certainly a glorious affair, but
it is not nearly so splendid as the revelation of God in Christ, because
the latter, unlike the former, gave men the gifts of justification and of
the Spirit.
Second, Paul demonstrates the superiority of the new over the old by
pointing to the transience of the old and the permanence of the new. The
glory of the old way was like the glory on Moses' face - real enough, to be
sure, but not eternal. The fading away of the glow on Moses' face was an
indicator of the temporary nature of the old covenant, which is now not so
much abolished as superseded (cf. Gal 3.23-26). The new covenant, based on
the death of Jesus, is permanent and enduring. The eternal must always
take precedence over the temporal. So, then, in 2 Corinthians 3, Paul
affirms the superiority of the new covenant over the old by pointing out
both the greater splendour of the new and its enduring character. Whether
or not this actually resolves the issue is another question. It is
sufficient here to note that the apostle attempts to dispose of the problem
in this way. Whether this attempt can be reconciled with other statements
and solutions of the problem in the Pauline corpus is also another question
which will not be pursued here.
To return to the notion of God as author, it is apparent from this
text that Paul regards God as a unique writer. God draws up a contract on
stone by using hammer and chisel. (Indeed might not one venture to say,
though in a different way, that God also wrote using hammer and nails, for
was it not the belief of the early church that God, in the crucifixion
death of Jesus, was writing a new covenant with men (1 Cor 11.23-26)?)
God produces epistles by making his mark on the lives of those who believe
in him. The world of this text is proposing that the reader recognize the
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superiority of the new covenant, commit himself to it, and allow God to
make his mark on his life. If every life is a letter, then the challenge
is to let God write the letter of the life of the believer.20
Paul depicts another relationship between himself and God when he
writes in 2 Corinthians 3.4:
IleTiof0r)Oiv 6s xoiabxqv ^xopsv 5ia xob Xpioxob Ttpdq xdv 8s6v.
ns7roi0r^oiq is usually translated 'trust, confidence' and is cognate with
7ist0siv, which means 'to convince, to persuade'. IlsTtoi0r|ai<; carries the
idea, then, of a trust which is the result of being convinced with respect
to a person or a thing. It is an assurance based upon persuasive evidence.
The suggestion here is that Paul has been persuaded by Christ to be
confident toward God. The topic of Ttsnof0r)oiq in verse 4 may refer back to
Paul's conversion and calling, in which it was the revelation of Jesus
Christ (Gal 1,12) which led him to re-orient his life toward God by
believing in Jesus as the Messiah. It may also refer to the preceding
context, in which case it means that Paul is confident in his role as an
apostle even though he does not have the external credentials which some
people think are so important.21 In any case, the confidence Paul has in
God is mediated through Christ.
What exactly was it about Christ which caused Paul to be confident
toward God? This can not be known, and it is not the object of this
inquiry, which is to interpret a text rather than to know the mind of its
author. What can be known is what Paul wrote, not what he thought, though
indeed his writings may be regarded as approximate expressions of his
thought. It is possible, though, to examine what he wrote and make
suggestions as to what might have persuaded Paul.
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Paul refers occasionally to the narratives of Abraham (for example,
Rom 4 and Gal 3). For him, Abraham is an example and a model of faith.
God made promises to Abraham and then fulfilled them, Abraham believed God
and it was credited to him as righteousness. Perhaps it was by meditating
upon the sagas of Abraham that Paul became confident toward God.
Or it may have been the entire Hexateuch, which is also constructed on
the model of promise and ful f i lment,3:2 The theme of promise is introduced
in Genesis through the narratives of the patriarch, and the theme of
fulfilment finds its ultimate, or at least a penultimate, realization in
Joshua, with the conquest and possession of Canaan. All along the way from
Egypt through the wilderness and into the promised land, the biblical
record shows God to be faithful to his promises and gracious to his people.
A third possibility, in addition to the narratives of Abraham and
Israel, may have been the example of Christ himself. Jesus was convicted
as a criminal and executed by crucifixion. He died in weakness. But he
'was raised from the dead by the glory of the Father' (Rom 6.4). Perhaps
it was the Christ event which led him not to rely on himself but upon God
who raises up the dead (2 Cor 1.9).
These are clues which may point to the cause of Paul's confidence in
God. But the experience or experiences through which he came to trust in
God are not accessible to the reader.
The experience as experienced, as lived, remains
private, but its sense, its meaning, becomes public.
Communication in this way is the overcoming of the
radical noncommunicabi1ity of the lived experience
as lived.23
Paul's conversion is a private event. He can try to communicate the sense
of this experience to others, but the event itself remains private, At
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this point it appears that the world of the text is proposing confidence
'through Christ toward God' as a possible way of orienting one's life. The
reader can not enter into Paul's experience, but he can read Paul's record
of Paul's experience. The reading of this text can challenge the reader to
rely upon God as Paul and others have done in the past. This text proposes
an alternative to relying upon oneself. It opens up a new vista and a
different orientation. The text invites the reader to join the 'we' of
this statement. It calls the reader to decide to live with confidence
toward God. Since this text is an atemporal object, the first person
plural subject of this sentence is not limited to Paul and his
contemporaries. Rather, any reader can choose to believe in Christ and to
step inside the circle of faith. The 'we' is not a closed community but
rather an open invitation to all readers everywhere to experience what Paul
has experienced.
The statement, 'Such is the confidence that we have through Christ
toward God,' is not a narrative in itself, but rather it is a sequence in
the larger narrative of Paul's relationship with God. There is often a
reciprocity between the actors in a small sequence of a narrative.For
example, if one is a donor, then the other must be a receiver. This
concept can be applied to the sequence in 2 Corinthians 3.4. If Paul has
confidence toward God, then this implies that God is trustworthy. This is
not necessarily an established fact from the narrative, but, in the absence
of any information to the contrary, the reader is justified in assuming
that it is true.25 The dependability of God is best demonstrated from the
promise-fulfilment schema outlined above. Paul fully accepted this notion,
as evidenced by his statement in 2 Corinthians 1.18-20:
As surely as God is faithful, our word to you has not
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been Yes and No. For the Son of God, Jesus Christ,
whom we preached among you, Silvanus and Timothy and
I, was not Yes and No; but in him it is always Yes.
For all the promises of God find their Yes in him.
That is why we utter the Amen through him, to the glory
of God.
Paul is without doubt persuaded that God is faithful to his promises.
Furthermore, he is convinced that the ultimate fulfilment of the promises
is to be found in Christ.26 So, in addition, to the other actions of God
already noted, it may be added that God not only acts but also acts
faithfully, responsibly, consistently. He can be relied upon to do what he
says he will do. Thus, the challenge offered by the text to 'trust in God'
is enhanced by the logical corollary that 'God is trustworthy'.
Closely connected to the notion that 'God is trustworthy' is the
statement that 'our competence is from God'.2"7 In emphatic fashion, Paul
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affirms that his competence is not at all from himself. Note that the occp
eocutSSv reinforced by the It, eauxffiv. The God he serves is an all-sufficient
God, and his sufficiency comes from such a God as this. The abstract
proposition that our sufficiency is from God is restated in concrete terms
in verse 6, when Paul writes that God has 'made us competent to be
ministers of a new covenant'. The competence supplied by God is not an
abstraction about which to theorize. Rather, it is a reality experienced
by Paul as he performs the job for which he was commissioned (cf, 2 Cor
1.21-22).
'Ixavotqq is a rare word, appearing only here in all of the Greek
Bible.20 It is variously translated as 'competence, sufficiency,
adequacy'. It signifies that there is enough skill to do the job. It may
be distinguished from an overwhelming abundance of performative ability on
the one hand and from a lack of energy and acumen to face the challenge one
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confronts on the other hand. Rather, God grants the apostle just what he
needs and what he is capable of receiving and implementing.23 In this way,
Paul is again confident toward God, because God has always made him
sufficient for whatever apostolic task arose. Paul can rely upon God
because God has made good his promises to Paul. His grace has always been
sufficient, and the apostle has repeatedly seen the power of God manifested
in the apostle's weakness (2 Cor 12.9).
Another action of God in 2 Corinthians 3 is that of giving life. In
verse 6, Paul writes: x6 yap ypbtppa amoxt^vvei, to TtveOpa C<j>°rcoTEt.
The contrast of life and death is familiar in the Pauline epistles, and it
is especially important in 2 Corinthians. When this epistle is read as a
unity, it appears that Paul thinks that the church at Corinth is at a 'T'
junction. If they turn with Paul, they will be choosing life. If they
turn away from Paul at this crucial point, their salvation is in
jeopardy.30 Much of the epistle is designed to challenge the Corinthians
to obey Paul, because 'he is God's agent, from whom comes salvation.'31
The significance of life and death as religious metaphors will be explored
in more detail in Chapter 3 of this dissertation, but at this point it is
sufficient to notice the importance of these words in 2 Corinthians 3.
They pervade every section of this chapter as well as passages preceding
and following it (2.14-17 and 4.7-12).
The emphasis at this point is on God as life-giver. The verb CmonoiEto
is variously translated as 'make alive, give life to'. It is used
'especially of dead persons who are called to life'.32 The notion of God
as life-giver is related to his work in creation and resurrection. In
Genesis 2.7, the reader is told that '... the Lord God formed man of dust
from the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man
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became a living being.' The creation narrative suggests that God initiated
life in that which was inanimate. Although ^aanoliu) is not used in the
LXX rendering of the creation narrative, the sense of C<£onox£a>, bringing to
life that which was not formerly alive, is clearly present. This notion is
evident in 1 Corinthians 15.42-50, where Adam is contrasted with Christ: o
"io%axoc, 'A5ap sx<; TivsCjioc CmonotoOv (v. 45). Whereas the first Adam was
breathed upon and became a living soul, the last Adam breathes upon others
and causes them to come alive (cf. 1 Cor 15.22: o^xrnq xax ev xS XpxaxS
Ttbtvxeq C^onoir)8tjaovxax). In this way, Paul develops the motif of the new
creation (2 Cor 5.17), in which a person becomes a new creation by the
agency of Christ, who is himself the life-giving spirit.33
In the Pauline corpus, the notion of the life-giving God is also
connected to the resurrection:
ex 5£ xb nveOpot xoO EYexpavxoc, xov 'ir^aoCv ex vsxpSv
oxxef Iv upxv, o Ivexpac; Xpxcrxdv ex vsxpSv CgorcoxfjoEx
xax xdc Sv^xa ampaxa ifiQv 5xa xoO svoxxoOvxoq auxoO
nvebpaxoq ev upTv (Rom 8.11).
'St. Paul is fond of arguing from the Resurrection of Christ to the
resurrection of the Christian.'God raised Jesus from the dead. He will
also make alive those who believe in him. He will do this through the
power (or on account of the presence) of his spirit.3® His spirit dwells
in (or with) believers.
This passage from Romans will perhaps clarify the meaning of 2
Corinthians 3.6, All men are dead in sins and trespasses before they come
to faith in Christ. It is the role of law to define sin and transgression.
The law was given for life, but in itself it has no lifegiving power.3G It
can point out the extent of one's sin and sinfulness. This leads to death.
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This is the case for every man. But the 'unholy trinity of law, sin, and
death'37 does not have the last word. Through faith in Christ, God
reverses the process, Law, having served its purpose, no longer condemns
the one who has faith in Christ (Rom 8.1-2). It is neither abolished nor
terminated. But once it has performed its function, it is no longer
effective in the salvation process. Because of Christ, sins are forgiven
and sin's power is broken. The believer is no longer a slave to sin but
instead becomes a slave to righteousness. Death, as a metaphor for
alienation from God and as the penalty for sin, is done away with. The
believer is now alive unto God (Rom 6.11), and he 'walks in newness of
life' (Rom 6.4), as one who has 'been brought from death to life' (Rom
6.13). This newness of life is a gift of the spirit, and it is by the
power of the spirit that the believer is transferred from death unto life,
In this way, the spirit makes alive. He is sent by God to anyone who comes
to believe in Christ, and he brings that dead person back to life.33
If the concept of reciprocity is applied to the sequence in verse 6,
'the spirit gives life', then the corollary of 'someone receives life' can
be deduced. In this sequence, the giver of life is logically regarded as
superior to the receiver of life. The receiver, prior to being quickened,
has been overpowered by death. The text states only one possibility for
being made alive - the spirit of God, The donor need not be superior in
every narrative sequence. For example, a king may accept a gift from his
subject without in any way becoming inferior to the donor. But in this
case, the donor of life must logically be superordinate to the receiver.
The receiver is implicitly acknowledged as inferior by his inability to
redress his problem by himself. The necessity to rely upon another more
powerful person requires that the receiver be regarded as inferior and the
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donor as superior. Once again, Paul depicts himself as subordinate to God.
The issue of the text of 2 Corinthians 3.6, indeed of 2 Corinthians as
a whole, is life (cf. 1.8; 2.16; 4.12; 5.15; 6.9). This text portrays God
as one who is able to bring life into situations where there is death,33
There are perhaps many ways to explain how x6 yp&ppa otioxx^vvei . But the
crucial factor for Paul is that all men without Christ are already dead.
And the spirit of God is the only one who can bring them back to life.
This text proposes life for everyone who will turn (Eiuaxp£cpa>, v. 16) to God
and have confidence <Tteiroi0r)criq, v.4) in him. This life is not ordinary
biological life (Btoq) but life of a different quality, the eternal life
which is the gift of God (Crnf), Rom 6.23). This text challenges the reader
to open himself toward God and receive the gift of life which God offers to
him. The re-orientation, though, implies a willingness to acknowledge
one's own helplessness in the present situation. It necessitates a desire
to look to someone else and to acknowledge that other person as more
powerful than one's self. This text claims that that powerful other is
God, and it requires man to accept God as his superior. If man does so, he
receives not only life, but also hope, (2 Cor 3.12), peace (Rom 5.1), and a
host of other gifts from God.
The final actions of God, the ultimate actant, to be considered are
found in 2 Corinthians 3.18:
qpeTq 56 tc&vxec; ctvaxexocXuppdvm rcpoacoji;© xrjv 86£av xopiou
xaxorcxptf;6pevot xf|v auxf|v elx6va pexapopcpoupeQa and
56£r)<; e'q 56£av xa0dnep and xupiou ixveupaxoq.
This verse is long and complex, with 'many ideas crowded together here'.*0
Before attempting to interpret the sentence as a whole, it will be useful
to examine some of its parts.
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The subject is r)pet<; Ttdvteq, or possibly just rjpsiq, since some
manuscripts omit rcdcvTsq; but that problem will be discussed later. At this
point, however, it is clear that r)p.etq at least is the subject, and that
two phrases serve to modify this subject. (1) The first is
avax£xocXi>pp6vG) Ttpoo-mrcm. The perfect participle indicates that the face was
covered with a veil at some point in the past, uncovered at some later
point, and now remains unveiled at the time of writing. This seems to be a
straightforward statement of fact. But who was it that lifted the veil?
According to Exodus 34, Moses both veiled and unveiled himself. Perhaps
Paul is suggesting that believers, who once veiled themselves through
disobedience to God and rejection of his Christ, are those who have now
unveiled themselves. That is, they have seen the error of their ways and
turned to the Lord, trusting in Christ now for salvation. A different
possibility is that the believer's face is uncovered by God. The
participle could be taken as a divine passive and would point to God as the
initiator of the salvation process. He is the one who enables men to see
salvation as coming from outside of themselves, and he is the one who
reveals his glory to them. Since this passive participle is anonymous,
perhaps the primary emphasis of the text is not upon the one who does the
unveiling but rather upon the fact that the veil which once covered the
face is no longer there, and it is now possible to behold/reflect the glory
of the Lord.
(2) The other phrase modifying the subject is Tf|v 6o£av xupfou
xaTOTttpiCbjJievoi. There are two problems with this phrase, textual and
lexical. First, there are textual variants for the participle. The
majority of manuscripts read the text printed above, which is preferred by
Nestle-Aland. However, Minuscule 33 reads xorcorcrpiCopeea, thus putting two
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finite verbs in verse 18 and presumably making two sentences instead of
one. P 46 also reads xaxomxpxCbpeSoc, but it has ox pexapopcpobjievox instead
of psTotjjiopcpoujjieea. Alexandrinus, Origen, and 614 have both xocxorcxpxCbpevox
and pexocpopcpoupevox, thus leaving two participles and no finite verb in the
verse. What sense can be made of this textual situation? It seems most
likely that 33 is the latest stage of textual revision. By emending the
text to have two finite verbs (instead of one or perhaps none in the text
received by the copyist) and thereby two sentences, the awkwardness of this
overloaded sentence is reduced. Because this is the easiest reading, it
is probably not the original. P 46, an early and normally very reliable
text, apppears also to have made an attempt at smoothing out a difficult
predecessor. It is possible that the predecessor contained a verse 18 with
two participles. P 46 would then have made one of them dependent on the
subject rjpexq and the other one the main verb of the sentence. P 46,
which omits rc&vxeq or possibly copies a text which did not include it, can
be translated like this:
We, the ones who are being transformed into the same
image from glory to glory as by the Spirit of the Lord,
are with unveiled face beholding the glory of the Lord.
The rest of the manuscript tradition made the opposite move, keeping
xocxonxpxCdpsvox as a participle of attendant circumstance dependent on the
subject and changing pcxapopcpoupsvox into the finite verb pexapopq>oupe8a.
That leaves A, Origen, and 614, which, it is being suggested here,
preserved the original text which had the two participles, xocxoxrxpxCdpsvox
and pexapopcpoupevox, and no finite verb. This is the most difficult
reading, and it best explains the other variants, which changed either one
or both participles into finite verbs in order to create a syntactically
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correct sentence(s), 41
The second problem with xocxorcxpif bpsvoi is lexical. Collange has
summarized the four possibilities;*2 (1) to behold as in a mirror; (2)
to reflect as a mirror reflects; (3) to behold, without the idea of a
mirror; and (4) both to behold as in a mirror and to reflect as a mirror,
because, since Paul has intentionally employed an ambiguous verb, there is
no need to choose between the alternatives. Bultmann gives the evidence
for options (1) and (2) before deciding in favour of (l).*3 Hughes makes a
case for (3),** and Carrez for (4).*s
It is this fourth option which is most interesting and promising.
Carrez notes that the evidence for 'behold' is weighty indeed. But he also
understands the force of the middle voice in this case to mean that the
subject is personally involved in the action. In a rather passive way, the
believer is viewing the glory of God on the face of Christ. But in a more
active sense, he is also reflecting this glory to others.
Le sens est alors: 'Nous tous, le visage devoild, nous
contemplons et nous refldtons la gloire du Seigneur' .
Ce sens parait conforme A la manifere de proceder de Paul:
il exprime souvent un double mouvement par un seul mot,
toute relation vraie allant de Dieu a 1'homme et en re-
tour de 1'homme A Dieu ainsi qu'aux autres hommes.*e
Carrez does not cite any examples of this 'double mouvement', but the
middle voice of xaxorcxpiCdpevoi, along with the other conflicting evidence
from external sources and the extremely difficult context in which it
appears, should be sufficient to prevent one from hastily eliminating the
ambiguity. Because the middle conveys aspects of both the active and
passive, Carrez seems justified in making this translation. And because
his translation preserves the ambiguity associated with the word itself,
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this interpretation seems to be the most acceptable.
There is one other point in favour of Carrez's proposal. It relates
to the troublesome phrase, xr)v ocuxf|v eixbva. It is almost always attached
in some way to p£xocpop<poi3p£0a, even though a passive verb with an
accusative is rare. If exxmv were the object of a preposition (such as eiq
or xaxdc), it would attach very smoothly to a passive verb such as
pexapopcpobpeOa. Alternatively, eixmv can be regarded as an accusative of
respect. Cerfaux suggested instead that xf|V aux^v eixbvot stands in
apposition to xf|V 86£ccv xupiou, but this attempt has been criticized on
grammatical grounds.'1'7
Plummer, however, says that the construction is not rare. Rather, it
is the regular construction for psxocpop<poOcr0oci. and other compound verbs
formed from psxd, such as pexotfSdXXeiv and psxaXXdooeiv, which need no
preposition to convey the sense of 'to' or 'into' because this is implied
in the verb itself. He states that p.sxapop<po(><j0ax means 'to be transformed
into'. This would work well here, but it would create a dangling
translation in Romans 12.2 and Mark 9.2, where p.£xocpop<poOa0oa is again
passive and there are no complements with which the 'into' can be
connected. He cites parallels from Plato and other classical writers,
showing that pexdt verbs can appear quite normally with a simple accusative.
But all of his illustrations are in the active voice, and the accusative
follows the verb in every case. None of them show an accusative attached
to and preceding a passive pexd verb. Philo, on the other hand, uses pexa-
verbs regularly in De vita Mosis, and every time he uses one in the passive
with an accusative there is a preposition to link them together.'13
It is not impossible that e'xwv is an accusative of respect or an
accusative in the manner indicated by Plummer , though these explanations
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are not without their difficulties. But it is also possible that another
approach could be successful. The suggestion being proposed here is that
xf|v ocuti*|v exxova is the complement not of psxapopcpoupeBoc but rather of
xaxoTixptCdjisvoi. This participle has already been shown to be best
translated by rendering both of its basic meanings, 'behold' and 'reflect'.
It is possible that xf|v 56^av xoptou could be the object of 'behold' and
xf|v auxf|v sxxdva could be the object of 'reflect'. Such an interpretation
could be translated like this: 'All of us, with unveiled face, beholding
the glory of the Lord and reflecting that same image,....' This
arrangement has several points in its favour: (1) It preserves the
ambiguity which is inherent in xocxoixxpiCopsvoi. (2) It provides a
suitable complement for each of the English verbs used to translate the two
senses of xaxoTtxpiCopevox. <3) It allows the accusative which follows the
participle to be the object of that participle, a perfectly natural and
easy interpretation of a participle followed by an accusative, (4) It
eliminates the awkwardness of trying to force xf^v auxqv exxova to be
construed with p.sxapop<pou}j.£8oc, (5) It allows pexajjiopcpoufjieSa to be linked
directly to the phrase &rc6 56|q<; exq 56£av, which is its most natural
grammatical connection.
The above proposal interprets verse 18a as a variation of the
grammatical construction called zeugma. Zeugma is defined as the 'placing
of two words in the same relation to another that is suited to one only of
them'.'1'5' An example is: She arrived in a car and a fit of rage. The
preposition 'in' is connected grammatically to both phrases which follow it
in the sentence. The one sentence may be analyzed into two. 'She arrived
in a car' is simple enough, and the preposition, used locatively here, is
well suited to its complement. But 'She arrived in a fit of rage' requires
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the reader to adjust his understanding of the preposition, because 'in' now
signifies an attendant circumstance, not a location. 'In' does not connect
with 'fit of rage' in the same way as it connects with 'a car'. This
example is rather simple, and it presents no particular problem of
understanding. The average Scotsman could make the necessary adaptation of
meaning, perhaps without even consciously thinking about it.
In the case of 2 Corinthians 3.18a, the construction is somewhat more
complicated. The participle here requires the reader to think of its two
different meanings, in a similar way as he recognized the two senses of
'in' in the example above. Just as each complement of 'in' suggested how
the preposition was to be understood, so also in verse 18a each direct
object indicates which meaning of xaxorcxpiCdpsvox should correspond with
it. In comparing the two dispensations, Paul states that every believer,
not just one privileged leader, can behold the glory of God.so After
having beheld the glory, each believer will naturally reflect the same
image of that glory on his face.s1 So it is that each object calls for a
different nuance of the same verb.
Two new suggestions have been made thus far with respect to verse 18.
First, the original text most likely read two participles instead of one
verb and one participle or two finite verbs. Second, xaxonxpiCopevoi
should be interpreted as conveying both of its meanings in this context,
because the two direct objects call for two different senses of the verb.
Now what significance do these proposals have for the interpretation
of this verse? How could it be interpreted with no finite verb?
Participles standing alone may occasionally function as imperatives.52 The
entire textual and interpretative tradition has taken this verse as an
indicative, as statements about what God through the spirit is doing and
89
will do for believers. This surely is no mistake, and, if it were, it
would involve a mammoth project to point out the errors. However, it is
possible that these participles may originally have had some imperatival
force, in addition to their indicative function. Since all believers are
now with unveiled face, it is important that they view not Moses but the
glory of the Lord. Since all believers are now able to behold the divine
glory, they should reflect that same image to others, and not hide their
light under a bushel basket (cf. Mt 5.15), Since the spirit is the power
of God at work within the believer to transform him, he should not hamper
or resist this divine process of transformation. These participles were
surely meant to be understood as indicatives, but there is also an implicit
imperatival force lying nearby.
The actions of God in verse 18 may now be summarized. If believers
are able to behold and reflect the divine glory, it is because God has
revealed his glory to them by means of Christ. Some Old Testament
narratives suggest that the glory of God is a brilliant splendour which is
revealed only on certain rare occasions (for example, Ex 33; Is 6; Ez 39).
But it is the teaching of Paul here that the divine glory is always on
display. If anyone will gaze intently upon the face of Christ, he will see
the glory of God, That which had been concealed is now revealed, so that
it can be seen by all who have been unveiled.
Secondly, it is God who transforms believers. This transformation is
not a magical or mystical process, but rather the power of God at work in
the lives of believers.It does not occur 'through some ecstatic
experience' but rather through a gradual and continual process which
'transforms all of one's relationships within history'.The goal of the
transformation is not that the believer will become deity,ss but rather
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that he will be changed from one degree of glory to another, until he has a
glory fit for the kingdom of God.se And all of this is accomplished by God
through the power of his spirit.
In summary, then, it is being suggested that xocxonxpi Cops vox be
translated in such a way as to maintain the double meaning of 'behold' and
'reflect'. This can be done by viewing both 5o^a and e'x©v as objects of
xocxortxpxCdpsvoi. Such an interpretation recognizes the surplus of meaning
in xaxoTtxpiC6p£voi and allows the translator the freedom to express it.
This suggestion may not be entirely acceptable, but it is an attempt to
deal with a textual problem whose previously proposed solutions were not
entirely satisfactory either.
The roles of God which have been displayed in 2 Corinthians 3 may now
be summarized. God has been viewed as creator. As creator, he is superior
to the creation and to humanity, to which he has given both physical life
and spiritual life. God is also lord or master, and in this role he Is
superior to slaves. At this time, only those who have believed in Christ
are called his slaves, but some day every knee will bow and acknowledge the
lordship of Christ. Then Christ will hand over the kingdom to God, who is
also the father of Christ and the father of all believers. The role of
father is only implied in our text, by means of the mention of Christ,
Christ is the son of God, but, for Paul, Christ is also the first born of
many brethren, so, by implication, all believers are also sons of God.
This is stated explicitly in the greeting of all the Pauline epistles,
where God is called 'our father'. As it is in the human family, where all
the children are subordinate to the father, so it is also in the family of
God, where all believers are subordinate to God. For Paul, Christ is the
ideal model of sonship, because he has humbled himself and been obedient
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unto death. All the younger children are exhorted to imitate the example
of Christ. The God who is creator and father is also revealer and
transformer. Through the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus and
through the preaching of the gospel he has revealed his power and glory.
To those who trust Jesus God has promised a transformation, a changing from
glory to glory.
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SECTION C. PAUL AND THE WORLD OF 2 CORINTHIANS 3.
Paul plays many roles: father, son, overseer, slave, emissary, and
the sender of emissaries. In the Corinthian correspondence, he portrays
his relation to God and the Corinthians by means of the many different
roles he assumes. In this section, the topics of investigation are Paul's
roles and the actions which correspond to these roles. The investigation
consists of two parts. In the first, the Corinthian correspondence as a
whole will be surveyed in order to identify Paul's roles in relation to God
and the Corinthians. This rather lengthy overview will identify in turn
four different language fields - family, workers, emissaries, and servitude
which Paul uses to spell out his involvement with God and the
Corinthians. In this Pauline panorama, it will be seen that Paul depicts
himself as always subordinate to God, but as alternating between
superordinate, subordinate, and equal in his standing with the Corinthians.
In the second phase of the enquiry, the focus will be upon 2 Corinthians 3
in particular and on Paul's role of Sidxovoq which is so prominent there.
The examination of 2 Corinthians 3 will reveal that Paul uses the 6i6xovoq
metaphor in this smaller text to display the same relations which he
illustrates with such variety in the larger text of the Corinthian
correspondence as a whole; namely, that he is always an underling of God,
but that his status with the Corinthians varies. If Paul used words to
paint pictures of his relationships with God and the church at Corinth,
then the Corinthian epistles are a mural, and 2 Corinthians 3 is a
miniature.
Paul uses family language to talk about God. As mentioned in the
preceding section, God is depicted in the Pauline epistles as the 'father'
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of all the believers. By calling God his 'father' (1 Cor 1.3; 2 Cor 1.2),
Paul recognizes his own role as that of a child, who is subordinate to the
parent. In this family, Paul is an obedient child, and God is the good
provider:
And God is able to provide you with every blessing
in abundance, so that you may always have enough of
everything and may provide in abundance for every
good work (2 Cor 9.8).
To talk of the father of a family is to speak literally. For an American,
however, to say that 'George Washington is the father of my country' is to
use metaphorical language. 'God is my father' is also metaphorical. It
suggests that all believers now relate to one another in a different way.
This new relation is as brothers and sisters. God is responsible for this
new relationship. He has started a family. In this family, God is the
'father', Jesus is 'older brother', and all believers are 'brothers'. The
institution of family is especially significant in the Corinthian
correspondence, where he calls that congregation 'brethren' no less than
twenty-three times.1 By naming them as brothers, he is recognizing the
equality of roles which they share. Both he and they are children of God,
and thus brothers to each other.
In the Corinthian epistles, Paul calls other believers 'brother' also.
In the greeting of 1 Corinthians, he identifies Sosthenes as co-author and
brother (1.1), and in 2 Corinthians, he names Timothy in the same manner
(1,1). In another passage, Paul calls Timothy his 'son' (1 Cor 4,17), but
that reference will be discussed below (p. 98). Other mentions of brothers
are: Apollos (1 Cor 16,12); Titus (2 Cor 2.13); and the anonymous brothers
who are 'messengers of the churches' (2 Cor 8.23).
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Paul's use of 'brother' indicates his acceptance of all fellow-believ¬
ers as equals, at least in respect of their common faith in Christ. Since
he and the Corinthians are brothers, they are equals. They are neither
subordinate nor superordinate to each other. Thus, they do not have
authority over one another. Rather, they are all subject to the authority
of the father. As brothers, and therefore equals, Paul has no inherent
authority over the Corinthians. The only authority Paul or any other
brother might expect to have is a moral authority earned from the others on
the basis of a superior wisdom, character, and conduct. As brothers in
this family, though, no one can demand hegemony over the other brothers,
since all are equally subordinate to the father.
Even though Paul often uses egalitarian terminology to refer to the
Corinthian believers, it is clear from the Corinthian correspondence that
Paul consistently acts like one who has authority over this congregation.
This is stated explicitly in 2 Corinthians 10.8 and 13.10:
For even if I boast a little too much of our authority,
which the Lord gave for building you up and not for de¬
stroying you, I shall not be put to shame.
I write this while I am away from you, in order that
when I come I may not have to be severe in my use of
the authority which the Lord has given me for building
up and not for tearing down.
These texts indicate that from the Lord Paul has received authority over
the Corinthians. Paul qualifies the purpose of the authority. It is
neither arbitrary nor totalitarian. Rather, it is for the edification of
the church. It is clear that Paul writes as one who is convinced that he
has authority and as one who is attempting to exert it.
Authority, though, as a social phenomenon, is a reciprocal
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relationship. One has authority only to the extent that it is recognized
by the intended subjects.2 It can be delegated, as in this case from the
Lord to Paul, but, in order for it to be effective, it must be accepted by
the underlings. Paul is one who, according to himself anyway, has been
given authority by the Lord over the Corinthians. The real issue now is
whether the Corinthians will acknowledge it by becoming submissive to Paul.
Paul expects the Corinthians to be obedient to him.
For this is why I wrote, that I might test you and know
whether you are obedient in everything (2 Cor 2.9).
It is not clear which role Paul is playing as he writes these words.
Surely he writes as one who thinks he has authority, but it is not apparent
whether this is the authority of a father, a master, or some other figure.
However this passage does indicate that Paul thinks that he has
jurisdiction in this matter and that therefore he has the authority to
intervene. It further shows that he expects the Corinthians to recognize
his authority by their obedience to his exhortation.3 The test (Soxipfj) of
their obedience is also the confirmation of his authority.
The example of 2 Corinthians 2.9, cited above, is just an explicit
case of Paul's seeking to get the Corinthians to ratify his authority.
This occurs implicitly in his repeated exhortations, suggestions, and
warnings to them. All through 1 Corinthians Paul issues instructions and
orders about community life in the congregation at Corinth. This implies
that he has the right to direct their affairs, to some extent. It also
implies that he expects them to abide by his rulings on these points of
controversy. The fact that they had previously written to him, inquiring
about certain matters, implies on their part that they thought that he had
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some degree of jurisdiction in their affairs (e.g., 1 Cor 7.1).
Even though Paul calls the Corinthians 'brothers', it is clear that he
does not always act like brother. The examples cited above show that Paul
exerts (or tries to exert) authority over the church. This is not properly
a fraternal relationship. How does Paul justify this?
One answer may be found in another of Paul's uses of family language.
In several passages, he refers to himself as 'father' of the Corinthians.
That Paul can conceive of himself as both brother and father to the
Corinthians may help to explain the fact of Paul's occasional intervention
in the church at Corinth.
Paul's role as father of the Corinthians is most explicit in 1
Corinthians 4. 14~17a:
I do not write this to you to make you ashamed, but to
admonish you as my beloved children. For though you
have countless guides in Christ, you do not have many
fathers. For I became your father in Christ Jesus
through the gospel. I urge you, then, be imitators of
me. Therefore I sent to you Timothy, my beloved and
faithful child in the Lord....
Paul has indeed already shamed his readers in 1 Corinthians 4.7-13, but he
now says that he wrote that out of his fatherly love for them. He implies
that no one could love them more than he does, because he is their father.d
He became their father by preaching the gospel of Jesus Christ to them.
They became his children (t£xvoc) by believing the gospel.s As their father
he is superior, and this superiority is demonstrated: (1) by his appeal
for them to imitate him (v.16); (2) by his ability to shame them, though he
prefers rather to appeal and to admonish (vv.14,16); and, most of all, (3)
by the power of the rod of discipline which he wields over them (v.21).G
Rather than come in person at this time and use the rod, though, he shows
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his fatherly affection by both writing them a letter and sending them
Timothy to give them guidance and encouragement (1 Cor 4.17).
The mention of Timothy in 1 Corinthians 4. as 'my beloved and faithful
child in the Lord' is no accident. Timothy would already have been known
to the Corinthians as a fellow-preacher of Paul (2 Cor 1.19). One might
assume that, as a co-worker and 'brother' (2 Cor 1.1), Timothy was on equal
terms with Paul, Yet here Paul refers to him as his son. As a beloved
son, he is being identified with the Corinthians, as one among those whom
Paul had led to faith in Christ. But as a faithful son, he is being held
up to the Corinthians as an example of how to be an imitator of Paul.
Timothy knows the teachings of Paul and adheres to them faithfully. Paul
rather subtly admonishes the Corinthians to do likewise. The faithful son
is sent to encourage the other sons to become faithful also.
Because Paul is father to the Corinthians, he has affection for them
and authority over them.7 He has the right to instruct them and to expect
them to obey him. If they do not obey, he threatens to punish them with
the rod of discipline, though he prefers to come to them 'with love in a
spirit of gentleness' <1 Cor 4.21). So it may be concluded that it is at
least partially on the basis of his role as father that Paul can exert
authority over the Corinthians.®
Three times in 2 Corinthians Paul implies that he is father to the
believers in Corinth.3 The first instance is in an appeal for them to
reciprocate a candour which he uses with them:
Our mouth is open to you, Corinthians; our heart is wide.
You are not restricted by us, but you are restricted in
your own affections. In return - I speak as to children -
widen your hearts also (6.11-13).
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Using a pastoral tone, Paul pleads for warmer personal relations with the
Corinthians. 'This appeal is marked by a warmth and tenderness',10 which
indicates that Paul as parent is not scolding them as he does in 1
Corinthians 3, In calling them 'children', Paul assumes the role of
father. As a superior, he appeals to them to diminish the distance between
them and himself and enter into an intimate relationship more
characteristic of children with their parents.
The language of parent and child is also implied in 2 Corinthians
11.2:
I feel a divine jealousy for you, for I betrothed you
to Christ to present you as a pure bride to her one
husband.
Although the imagery here is a little confused,11 there can still be little
doubt that Paul is taking the role of a father presenting his daughter as a
virgin bride to her husband. According to Jewish marriage customs, it is
the father who presents his daughter to the groom, and it is the father who
is 'responsible for safeguarding his daughter's virginity between the time
of her betrothal and the time when he actually leads her into the
bridegroom's house'.12 It is on the basis of his role as parent that Paul
chides the Corinthians for their willingness to be led astray by the
teaching of other apostles. As a father, he expresses his concern for the
well-being of their faith.
The third and final occurrence of parent-child language in 2
Corinthians is in 12. 14-15:
Here for the third time I am ready to come to you.
And I will not be a burden, for I seek not what is
yours but you; for children ought not to lay up for
their parents, but parents for their children. I
will most gladly spend and be spent for your souls.
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Paul is not scolding or disciplining his converts here. Rather, he is
conveying his love for them and contrasting his methods with those of his
opponents. 'Through the Gospel, Paul had begotten them as Christians, and
was therefore responsible for, and for maintaining, their Christian
existence; they were in no sense responsible for him,113 Since Paul is the
parent of the Corinthians, he has the responsibility not only to nourish
them but also the right to exercise authority over them. 'Paul has a
superordinate role in relation to all those whom he converts.'14
The Corinthian epistles, then, portray Paul in two completely
different family roles in relation to the Corinthians. Since both he and
they are children of God, he is, on the one hand, a brother, and therefore,
equal to them. But, with reference to their entrance into the Christian
faith, Paul considers himself a father and the Corinthians his children.
As father, Paul can apply stern discipline, but he prefers, in loving
authority, to appeal and admonish, In this family relationship, Paul is
superior. As parent to the Corinthians, Paul has both rights and
responsibilities which he does not have as their brother.15
In addition to family terminology, Paul also uses 'working' language
to define his roles and his relationships vis-h-vis God and with the
Corinthians. This is one of his favourite metaphors for describing his
missionary activity.15 '"Work" is for him primarily a metaphor for the
noneconomic productivity of believers among believers (1 Cor 15,58; 1 Thess
1,3) and particularly for the productivity of those believers like himself
who have a special role to play in relation to the gospel.'1'7
Paul is not alone in the work of the Lord. He has co-workers. First
and foremost among these is God. 'For we are God's fellow workers' (1 Cor
3.9).165 This statement occurs in the midst of a passage which deals with
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the relationship of Paul and Apollos as they work for God among the
Corinthians (1 Cor 3.5-17), The Corinthians are the field and the building
which are the workplace for Paul and Apollos, God owns the field and the
building, and he works there too. He is a working manager, a working
owner. He is not simply a gentleman farmer, who lives in town and sends
others to do all of the work. He is involved in the work, too. And the
text portrays Paul as one of those who labours alongside of God on the farm
and the construction site.
Another of Paul's co-workers is Apollos (1 Cor 3,5-9). Apollos
appears to be an equal of Paul. His name, like Paul's, is attached to one
of the four parties in the church at Corinth (1 Cor 1.12; 3.4). Paul
identifies both Apollos and himself as 5i&xovoi (3.5). Paul had one job
(planting), and Apollos had another (watering), but both are insignificant
in comparison to God, who causes the growth (3,6-7). Their equality would
seem to be indisputable, according to 1 Corinthians 3.8-9:
He who plants and he who waters are equal, and each
shall receive his wages according to his labour. For
we are God's fellow workers; you are God's field,
God's building.
Paul asserts here that he and Apollos are equal. Both are hired workers
under the employ of God. Both will receive wages according to their
effort. Lietzmann notes that cruvepYOi can mean both Leute "die mit
Gott arbeiten" und "die miteinander im Dienste Gottes arbeiten"'.13 So
both as workers together with God and as workers with each other in the
service of God, Paul seems to be stating his equality with Apollos. This
is confirmed by the conjunction of Paul, Apollos, and Cephas in 1
Corinthians 3.22 and by Apollos' refusal to heed the suggestion of Paul (1
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Cor 16.12), which indicates his independence of Paul and the non-necessity
of his submitting to the authority of Paul.
But Paul does not always view Apollos as his equal, for there are
subtle suggestions in the text which indicate the contrary. 1 In both agri¬
cultural and building construction metaphors, Paul depicts his job as
temporally prior to and as of more fundamental significance than
Apollos's. '20 This becomes clearer in verses 10-15, where Paul depicts
himself as the one who lays the foundation and warns those who build upon
it to be careful in their construction. Whatever is built upon the
foundation which Paul lays must be congruent with the gospel of Jesus
Christ which Paul preaches. This implicit warning to Apollos and the
parties in Corinth is a clear attempt by Paul to assert his superiority.
It shows that he thinks of himself as still responsible for the quality of
the building, even though he only laid the foundation and then moved on.
He writes as one who has the power of veto over all of the construction
plans and work of the church. 'As the foundation layer Paul has the
ultimate superordinate authority' in the local community.21 Thus Paul
represents himself as superior to his co-worker Apollos, despite all of his
explicit statements to the contrary.
Another co-worker mentioned in the Corinthian correspondence is Titus:
'As for Titus, he is my partner and fellow worker in your service' <2 Cor
8.23a). As a partner and co-worker, one would assume again that Paul is
regarding Titus as an equal. Support for this is seen in Paul's reference
to him as 'my brother' <2 Cor 2.13), and in Paul's appeal (not command) for
Titus to go back to Corinth in order to complete the good work he had begun
there. Titus agrees to this appeal and goes there 'of his own accord'.
But again, as in the case of Apollos, these explicit signs of equality
102
and independence conceal Paul's authority.2:2 'The subordinacy of the fel¬
low workers to Paul is principally reflected in the fact that Paul usually
initiates their actions.'23 In this case, Paul strongly implies that he is
sending Titus, in that he says that he is sending other men along with
(avfiniixna) Titus (2 Cor 8.18-22). Similarly, Paul appeals (TtapaxaX£a>) to
Titus to return to Corinth, and he states he is sending with him
(CTUvomocrt£\\a>) 'the brother' <2 Cor 12.18). On another occasion, Paul
writes that 'I went up again to Jerusalem with Barnabas, taking Titus along
me' (Gal 2.1). The reference to 'taking' (crupitapaXapBdvo)) is a clear sign
that Paul perceives Titus as a subordinate. If Titus is indeed a partner
and co-worker with Paul, then Paul is clearly the senior partner. Thus,
the explicit language of equality with Titus is undermined by implicit
suggestions of a hierarchical pattern in their relationship. 'The fact is
that Paul sends all of his emissaries because they are his emissaries.
They go from him, work for him where they are sent, and return to him (cf.
1 Cor 16.10-11; 2 Cor 2.12-13 and 7.5-16; 1 Thess 3.1-8).'2*
The last of the co-worker passages to be considered is 2 Corinthians
1.24:
Not that we lord it over your faith; we work with
you for your joy, for you stand firm in your faith.
In this verse, Paul declares himself a co-worker with the Corinthians.25
As such, he is not lord (Kupioq) over them.26. He is renouncing a role
superior to them, and instead adopting a role of equality. In most other
'work' passages, Paul portrays the Corinthians as the product of his work.
But, in this verse, Paul portrays them as workers and co-workers with
himself, in order to generate a rapport with the Corinthians and to reduce
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the tensions which had arisen since his last visit.
Although Paul depicts himself as a co-worker with the Corinthians, he
still sees himself in some sense superordinate to them. For after the
egalitarian language of 2 Corinthians 1,24, he is soon giving them
instructions and suggestions again, indicating his role of primary care¬
giver for them and authority over them (2.5-9). So it seems that at times
Paul's egalitarian language is only a thin veil for his superordinate
position in all of the churches he has founded.
In addition to the language of the family and the workplace, Paul also
uses terms from the 'emissary' word field to depict his roles. He often
refers to himself as an cot6cjto\o<; (e.g., 1 Cor 1.1; 2 Cor 1.1), and once he
uses the verb npeobeuco (2 Cor 5.20) to describe his activity. In addition
to being one who is sent, he also sends other men on missions (e.g., 1 Cor
4. 17; 2 Cor 8.18).
3An6oTo\oc;, from coioctt£\\g>, means, of course, one who is sent out or
?
sent away on a mission. In the New Testament, anooxoAoq has four related
but distinguishable meanings:27, '(1) one who is sent, and sent with full
authority; (2) one who is lawfully charged to represent the person and
cause of another; (3) the commissioned representative of a congregation (2
Cor 8.23; Phil 2.25); and (4) a bearer of the New Testament message,' The
first three of these meanings are usually translated by either 'delegate,
envoy, or messenger', but the fourth is translated by 'apostle', because
it has the more restricted sense of one serving a special function in a
Christian community.2e It is this final sense which is most relevant to an
understanding of Paul's role as an apostle, though one must acknowledge
that Paul never '... quotes a generally held definition of the apostle.129
The term 'apostle', as it applies to Paul, has "... often been
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investigated, but with varying results',30 It does seem to be fairly
clear, though, that he views his apostleship as a commission given him by
God and not by man. ' It did not come to him in the ordinary course of
events, but by a definite Divine decree.'31 Accordingly, Paul, 'a divinely
appointed emissary',32 felt compelled to follow this calling of preaching
the gospel of Jesus Christ <1 Cor 9.16-17).
As one sent by God, he goes with the full authority of God. In
Galatians 1.1, Paul calls himself an apostle and then stresses the sender:
Jesus Christ and God the father who raised him from the dead. As an
anoCTToXoq, Paul puts the emphasis upon the sender, who has initiated both
the mission and the message which is entrusted to Paul. Paul has something
like a 'power of attorney' from God, a permission to act for him and to
speak for him (2 Cor 2.17). He has been commissioned to preach a message
of reconciliation (2 Cor 5.19). So in this sense, 'apostle' means much the
same as 'professional missionary',33 for he is one who is commissioned to
go and tell. But Paul is adamant that he was not sent by any man or human
institution. For him, the apostolate is not an office in an organization
nor a position to which one is elected.3/1 Rather, it is '... a product of
God's decision that a certain function be performed by certain
individuals'.35 Furthermore, the apostolate is not a local function like
some others mentioned in 1 Corinthians 12 and Romans 12. Rather, it is an
itinerant function, with a 'translocal authority' ,35 which supersedes the
authority of any local office or function.
In this role, Paul is unquestionably subordinate to God, since the
sender is always greater than the one who is sent <Jn 13. 16).37 For this
same reason, Paul is superordinate to all those in his missionary
entourage, since he sends them on missions for him. Furthermore, Paul, as
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an apostle, must be regarded as superordinate to the churches which he has
founded, since he comes to them with the full authority of God. He is
acting on the initiative of God. He is proclaiming a story not about
himself but about Jesus Christ (2 Cor 4.5). He does not send himself, but
he is sent by one who is greater than himself and the Corinthians. When
Paul speaks, people listen, or at least he thinks they should, since he
speaks for God. As one who has encountered the Risen Christ and been
commissioned by him, he has been smitten by the mighty power of God. And
once smitten, he is forever driven - driven to fulfil the mission which has
been assigned to him.
Somewhat parallel to Paul's self-characterization as apostle is that
of ambassador:
> C
cYmep XpioxoO oOv Trpeogsuopev ox; toO 0eoC TtapaxocXouv-
xoq 5i* ifpaSv. 6e6ps0a orc^p Xpicrcob, xaxaXXdr^Te xft
0e« (2 Cor 5,20). 1
i
Now mpsopeuco, unlike otKooxoXoq, does betray in secular Greek writings a
history of diplomatic usage. It can mean simply 'to be one who is sent',
but it can also signify 'to bring a message' and 'to negotiate'.36* Philo
uses the word in a religious sense, to indicate the mediatorial ministry of
Moses and of others who represent men to God and God to men.33 Thus,
TipsoPeuxr^q comes to signify not a title or an office but a function.
So in this passage, Paul is saying that he is doing the work of an
ambassador. He is doing it on the orders of Christ, since umbp often
indicates the one who commissions and authorizes the ambassador,AO Thus,
his preaching is official and authoritative. He is representing Christ
when he speaks. And when he pleads with the Corinthians, it is as though
God himself were appealing to them. Once again, Paul casts himself as one
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who is subordinate to God and superior to the Corinthians.
Paul, then, is one who is sent by God on a special mission. He can ex¬
press this either by the noun artocrtoXoq or by the verb npeoPeuco. But Paul
is also one who sends. He sends Titus and Timothy as his emissaries to
Corinth. But they are not called apostles. Paul calls them 'brother', 'co¬
worker', and 'partner', but not 'apostle'.*1 But since they are his emi¬
ssaries, they share in his authority. So when he sends them to Corinth,
they are (theoretically) superordinate to the church there. Apparently
these men did a good job. Whether their success is due to Paul's authority
or to their own ability may never be known. But what can be known is that
Paul had the authority to send men on missions, and these men recognized
that authority by going and doing as they were instructed.
The final category of roles with which Paul characterizes himself in
the Corinthian correspondence is drawn from the language of servitude.
Paul is a 5oOXoc;. There is a xupioq who owns him body and soul. He works
for the master, doing whatever he is told. As a 5oOXo<;, he is not a free
man. He is under obligation to serve his master. In using SoOXoc; as a
self-referential term, Paul may occasionally intend to portray himself as a
courtier of the king of heaven, as an official working for the God of his
fathers. Such a possibility is Romans 1.1-6, where Paul appears as a slave
entrusted by God with a major project, 'to bring about the obedience of
faith for the sake of his name among all the nations' (Rom 1.5b). As
SoiSXoq, Paul is always to be regarded as subordinate to the xuptoq. But as
5o6Xoq he may serve in any number of positions of various rank and honour.
One of these offices is oixovopta, the management or administration of
y
a household. Paul writes: oixovopicxv ttstuaxeupai (1 Cor 9.17). He has
been entrusted with a responsibility to oversee the estate of his master.
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As overseer, his title is oixovdpoq (1 Cor 4.1). The prime requirement of
•J
an oixovdpoq is that he be trustworthy, because the possessions of his
master are under his care (1 Cor 4.2). As an oixovopoq, he is subordinate
to his master. But, because the oixovopoq was often the overseer of all
the slaves of the household, he is superordinate to the rest of the
domestic staff.*2 This accords well with Paul's use of relationship
language elsewhere. He uses egalitarian language to indicate that all
believers are on the same level (all are sons, all are slaves). But he
also uses hierarchical language to talk about church order. Yes, he is a
slave, but he is also an oxxovdpoq, with authority over the Corinthians.
There is a continuing tension in the epistles between the egalitarian and
the hierarchical. Paul's use of SoOXoq and oixov6poq is just one example.
£
Another term which shows Paul to be a servant is UJtqp6xr|q, which he
uses in 1 Corinthians 4.1:
Obxcoq qpaq Xoyi7&v0po>7ioq coq urcqp^xaq Xpiaxob xai
orxovdpouq puaxqpxmv 9eo£>.
In classical Greek, an urcqp^xqq denotes someone who works under the
supervision and instruction of a superior. He may be, among other things,
a soldier's helper, a physician's assistant, or a builder's apprentice.
The uftqp^xriq, in contrast to a 8oOXoq, is a free man and willingly accepts
subordination to his master. He is still bound to obey, but he does so as
a free man and not as a slave. These connotations are carried over almost
intact into Hellenistic Judaism, where the emphasis continues to be on the
service rendered freely to a superior, who gives the instructions and sets
C
the goals. Philo characterizes Joseph as a OTtr)p£xr|q, and Josephus likewise
Moses, since both are God's assistants in the accomplishing of his will.*3
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Paul uses 07tr)p£xT)c; only once (1 Cor 4.1) and applies it to himself and
Apollos, as men who are committed to obey God. God tells them what to do,
and they do it. Since Paul and Apollos are taking orders from God, they
are not subject to the judgment of the Corinthians.
This context establishes clearly that Paul subordinates himself to
God. He should not be condemned by others, because he is following
c
instructions issued by God. But, in using U7ir)p£xr)<;, Paul is also subtly
implying his superiority over the Corinthians. As an assistant to and a
'co-agent1of God, he is related hierarchically to his congregation.
Paul is no ordinary believer, but rather one who is intimately related to
Christ, as an apprentice who works daily with a master craftsman. He
receives instructions directly from his supervisor, so he knows how things
are supposed to be done. There is, then, an implication here that the
Corinthians should subordinate themselves to Paul, as he has subordinated
himself to Christ.
The final self-characterization which Paul uses from the semantic
field of servitude is Si&xovoc;. In the New Testament, 8xdxovoq is used in
several different senses. (1) It carries its original concrete sense of
one who is 'a waiter at a meal', as in John 2.5. <2) It has the slightly
developed meaning of 'a servant of a master', as in Matthew 22.13. (3) It
also signifies in a figurative sense 'a servant' or 'a helper' who is
attached to a spiritual entity, such as 5txaio<7i3vr| (2 Cor 11.15),
TP
euocYyeXiov (Col 1.23), and Xpxaxdq (2 Cor 11.23). (4) It denotes an
official position in the church (Rom le.l).^5
The distinguishing sense of Si&xovoc; (and its cognates) as contrasted
with other Greek words in this semantic field is that it points to the act
of the service performed and the benefit of that service for its
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recipients.Ae This is clearly exemplified in 1 Corinthians 3.5, where Paul
, c
indicates that he and Apollos are nothing but ... 5iaxovoi 5i ffiv
y
src i axeboats. The emphasis of this statement is not upon the servant him¬
self but upon the result of the service performed. Because Paul and
Apollos fulfilled their assignments, the Corinthians came to believe in
Christ. Paul is playing down the significance of his and Apollos' work,
noting that they are only instruments used by God to bring the Corinthians
to faith,As a Si&xovoq, Paul is God's helper or errand boy.
In this role, Paul is clearly subordinate to God, who has commissioned
and sent him. The role of Sidocovoq implies the existence of at least three
persons: the sender or master; the Sidtxovoc, himself; and the persons who
benefit from the service. Normally, one might assume that the Siaxovoq is
inferior not only to his master but also to the recipients of his service.
The persons seated at the table are greater than the persons serving the
meal. The dinner guests of the king are of higher rank than the waiters
and waitresses.
Elsewhere, Paul calls himself a servant of the new alliance (2 Cor
3.6); a servant of God <2 Cor 6.4); and a servant of Christ <2 Cor 11.23).
Thus it appears that, for Paul, the role of 5i6xovo<; was virtually
identical to that of aitocrxoXoq, and it may be translated by ' envoy',
since it involves the work of missionary preaching rather than acts of
charity. When Sidcxovoq is thought of as a functional equivalent of
coibaxoXoq, the notions of leadership and authority surface again. Though
Paul is in one sense a servant for the Corinthians, he is in another sense
their authority figure also.
Having examined the Corinthian correspondence to determine the roles
of Paul, the results of this first part will be summarized. It is clear
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that Paul always characterizes himself as subordinate to God. Even in
passages in which Paul seems to indicate an equality of roles (CTUvepyot, 1
Cor 3.9; auvspyoOvxec,, 2 Cor 6.1), the context indicates that God is a
worker of a superior order, and that his work is qualitatively superior to
that of Paul, of Apollos, and, by implication, of all men. Similarly, Paul
always depicts himself as superior to his missionary companions. Even
though he uses egalitarian language to depict their roles (partner, co¬
worker, brother), he also uses hierarchical language in order to make clear
that his relationship is superordinate to theirs. Because Paul is
superordinate, he can call them 'son' (of Timothy, for example, in 1 Cor
4.17), and he can send them as his emissaries (2 Cor 8). In relation to
the Corinthians, the situation is similar. Paul seems to regard them as
equals. Both he and they are slaves, brothers, co-workers, sons of God.
But Paul also uses hierarchical language in regard to the Corinthians. He
calls them his children. He portrays himself as one in authority over
them, by using language of family, workers, emissaries, and servitude.
Thus there is a tension in his depiction of his relationship with the
Corinthians, as he uses both egalitarian and hierarchical language for his
roles. He looks like a brother, but he acts like a father.
In the second part of the investigation, the focus will be on 2
Corinthians 3 and especially on Paul's use of Sidtxovoq as a self-
designation, As a Siotxovoc, in this passage, Paul will continue to appear
as always subordinate to God, but he will appear to have three different
relations to the Corinthians.
In verse 3, Paul refers to the Corinthians as an £7Uoxo\r) XpioxoB
c - c
SiaxovqGetaa u<p qpSSv. In this verse, Paul is seen to be subordinate to the
Corinthians. They are portrayed as a letter of Christ, while he plays the
111
lowly role of servant. This may mean that he is an amanuensis, taking
dictation from Christ and actually writing the document. Or it may signify
the duty of errand boy, delivering the letter to its destination. Possibly
it involved the activity of proper care and attention for those who
constitute the letter. In any case, Paul is designating a lowly role for
himself, and showing himself to be a helper for the benefit of the
Corinthians. This characterization is similar to that of 4.5, in which
Paul says he is a 5oOXoq upffiv 5idt Xpiotdv. This does not mean that Paul is
a slave owned by the Corinthians, Rather, he belongs to Christ, who has
assigned him to labour for the benefit of the Corinthians.
The lowly rank of Paul is reinforced by 3.5, in which Paul declares
that he is not sufficient for the job to which he has been assigned.
^Ixavbq is variously understood as sufficient, adequate, qualified, fit, or
competent. It suggests that one has the necessary resources to cope with
the demands that arise. This Paul says he is quite unable to do. But he
does his work anyway, because he is made competent for his work by God.
God's faithful and powerful dealing with Paul gives him confidence
<neTtof0T]<Jiq, v. 4) in his relationship toward God. Though only a servant,
Paul knows that God always treats him fairly and sometimes even better than
he deserves. Paul's nenotQqoiq comes about through Christ, who was
mistreated by men but in the end was vindicated by God through
resurrect ion.
The project in which Paul is involved is full of glory, even more
glory than accompanied Moses during the inauguration of the old covenant
(vv.7-11). As a minister of the new covenant, Paul participates in its
greater glory. The humble servant (Stdxovoq) is also a glorious minister
(5iaxovoq)! It is quite probable that, as a minister of the new covenant,
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Paul is contemplating also the divine commission he was given and the
divine authorization which would have accompanied it. As a preacher of the
good news and as an organizer of Jesus communities, Paul has the power to
instruct, discipline, and guide the new congregations. Such a Si&xovoc; is
superordinate, since he has been specially chosen by God for the task. In
Paul's view, the welfare of his churches depended on their obeying his
authority.
In his work as a Siaxovoc; 0eoO, Paul uses great boldness (itapprio-ia, v.
12). He is not at all ashamed of the gospel of Christ, but instead he is
eager to preach (Rom 1.16). Great boldness would indeed be needed to con¬
tinue proclaiming when such activity frequently resulted in persecution (2
Cor 4.7-12). But mappqcKa also suggests the idea of freedom of speech, as
practiced in the Greek cities. Paul is permitted (or acts like one who is
permitted) to speak openly and state his case before others. riappqcnoc
designates 'the right to speak openly and publicly'50 in the assembly as
well as the privilege of speaking frankly to a friend. It is the latter
connotation that may be most applicable in the context of 2 Corinthians 3.
Paul is bold toward the Corinthian converts. Initially, he preached them
the gospel freely and boldly. As they came together and formed a congre¬
gation, he admonished and even disciplined them. He opens up to them and
speaks his mind. He wishes they would do the same with him (2 Cor 6.11-13).
Paul the Staxovoq has hope (£Xmiq, v. 12). The hope is based on his
understanding of the new covenant, which gives men the Spirit and
justification. It is grounded in God, for Paul knows that God will
ultimately bring victory to the cause of the gospel. In fact, the
celebration has already begun (2 Cor 2.14). Just as a little boy believes
his father can always make everything come out right in the end, so also
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Paul is even more confident that his heavenly father will eventually
produce a successful conclusion to all things (Rom 8.37; 1 Cor 15.57).
For Paul and all believers, this hope leads toward a transformation
from glory to glory (v. 18). The Spirit is at work now and will be in the
future to produce changes in believers. The result is glory (£o^a.). At
this point, one might say that considerations of subordinacy and
superordinacy have fallen aside, for Paul's Sxaxovfa aims at leading all
men into this intimate relationship with God. The transformation pertains
equally to all men, and it eliminates notions of hierarchy. This glorious
work of God is not meant only for a privileged few, but is intended for all
who believe. This is the which leads Paul onward, even in the face
of tribulation.
In summary, then, Paul's epistles show that he always views himself as
God's underling. Whether he calls himself a son, slave, or a servant, he
always recognizes the superiority of God in every way. But Paul's
relations with the Corinthians are more complicated. He sometimes uses
egalitarian language, calling the believers his brothers or co-workers.
However he reveals his superordinacy toward them by referring to himself as
their father. At the other extreme, he calls himself their slave. Paul
seems to be using a sliding scale to depict his relationship with the
church, for he shows himself alternately as equal to, greater than, and
less than the Corinthians. This is also the case in 2 Corinthians 3.
«•
Paul's use of Siaxoveco and ixav6q suggest that he is rating himself rather
low in comparison to the Corinthians. But his talk of the splendour and
grandeur of his Siaxovtoc produces an image of respect and eminence. But in
3.18, the talk of transformation seems to erase all distinctions of rank,
since it is an event that affects all equally.
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SECTION D. THE CORINTHIANS AND THE WORLD OF 2 CORINTHIANS 3.
In this section, some of the major roles of the Corinthians, as they
appear in Paul's letters to them, will be enumerated. Some of these roles
have already been suggested in Sections B and C. More attention will be
paid to those roles which have not been treated extensively thus far. Then
the roles of the Corinthians in 2 Corinthians 3 will be investigated, in
order to determine how they relate to the other characters in that text.
First, the Corinthians are sons of God, They, like Paul, can address
God as 'apgcx o naxfjp' ((Rom 8.15; Gal 4.6). Paul teaches that those who
believe in Jesus Christ may call God their father (1 Cor 1.3; 2 Cor 1.2).
As noted earlier, Paul thinks of the church as a 'family', with God as
father and all the believers as sons. Christ is pre-eminent among the
children, because he is 'the first-born among many brethren' (Rom 8.29).
The remainder of the brothers are often portrayed as equals. But Paul
sometimes exerts authority over the Corinthians, assuming either the
explicitly stated role of father or the implied role of big brother. So,
even though all believers are sons of God and brothers to each other, and
therefore presumably equal, there is a 'pecking' order among them, and the
Corinthians are portrayed as subordinate to Christ always and to Paul
sometimes.
It is possible that being younger brothers to Paul chafed them
somewhat. There are signs of tension between them and Paul throughout the
Corinthian correspondence. These letters can be read as Paul's attempt to
assert his authority over a group that is trying to assert its independence
of him.1 Since all believers have freedom (2 Cor 3.17), the Corinthians
appear to be exercising their freedom by choosing to affiliate with other
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apostles (2 Cor 11). Much of 2 Corinthians can be viewed as Paul's
persuading the Corinthians that this is not a wise choice. As an older
brother, he exhorts them (2 Cor 13.11) to accept him as their apostle and
to acknowledge his authority over the church. But younger brothers can be
'feisty' sometimes.
The process of becoming metaphorical brothers to those who are not
literal brothers can be called 'resocialization', because it involves
becoming oriented differently to society and to other people.2 Resocial-
ization is not always a smooth process, and, in the case of the Corinthian
Christians, there was some difficulty. The difficulty was that the
believers were not fully integrated into a cohesive group. There was
division among them. This may have had theological origins. The
splintering has been attributed to the emergence of 'parties' or 'cliques'
in the church, each loyal to a different figure.3 Or it may have been the
result of a spiritual elitism, arising out of a Philonic interpretation of
Christianity introduced perhaps by Apollos or other Hellenistic Jews.*
Alternatively, the failure to coalesce may have had sociological
causes. The Corinthians had come from different social groupings - slave
and free, rich and poor, men and women. It would have been difficult for
everyone to drop on the porch of the house church every aspect of his
sociological self-image before entering for fellowship and worship. But,
because they believed in Jesus Christ, each of them had become a member of
equal standing in the same social group, the family of God. Paul regarded
all of them as brothers, and he taught that they too should consider one
another as brothers and, accordingly, as equals. But problems arose in
this branch of the family, and there were questions about how to treat a
literal non-brother as a metaphorical brother. Much of 1 Corinthians is
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concerned with Paul's trying to resolve this fraternal conflict. At least
twenty times in 1 Corinthians, Paul addresses his readers as 'brethren',
and then he goes on to give them advice, suggestions, or commands on
practical issues of Christian living.5
In 2 Corinthians, though, the situation is somewhat different. Only
three times are the believers called 'brethren', and the emphasis is less
upon intra-church affairs, as in 1 Corinthians, and more upon the relation
of Paul to the church. In this epistle, Paul defends his ministry and
apostolate from attacks originating both among some Corinthians and some
unnamed intruders.5 Because of the changed situation, the Corinthians,
though still sons of God and brothers of Paul, are not so often portrayed
as brothers. When they are so addressed, it is in connection with an
instruction or an appeal, as in 1 Corinthians.7
In addition to being sons of God and brothers of Paul, the Corinthians
are also slaves of Christ. When they call Christ 'xtipioq', they imply that
they are his '5oOXot'. Because they are 5oOXoi, they are bound to obey and
honour their xupioq. They are not free to do as they please. Rather, they
f
must do the bidding of another. Yet Paul writes: o£> 5£ to rnvsOpa xuptou,
eXeuQepta (2 Cor 3.17). A believer is both a 5oQXoq and an eXeuS^poq, even
though these terms are antonyms and appear to be mutually exclusive. To be
a free slave is 'ein paradoxes SooXeusxv'.e The paradox arises in part
from Paul's use of language from the same word field (master/slave
relations) in two different ways to talk about the life of the Christian.
In relation to the power of sin, the believer is free (Rom 8.2; Gal 5.1,
13). In relation to Christ, he is a slave.
In Romans 6, Paul seems to teach that all men are slaves. They are
either the slaves of sin and law, resulting in death, or slaves of God and
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righteousness, resulting in sanctification and eternal life. In this life,
then, no person is absolutely free. All are slaves, The believer is one
who is no longer a slave of sin, but rather has been 'bought with a price'
(1 Cor 6,20) and has become a slave of Christ. The freedom of the
Christian is not an absolute freedom, but rather a freedom from bondage to
sin. He has been transferred from one master to another. He is now free
from the compelling power of sin and is free to obey and serve God. He is
still a slave, but is now a 'freed slave' - a slave who has been released
from the binding power of sin.9
The Corinthians, then, are freedmen in relation to their former
master, sin, but they are slaves in relation to their new master, Jesus
Christ. The concept of the bondage of a slave, though, still seems to
conflict with the idea of the freedom that a son would have. Though still
subordinate to his father, the son is not in servitude as is the slave.
Since the Corinthians are both slaves of Christ and sons of God, and
therefore both bound and free, their relationships are discordant.
Petersen suggests that these conflicting roles are mediated through the
image of adoption, 10 In this life, the Christian is actually a slave of
Christ and only potentially a son of God, He has received the spirit as a
downpayment, and the adoption process is underway though not yet completed.
Until it is, he is still a slave, though sonship is a reality which is
already partially realized. The completion of the adoption will only occur
after the death and resurrection of the believer. Then he will become a
full-fledged son, and no longer will he be a slave. This adoption process
is a transformation. It changes an enslaved non-son into a free son.
Along with this change in one's status occurs a change in one's
honour-rating, for the glory of a son is greater than that of a slave.
118
This change in the degree of one's glory is one possible explanation of the
enigmatic phrase in 2 Corinthians 3.18b: petap.op(pobps8oc and 5o£r)q sic,
56£av. The Corinthians have now the lesser glory of a slave, but they are
being transformed by the spirit through the adoption process, and they will
someday have the greater glory of a son. Through the image of adoption,
then, the master/slave system is related to the family system as one stage
in the process of believers becoming the sons of God.
In addition to being sons of God and slaves of Christ, the Corinthians
are the addressees of an epistle (2 Cor 1.1). As addressees, they are
meant to receive and read the letter. The writing of a letter either
initiates or maintains a relationship between the two parties. In the case
of 2 Corinthians 3, Paul is attempting to maintain (or regain) his
relationship with the Corinthians as their apostle. In order for them to
receive the letter, it had to be delivered. Paul did not use the imperial
postal service. This letter, probably written in Macedonia, was delivered
to Corinth by Titus, Paul's personal courier,11 If carried overland, the
journey of about two hundred miles would have taken approximately two
weeks.12
With the letter written and received, it remains now for the letter to
be read. The writing of a letter implies that it will be read. A letter
is a 'surrogate'13 or 'substitute'"1 for the personal presence of the
author. But the reading of a letter is not an example of dialogue. The
reading of a letter results in "... the reduction of the reciprocal
subjectivity of the face-to-face encounter to the one-sided objectivity of
the letter.'15 Letters are written because the two parties can not or will
not meet in person with each other. In this case, Paul may have been wiser
to write than to visit, since he had a reputation for producing epistles
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'weighty and strong', and since his personal presence was regarded as weak
and ineffectual by some in Corinth (2 Cor 10.10). Because the situation in
Corinth was tense and fragile, Paul probably put his best foot forward by
keeping both his feet in Macedonia and sending a letter via Titus.
The Corinthians, then, are the addressees, recipients, and readers of
a letter, Every letter tells a story,1S This letter, 2 Corinthians, not
only tells a story, but is also a part of the larger story of Paul's
dealings with the church at Corinth. As principals in the larger story,
the Corinthians, more so than the modern scholar, would have understood the
letter and its various referents. They knew the situation. The letter
refers to prior events in their relationship.17 Also, the letter itself
becomes a part of the continuing drama. It is 'a functional link in a
specific chain of communications between Paul and the Corinthians.'13 The
Corinthians would have well understood this link because they held the
chain to which it belonged. The modern reader holds only the link.
As mentioned earlier, Young and Ford have identified 2 Corinthians as
an apologetic epistle, modelled on the example of other such documents.19
They point particularly to this passage in 2 Corinthians 12.19 as evidence
for their claim:
Have you been thinking all along that we have been
defending ourselves before you? It is in the sight
of God that we have been speaking in Christ, and all
for your upbuilding, beloved.
They could also have cited 2 Corinthians 13.11, where Paul gives several
commands, including rcapaxocXsio-Se, which the RSV translates as 'heed my
appeal'. If the epistle is indeed an apology, then Paul would have been
exhorting his readers to take notice of the appeal it contained, and to
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respond positively to its content.
If the epistle is a unity and if it is apologetic, as Ford and Young
at least maintain, then what effect would 2 Corinthians 3 have had on the
church as it was read and re-read? How does this passage fit into the
overall scheme of the defence? The discussion of these questions could
lead on to tangential issues of authorial intention and psychological
interpretation, and away from the main purpose of this dissertation, which
is to analyze the roles, relations, and actions of the characters in 2
Corinthians 3 and to explore the language used to portray these roles,
relations, and actions. Yet the question of genre is a valid one, and it
is a significant hermeneutical issue.120 It is possible, and perhaps
necessary, to propose a possible genre and to posit an intention which gave
rise to that genre, even though no one knows or can know what Paul's actual
intention was,21 Once an intention is proposed, then a genre can be
suggested, one which corresponds to the proposed intention. This too can
never be conclusively verified, but it can be tested, and it can be judged
more or less probable than other possibilities. The approach here will be
to examine the proposal of Young and Ford, and then, after surveying the
chapter, determine how useful it is in interpreting 2 Corinthians 3.
If 2 Corinthians is an apologetic epistle for Paul's apostolate, then
chapter 3 is part of the 'proofs' section of the epistle, which comprises
2. 14-9. 15.2:2 2 Corinthians 3 is that part of the defence where Paul
reveals his concept of the true Sitxxovoq. He portrays his Sioocovtoc and
defends his role of Siocxovoq by making four points.
First, he has good credentials for the job (vv. 1-3). The existence
of the Corinthian church validates his ability to do the work, even though
that existence is certainly fragmented and subject to strain. While in
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Corinth, Paul preached the gospel, some believed it, and they were gathered
into a congregation. This fact verifies that Paul has done (and can do)
the work of an apostle.
Second, Paul claims that he is both commissioned and qualified by God
(vv. 4-6). Paul did not choose this career for himself. Nor did any men
select him to do this work. Rather, God himself picked Paul for the
preaching of the gospel. Furthermore, Paul does not think himself
competent for the work of a Si&xovoq. But God has made him sufficient to
perform the work to which he was called.
Third, Paul maintains that his Siaxovioc is attended by a greater
splendour than that of Moses <vv, 7-11). In a series of qal wa-homer
arguments, Paul specifies the superiority of his service. The new service,
that of the Spirit, is even more certainly attended with glory than that of
Moses, which was a service of death (vv. 7-8). Furthermore, Paul's
service, a service of justification, much more abounds in glory than that
of Moses, which is a service of condemnation. Finally, Paul's work, part
of an enduring enterprise, has a far more excellent splendour than that of
Moses, which was only for a while and is now passing away (vv. 10-11).
The fourth and final point in Paul's portrayal of his ministry is that
he has performed his work differently from Moses (vv. 12-18). Paul acts
with great boldness, but Moses was somewhat diffident (vv. 12-13). Under
Moses, the people's minds were hardened, but, under Paul, people are being
converted (vv. 14-16). Whereas Moses' ministry was accompanied with a
veiling (which still is present today), Paul's ministry is characterized by
an unveiling, which results in a glorious transformation (vv. 14-18).
Each of these four points is intended to delineate Paul's conception
of his apostolate and to persuade the Corinthians to accept its validity.
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Included in the proofs are appeals to external authority (namely, the
Hebrew Bible), rabbinic argumentation, and comparison and contrast. It is
difficult to determine how convincing these proofs would have been, since
the nature of the opponents and their charges are not known for certain.
If 2 Corinthians is an apology, then a courtroom setting may by way of
illustration be imagined for its reading. The opponents (and whatever
Corinthian believers they may have persuaded) are the plaintiffs. The
exact nature of their charges can not be ascertained, but it seems to have
related to Paul and his particular style of Sicocovfoc. Paul is the
defendant. Rather than hire an attorney, he chooses to represent himself.
He does not appear in person to answer the charges pressed against him.
Instead, he sends a written deposition which constitutes his defence. The
Corinthians themselves are the jury which will render a verdict in the
case. They have heard the case presented by the plaintiffs, and some of
them have been persuaded of the legitimacy of their position. Now it is
time for Paul to tell his side of the story and to put forward evidence
which will exonerate him of all charges. Paul's case, according to Young
and Ford, is contained in 2 Corinthians.
As mentioned earlier, the Corinthians must be thought of as readers.
As they read the epistle known as 2 Corinthians, they are doing more than
ingesting information. They are being called upon to judge the validity of
its contents. They are being required to evaluate the evidence that is
being presented. Every time Paul makes a 'we' statement, such as 'we use
great boldness' (2 Cor 3.12), the Corinthians must contemplate the truth of
the claim. They cannot be neutral observers, because they are in the midst
of a conflict. They must decide for one or the other. They can be
impartial, but they cannot be noncommittal. They must take a decision.
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And Paul's opinion is that ruling for him is choosing for life, while
ruling against him will have serious consequences.23
The claim of Young and Ford that 2 Corinthians is an apologetic
epistle can neither be verified nor disproved. It is a reasonable
suggestion, though it needs more evidence to make the case a probable
hypothesis. The attractiveness of their suggestion is that it helps to
explain the presence of different genres of material within a single
document. For, according to the handbooks of rhetoric, an apology could
consist of several types of discourse, including narrative, proofs, and
exhortation.So the occurrence of these and other types of material in 2
Corinthians need not be considered unusual.
The weakness of the argument of Young and Ford is their reluctance to
specify exactly who and what Paul is defending himself against. An apology
is not mere exposition, but rather it is a treatise addressed to someone in
which the author is arguing against the charges of someone else. Young and
Ford are disinclined to discuss the identity, doctrines, and charges of
Paul's opponents. Yet they claim that 2 Corinthians is a defence against
specific persons and charges. It would not be easy for a reader of this
epistle to understand the apology, if he does not even know the complaint.
So the hypothesis is limited in its interpretative value, as it applies to
the epistle as a whole and to 2 Corinthians 3 in particular.
The strength of the position of Young and Ford is that it does under¬
score the importance of the reader in interpretation. By suggesting the
judicial nature of the epistle, it projects the original reader into the
role of judge or jury.25 This active orientation of the original reader is
paralleled by the active role required of the modern reader as well. The
text is not self-explanatory. It requires the reader to make explicit some
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logical connections that are only implicit in the text. It requires him to
construe the meaning and reference of sentences, some of which give no more
than clues as to their real import. Finally, the text requires the reader
to use his imagination synthetically to link together the sentences into a
cohesive discourse,26 This emphasis upon the role of the reader and his
reception of the epistle as a text to be read is the primary value of the
twin hypothesis of Young and Ford that 2 Corinthians is a unity and that it
belongs to the genre of apologetic epistle.
The facts of the Corinthians being sons of God, slaves of Christ, and
brothers of Paul are garnered from the epistolary salutation of the
epistles (1 Cor 1.1-3 and 2 Cor 1.1-2). These data may be regarded as
constitutive elements in Paul's symbolic universe.27 That the Corinthians
are the addressees of this letter is made explicit in the salutation (2 Cor
1.1). That they are recipients and readers of this epistolary text is
implied also by the salutation. These, then, are some of the roles of the
Corinthians as portrayed by Paul in the Corinthian correspondence at large.
To be examined at this point are the roles of the Corinthians which
are mentioned specifically in 2 Corinthians 3. The focus of the
investigation will be on verses 1-3, in which the roles of the Corinthians
are most prominent.
Verses 1-3 reveal the roles of the Corinthians from Paul's point of
view, not their own, as no writings of the Corinthians are extant. So this
examination of the roles of the Corinthians is guided by what Paul writes
about them. This may differ from what the Corinthians themselves would
have thought, but the only information available for inspection is that
which comes from the hand of Paul.
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Paul's mention of the roles of the Corinthians in 2 Corinthians 3 is
introduced in verse 1:
*pApX°fJlE®a rcbcXiv eauxouc; avviaxdtveiv; ^ pit)
cdc, xiveq cruaxaxixSv etuoxoXSSv npdq upaq ^ If; upSv;
These two questions imply that Paul and the Corinthians are not on the best
of terms. The whole issue of commendation is a sensitive one for Paul, as
evidenced by his continual usage of aoviaxqpi and its cognates in 2
Corinthians. One common line of comment on this verse is that the
Corinthians perceive self-commendation as a distasteful practice, and that
in 2.14-17 Paul appears to be beginning to commend himself.20 The maXiv
suggests that Paul has practised self-commendation in Corinth previously,
or at least that the Corinthians regard some of his previous statements as
self-commendation. Paul is aware that this charge might possibly be raised
against him again at this juncture, so he meets the challenge head-on. The
first question, then, is viewed as a rhetorical means for Paul's denying in
advance a possible accusation of self-commendation. The question would
also give the impression that Paul is not prepared to engage in this
practice.
According to this common explanation, the second question is an
explicit reference to the opponents,23 who must have arrived bearing
letters of recommendation and used them to gain access to and authority
over the church at Corinth. Since Paul did not have any letters of
recommendation when he arrived in Corinth, his legitimacy is being
questioned, and his standing is being made to look inferior to that of the
intruders. In order to meet this challenge, Paul brings up the topic of
letters of recommendation, and, by means of another question which expects
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a negative answer, asserts that he does not have and does not need such
letters. This line of explanation is based upon the assumption that the
intruders had letters of recommendation, and that their use of them
resulted in Paul's being drawn into an unfavourable comparison with the
intruders,
Instead of an unfavourable comparison of Paul's credentials with those
of his opponents, P. Marshall has suggested a different scenario to account
for the appearance of the issue of letters of recommendation in this
chapter.30 His reconstruction, based on the social convention of
friendship in the ancient world, runs like this. Paul first arrived in
Corinth with no letters of recommendation. Instead, he initiated his
relationship with the Corinthians by means of self-commendation, which,
within certain limits, was an acceptable procedure. The Corinthians
accepted his self-commendation as valid and were converted by Paul's
preaching of the gospel. A relationship of friendship was established.
Since the giving and receiving of gifts was an important aspect of
friendship, and since some of Paul's converts in other cities had also
given him financial support, the Corinthians offered monetary gifts to
Paul. Paul refused to accept these gifts. The refusal of a gift offered
by a friend is a serious incident, though in certain circumstances it is
excusable. Unknown is the reason why Paul refused, but refuse he did. The
Corinthians were offended, apparently not agreeing with Paul about the
validity of his grounds for refusal. From the Corinthian point of view,
the relationship of friendship was terminated. Since Paul is now writing
them a letter (2 Corinthians), the Corinthians view this as Paul's attempt
to re-establish a friendship. It is likely that they would expect him to
be commended again, since it was customary for the person initiating a
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friendship to present a recommendation to the prospective friend. Paul had
initiated the first relationship with self-commendation, so perhaps the
Corinthians suspected that he would commend himself again. Thus the ques¬
tion in 2 Corinthians 3.1 arises: 'Are we beginning to commend ourselves
again?' The preceding paragraph (2.14-17) may have appeared to the
Corinthians to be the commencement of a letter of recommendation, and Paul
anticipates their response. The effect of his question is to assert that
he is not going to commend himself again. They already know him. For his
part, the relationship of friendship still exists, though it is somewhat
bruised. Paul is writing, then, to heal a relationship, not to initiate
one.
Concerning the second question in verse 1, Marshall suggests that Paul
is saying that he does not need commendatory letters to the Corinthians
because they already know him. They know him on the basis of his self-
commendation and his sojourn with them. Such letters would be superfluous
in this situation. Furthermore, he does not need letters of recommendation
from them, because he uses self-commendation instead. The use of letters
of recommendation might suggest that he is an agent of men, and Paul is
concerned that he be known rather as one sent by God.
The hypothesis of Marshall is attractive because it does not take
Ttvsc, (v. 1) as an explicit reference to the opponents. Thus he does not
have to struggle with the speculative questions of who they were and where
their letters of recommendation came from. Rather, he seeks to explain the
text on the basis of the history of the relationship between Paul and the
Corinthians. His explanation is guided by explicit information in the
text, especially as it is enlightened by the social custom of friendship in
the Greco-Roman world. The weakness of his position is that he too must
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rely upon speculation in order to complete his reconstruction. He is
forced to posit Paul's self-commendation as the first step in his
relationship with the Corinthians. Then he must assume that this self-
commendation was properly performed by Paul and approvingly accepted by
the Corinthians. Finally, the conventions of friendship and enmity seem to
be too narrow to account for all of the aspects of and developments in the
relationship between Paul and the Corinthians.
It is impossible to establish exactly what the circumstances were
which led to the writing of 2 Corinthians and to the mention of letters of
recommendation in 2 Corinthians 3. The evidence is too meagre to afford a
complete reconstruction. All the attempts, attractive as they are, rely
upon conjecture to fill out their sketch of the Corinthian landscape.31 To
attempt such a programme is to investigate the world behind the text and to
avoid coming to terms with the world of the text.
What can be known with assurance, however, is that Paul, for some
unknown reason, was concerned about letters of recommendation as they
affected his relationship with the Corinthians, and that he made this
concern explicit in 2 Corinthians 3.1-3.
By means of rhetorical questions, Paul insists that he is not
beginning to recommend himself again. Furthermore, he does not need to
bring letters of recommendation to them or take such from them. The fact
is that Paul has already established his credibility in Corinth, and his
credentials are located there. The surprising twist of language which Paul
creates is that the Corinthians themselves are his commendatory letters.
The imagery is not fully consistent in these three verses,32 but Paul
nevertheless declares, 'You are our letter' (2 Cor 3.2).
The primary role of the Corinthians in 2 Corinthians 3 is that of a
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letter, This is not a personal role, in the sense of a son, slave, or
ambassador. Nor does it fit neatly into a social institution, such as
family or government. Yet it is the role assigned by Paul to the
Corinthians at this stage of the epistle. The metaphor of letters of
recommendation will be explored further in Chapter 3, but some initial
comments will be offered here, in order to explain the grounding of the
word 'letter' as a relational term.
First, Paul writes, 'You yourselves are our letter' (v. 2). Then he
adds later, 'You are a letter of Christ' (v. 3). The juxtaposition of
these two letters generates an interesting interpretative problem. In what
way may the Corinthians be called a letter at all? Then, what is the
relationship between Paul's letter and Christ's letter?
It is commonly assumed that verse 2 means that the Corinthians are not
just any letter, but rather specifically a letter of recommendation for
Paul. This is indicated by the translation of the RSV and by the comments
of many scholars.33 This line of comment reasons that Paul first arrived
in Corinth with no letters of recommendation, but now, at a later time, he
is being asked to present letters of recommendation. Such documents would
function as credentials and validate his apostolic status. This had become
necessary because, in the meantime, some intruders had presented impressive
letters of recommendation to the Corinthian church and thereby gained their
confidence.
There is a problem with this explanation. To whom would Paul's letter
of recommendation be presented? Would it be presented to the Corinthians?
If so, then Paul is saying that the Corinthians are recommending Paul to
themselves by means of themselves. This is a rather odd formulation, for
it implies that the Corinthians do not know who they are. The idea is that
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they are a validation for Paul, and they do not even know it. Also, it
calls for a most peculiar practice, that of equating the recommendation
with the recipient of the recommendation. If that is the case, then one
must conclude that this is an ill-conceived metaphor. But this approach
seems contrived, and it is unlikely that it is the Corinthians to whom the
letter would be addressed.
Would it have been addressed to the intruders instead? This makes
better sense of the metaphor, for it separates the role of the recommender
(the Corinthians) from that of the recipient of the recommendation. But
this suggestion does not fulfil the reader's logical expectations, for Paul
would certainly not have wanted to commend himself to his opponents, whom
he later labels as 'false apostles' (2 Cor 11.13). Since that would have
served no useful purpose, it seems unlikely that the letter would have been
bound for these intruders.
A final possibility for the addressee of this letter of recommendation
could be the general public, especially since Paul states that it is
'known and read by all men' (v. 2). In this way, the letter would function
as an introductory letter, helping to acquaint strangers with the apostle
Paul, But this also seems unlikely, for this would make sense only in an
evangelistic context, and that is not the situation here. Also, it appears
that the problem with which Paul is dealing in this epistle is not a
problem with outsiders, but with insiders. It is not at all obvious how a
letter of recommendation to unevangelized outsiders would assist Paul in
his present crisis.
Failing to find a suitable addressee for these letters, one must con¬
clude either that they were not meant to have an addressee or that they are
not letters of recommendation at all. The latter option is simpler, and
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it makes better sense of the text. Instead of a letter of recommendation,
the Corinthians are rather a letter in the sense that they are the tangible
results of Paul's work, Paul metaphorically refers to these results as a
'letter', something which has been written. His efforts in Corinth were
not fruitless. The effect of his labours was the production of a document,
which is nothing other than the Corinthians themselves. The formation of a
Christian community was the result of Paul's visit to and work in Corinth.
Furthermore, the point of verse 2 is that this letter is Paul's
letter. The founding of the church in Corinth must be attributed to Paul
and not to anyone else. Thus Paul believes that there is and should con¬
tinue to be an indissoluble link between him and the churches which he has
initiated. The statement, 'You are our letter', is a reminder to the
Corinthians of their origin. They came together as a worshipping community
as a result of the missionary endeavour of Paul. He alone, then, is their
founding apostle, and he believes that he alone is the apostle with legiti¬
mate authority there. Others may come along later and contribute to the
edification of the Corinthians, but this does not displace Paul from his
position of authority over the church. As a pointer back toward origins,
this statement also serves to remind the Corinthians of the happy times
which they and Paul both experienced in the early days. This nostalgic
appeal is part of the rhetorical force of the letter, and it may be
identified as pathos, that kind of proof which is '... the emotional
reaction which the hearers undergo as the orator "plays upon their
feelings"'.
In calling the Corinthians 'our letter', Paul is reminding them of his
claim on the church. He founded the church, and he thinks that he still
has a right to exert authority over it. He will not allow poachers to
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sneak in and claim the church for themselves. Thus, implied in the
statement, 'You are our letter', may also be a warning to the intruders not
to try to take away that which rightfully belongs to another, that is, to
Paul. In this way, Paul is reasserting his claim that the church in
Corinth is his charge, his parish, and he will not allow others to muscle
in on his territory.
The statement, 'You are our letter', then, conveys several notions.
The letter may be thought of as a letter of recommendation, though this is
not the only or perhaps the most important connotation. For the writing of
a letter is a metaphor, conveying the substance of Paul's apostolic
activity while in Corinth. The Corinthian church is a letter, in that it
is living, visible evidence that someone has done something constructive
there. Paul 'wrote a letter' in Corinth. He did not burn a letter, as
some burn old love letters or as some burn copies of The Satanic Verses.
Rather than burning a letter, Paul wrote a letter. He produced a document;
he wrote an epistle which the Corinthians themselves constitute. The
letter needs to be edited now, so Paul is writing a literal dead letter to
the metaphorical living letter. He wants to correct some errors in the
metaphorical letter.
The metaphorical letter which was written is Paul's, not somebody
else's. No person, in Paul's opinion, can legitimately move in after Paul
leaves and claim this territory for himself. The Corinthians are still
Paul's letter, and he continues to care for them. As a letter of
recommendation, the Corinthians must be commendatory for Paul. But the
commendatory effect of the letter should not be construed as the sole
purpose of the letter. For as a letter, the Corinthians are proof that
Paul has laboured among them for God,
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The statement in 2a, 'You are our letter', is paralleled by that in
3a, 'You are Christ's letter'. How is £7u<JToXf| XpioxoC to be construed?
It could be: (1) an authorial genitive, 'a letter written by Christ';35 or
(2) an objective genitive, 'a letter written about Christ'.35
Rissi argues for the objective genitive, because he understands
'letter' again to refer to letters of recommendation. He thinks Paul's
point is that the Corinthians are letters of recommendation about Christ.
They are those who introduce people to Christ and speak a good word on
Christ's behalf. Rissi sees "the subject of letters of recommendation
beginning in verse 1 and continuing right through verses 2-3.37
Furnish prefers the authorial genitive and rejects the objective
genitive, because "... there is less thought of what is "in" the letter
represented by the Corinthian congregation than of the existence of the
letter as an attestation of Paul's apostleship.'33 This view is probably
correct, though there is no reason to eliminate entirely the possibility
that Paul intended the genitive to be ambiguous or polysemous. The
authorial genitive, though, seems to fit the context better, and it is to
be preferred as the primary meaning here.
When snicrtoXfi XpxcrxoO is taken as an authorial genitive, there is a
parallel between Paul's letter and Christ's letter. Paul's letter is
written by means of his proclamation, and the result is visible as
believers are gathered into a congregation. In this sense, it may be seen
and read by all men. Christ's letter, on the other hand, is produced in an
extraordinary manner - by the Spirit of the living God.
The relation between these two 'letters' is not competitive but
complementary, Paul worked according to the principle of 'Not I, but
Christ'.33 Having stated that the Corinthians are his letter, Paul hastens
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to correct himself by declaring that this letter is actually Christ's
letter. The Corinthians are a letter ultimately written by Christ, not
Paul. Paul has only a subordinate role in the composition of this letter.
Or, stated differently, 'Christ is the author, and Paul is the
instrument" ./to Or, Christ is the dictator, and Paul is the amanuensis.
This view is supported by Buitmann,^1 who explains the participial phrase,
Siaxovr)ecx<7a uq>' rjpSv (v. 3), in the following way:
... das Werk des Paulus ist also im Grunde nicht sein
Werk, sondern das Werk Christi (dessen SoOXoq er nach
4,5 ist), fUr das er nur die Rolle des Siaxovoq spielt.
Thus Paul has moved in three verses from a relatively trivial starting
point about credentials to a significant theological discussion of the
relationship of Christ, the Corinthians, and himself.A1Z
This 'communications' model, which depicts the activity and
relationship of these parties in 2 Corinthians 3.1-3, is similar in
structure to the models of 'agriculture' (1 Cor 3.5-9) and 'construction'
<1 Cor 3.9-15) which Paul also employs. In these latter two models, Paul
depicts himself as a workman and the Corinthians as the product of his
labour, though God is regarded as the effective force behind the work that
is done (1 Cor 3.6, 10). God gives the growth by giving Paul the muscle to
build! All three of these models are summarized in 1 Corinthians 9.1,
where Paul asserts by means of a rhetorical question that the Corinthians
are his workmanship (Ip-yov) in the Lord. Paul worked in Corinth as an
apostle sent by the Lord. The result of his labour is the Corinthian
church, his workmanship. And all of this occurred 'in the Lord', that is,
by means of his power.
Concerning the topic of letters, then, the main points may now be
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summarized. The Corinthians are called a 'letter' by Paul, but this does
not denote primarily Paul's letter of recommendation, though commendation
is in the context and though the letter may have nonetheless served to com¬
mend Paul to the 'readers'. They are Paul's letter and at the same time
Christ's letter also. As Paul's letter, they are evidence of his apostolic
activity. As Christ's letter, they are actually the work of Christ, with
Paul serving as a helper. Again, the Corinthians are not meant to be
letters of recommendation for Christ. Rather than introducing or
commending him, they are created by him. Christ is the author of that
letter which the Corinthians themselves constitute. It is not clear
whether the participle Siaxovr}0£iao£ indicates for Paul the function of
scribe or courier. Both senses can be supported with lexical evidence.
But another possibility is that Paul is here breaking out of the semantic
field of letter-writing altogether and moving into the (relatively
independent) field of community development. The sense would then be that
Christ has started communities of faith, and he has commissioned Paul to
help them grow stronger and more cohesive. In any case, it becomes
increasingly clear in verses 1-3 that Christ is the ultimate letter writer,
that Paul is his subordinate helper, and that the Corinthians are the
result of the synergistic efforts of that dynamic duo, Christ and Paul.
In order to summarize this section on the Corinthians, it may be noted
that, in relation to the symbolic universe of the Corinthian correspond¬
ence, the Corinthians are regarded as sons of God and slaves of Jesus
Christ. In this respect, they are subordinate to God. As sons of God,
though, they are brothers to Paul and therefore equal to him. Because of
the special relationship resulting from Paul's founding of the church in
Corinth, however, the Corinthians are sometimes regarded explicitly as
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children of Paul and elsewhere implicitly as younger brothers. If Paul is
indeed a brother to the Corinthians, he often acts like an elder brother
who has authority over them. Thus, the Corinthians are theoretically in
egalitarian relationship to Paul, but in practice they are often implicitly
portrayed as subordinates in a hierarchical relationship. This fact
becomes increasingly obvious in 2 Corinthians, in which Paul rarely
addresses the believers as 'brethren'. In this epistle, 'authority' not
'fraternity' is the significant issue.
In 2 Corinthians 3, in particular, the role of the Corinthians is that
of a letter. They are not only the addressees, recipients, and readers of
a letter, but they are also a letter themselves. As a letter of Paul, they
are evidence of his apostolic activity. They are the tangible result of
his labour in Corinth, As a letter of Christ, they are the product of a
divine author. They bear on their hearts the writing of Christ. In this
scenario, Christ is the superordinate letter-writer, and Paul, the subor¬
dinate, is his helper. Whether seen as Paul's letter or as Christ's
letter, the Corinthians are in any case subordinate to both. The letter-
writer is worthy of more honour than the letter, just as the builder is
worthy of more honour than the building (Heb 3,3), Thus, in the text of 2
Corinthians 3, the Corinthians are identified not as isolated entities but
in relationship to Christ and Paul. They find their place and significance
in a 'dyadic relationship'with their founding apostle Paul and his
sender, the Lord Jesus Christ.
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CHAPTER THREE. 2 CORINTHIANS 3 AND THE THEORY OF METAPHOR.
SECTION A. PAUL RICOEUR AND THE THEORY OF METAPHOR.
This chapter is concerned with Paul Ricoeur's theory of metaphor and
Paul of Tarsus' use of metaphor. The approach is first to define and to
criticize the theory of metaphor expounded by Paul Ricoeur. Then this
theory will be applied in a practical manner to the metaphors used by the
apostle Paul in 2 Corinthians 3. The purpose of this exposition and
application of Ricoeur's theory is to shed light on Paul's use of metaphor
and to suggest possible directions for explicating the metaphors which
appear in a particular biblical text.
Section A of this chapter will be devoted to a description and
critique of Ricoeur's theory of metaphor. The method to be followed will
be to summarize the contents of Ricoeur's major work on this subject, The
Rule of Metaphor. 1 This summary will be supplemented as needed by
references to other treatises in which Ricoeur deals with this subject.
Throughout this section, critiques of Ricoeur's theory will be offered, in
which the strengths and weaknesses, possibilities and limitations, and
abridgements and expansions of this theory are set out.
Each of the succeeding sections will be devoted to an examination of
one Pauline metaphor from 2 Corinthians 3. Relevant aspects of Ricoeur's
theory will guide the explication and interpretation of each metaphor.
These attempts at interpretation are designed to enrich the study of this
text by the contemporary reader, whether he be a scholar or not. Where
possible and practical, new metaphors will be proposed as a means of
teasing out more of the meaning of the dense and thick language which
occurs in the text of 2 Corinthians 3.
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The Rule of Metaphor is composed of eight studies, each of which takes
up one or more aspect of a contemporary study of the linguistic phenomenon
known as metaphor. Throughout the book, the guiding thesis is that only a
contemporary, semantically-based theory of metaphor can fully and
adequately do justice to the dynamics of metaphor. Such a theory
emphasizes the priority of the metaphorical statement over the metaphorical
word, and it stresses metaphor's ability to convey a new vision of reality.
Thus, "... metaphor is the rhetorical process by which discourse unleashes
the power that certain fictions have to redescribe reality' (7).
This statement is significant for understanding the unfolding of
Ricoeur's theory. It is perhaps as close as he comes to offering a formal
definition of metaphor, but, at the same time, it indicates that he is less
concerned with defining metaphor than with describing how it operates.
Metaphor is a process that generates new meaning, not merely a static word
with a stable meaning. The 'event' character of metaphor is attested by
its attachment to discourse, which also is an event as opposed to the
synchronic nature of language as langue. Metaphor, for Ricoeur, is neither
ornamental nor effete, but rather it is powerful enough to say something
significant. Though the truth of a metaphorical statement, considered
solely on the literal level, can not be sustained, it is nevertheless by
means of this fiction that reality is described on a higher level. In the
end, then, Ricoeur wishes to demonstrate that metaphor is not merely a word
game that exists for its own sake inside a linguistic ghetto. Rather, it
is an instrument for talking about reality, for referring language to a
real world. In order to flesh out this skeleton outline of the theory, a
summary of The Rule of Metaphor will now begin.
Study 1 is entitled, 'Between rhetoric and poetics: Aristotle.' The
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writings of Aristotle have been influential on the entire subsequent course
of the theory of metaphor. Aristotle's analysis led to the study of
metaphor being limited eventually to a mere classification of types of word
metaphors. Metaphor came to be regarded as a dispensable ornament of
language. Ricoeur admits that Aristotle can be read in this way, as
providing the basis for a 'taxonomic' (68) treatment of metaphor. But he
insists that another interpretation is also possible. Within the writings
of Aristotle himself are the seeds of a dynamic, semantic approach to
metaphor which Ricoeur and others are eager to exploit.2
Ricoeur emphasizes that metaphor is discussed both in the Rhetoric
and the Poetics. As a component of the field of rhetoric, it is quite
legitimately reckoned as one of the tropes, that is, figures of speech that
focus on the word. This orientation, coupled with Aristotle's emphasis on
the word as the basis of language and discourse, gave rise to the generally
held notion of metaphor as a word used figuratively, or other than in its
proper manner. But, because metaphor is also an integral part of poetics,
it participates in the power and the effects of discourse which can not be
reduced to an analysis of individual words. It is the soil of the Poetics
which proves to be the most fertile for Ricoeur's contemporary theory of
metaphor. It is the tension between metaphor's rightful place in two
different arenas that keeps it alive and prevents it from becoming simply a
pleasing decoration. It is this lively tension which allows Ricoeur to do
a biopsy instead of an autopsy, like so many before him have done.
Ricoeur begins (13) by citing Aristotle's definition of metaphor:
'Metaphor consists in giving the thing a name that belongs to something
else; the transference being either from genus to species, or from species
to genus, or from species to species, or on grounds of analogy.13 Ricoeur
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discusses four major features of this definition. First, metaphor is
something that happens to the noun' (16). It is this orientation toward
metaphor as naming that leads to the later emphasis upon classification.
Second, '... metaphor is defined in terms of movement' (17).
'Transference' (ijuq>6pa) indicates the motion of a meaning from one word to
another. Thus there is already something dynamic about metaphor, though
later rhetoricians tended to overlook this. The use of movement to talk
about meaning is itself inevitably metaphorical, since 'there is no non-
metaphorical standpoint from which one could look upon metaphor...' (18).
Third, Aristotle's definition suggests that'... metaphor is the
transposition of a name...' (18). According to Aristotle, everything has
a common or ordinary name. When called by a new name, the noun so used is
metaphorical. It is an alien name for the thing to which it refers. This
contrast between the current name and the foreign name is what gives
metaphor its unique character. This distinction also led to later
developments in the theory of metaphor which stressed the notions of
deviation, borrowing, and substitution as the essential mechanisms of
metaphor.
The final feature of Aristotle's definition is that '... a typology of
metaphor is outlined in the continuation of the definition' (20). In
listing these four types of metaphors, Aristotle gave impetus to the later
tendency to sort out and classify all metaphors accordingly. In the end,
'metaphor becomes nothing more than a figure related to the fourth type in
Aristotle's list' (21). The work of Jennings, Metaphor in Poetry, is an
example of this reductionist approach.A
Ricoeur is certain that there is more to the life and power of
metaphor than is allowed by this interpretation of Aristotle. In response,
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he offers a three point theory which squeezes more juice out of this fruit
than the old rhetorical tradition allows. First, metaphor can not be
something which happens to only one word, since it requires at least a pair
of words to accomplish the transference described by Aristotle. So the
result of metaphor is more than the 'displacement' of the meaning of one
word. Rather, it is the disruption of "... a whole network by means of an
aberrant attribution' <21).
Another possibility is opened up by regarding the transference of
names as a dis-orderlng instead of a deviation <22). Aristotle insists
that metaphor conveys new knowledge through the transference of names.
This increase may be accounted for if metaphor is seen to destroy an old
order of naming and to create a new one.® 'Thus, the category-mistake is
the de-constructive intermediary phase between description and
redescription' <22).
The final factor in Ricoeur's tentative hypothesis is that metaphor is
'... the process that disturbs and displaces a certain logical order, a
certain conceptual hierarchy, a certain classification scheme' <22). The
use of metaphor allows one to re-organize his view of reality to re-
describe his vision of the world.
Ricoeur resurrects an Aristotelian notion of the relation between
metaphor and simile, one which had been neglected <and even opposed) from
Quintilian onwards. The latter suggested that metaphor is an abbreviated
simile. But Aristotle, in proposing that simile is a developed metaphor,
made simile subordinate to metaphor, both logically and linguistically.
The result is that all metaphor calls for a spelling out of the simile
which is contained within, This point will be utilized extensively in the
present work, when the metaphors of Paul are interpreted.
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The remainder of the first chapter is concerned with other comments of
Aristotle about metaphor which help Ricoeur to install a semantic,
interactive theory of metaphor in place of an ornamental, substitution
theory. He notes that the purpose of metaphor is "... to instruct by
suddenly combining elements that have not been put together before' (33).e
This can be accomplished, in part, by "... setting the scene before our
eyes.'"' In this way, a good writer uses concrete terminology to describe
abstract realities (34). This notion will also be important in the
sections which follow. Finally, Ricoeur argues that, for Aristotle,
'mimesis is poidsis, and poiesis is mimesis' (39). Mim&sis is not simply
an imitation or reduplication of what one sees in the world about him.
Rather, it is also a creative interpretation which intensifies that which
is best and worst in humanity. Thus, mimdsis is involved in a double
tension: "... submission to reality and fabulous invention, unaltering
representation and ennobling elevation' (40). The intertwining of the
themes of imitation and construction will be a dominant theme for Ricoeur
throughout the remainder of his book.
Study 2 is entitled, 'The decline of rhetoric: tropology.' Ricoeur's
thesis in this chapter is that the fate of metaphor is linked to the study
of rhetoric. As rhetoric deteriorated, the theory of metaphor was grad¬
ually reduced to a study of types and categories of metaphor. 'A purely
rhetorical treatment of metaphor is the result of the excessive and
damaging emphasis put initially on the word, or more specifically, on the
noun or name, and on naming, in the theory of meaning' (44).
The field of rhetoric, concerned with the art of persuasion,
originally consisted of argumentation, style, and composition. Through the
centuries, this field was gradually reduced by the rhetoricians. The
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result was a 'restricted rhetoric, restricted first to a theory of style
and then to a theory of tropes' (9). This restricted rhetoric rated
metaphor as simply a decoration for discourse (45).
The postulates of rhetoric which led to this shrinkage of the role and
function of metaphor are summarized by Ricoeur (45-46):
1. Words have a proper meaning, because they name things which
properly belong together. Metaphor uses these words improperly, by refer¬
ring these names to other things.
2. Lexical or semantic gaps occur sometimes, when there is no proper
word to name an entity.
3. 'The iexical lacuna is filled by borrowing an alien term' (46).
4. The price of borrowing is 'deviation' (46), that is, the diffei—
ence between the proper meaning of the word and its newly acquired meaning
when used to fill a gap.
5. A word can also be used figuratively when there exists a name for
a thing, but another word is used instead. This is called 'substitution'
(46).
6. The reason for such a substitution, in the case of metaphor, is
resemblance, which thus becomes the paradigmatic structure for metaphor.
7. The reason for the use of a trope guides the process of recovering
the proper absent word, which can then be restored in place of the present
figurative word. This restitution results in an 'exhaustive paraphrase'
(46).
8. 'The figurative use of words does not provide any new information'
(46). Since the substituted word is fully translated by the restored word,
the metaphor does not say anything new. Or, 'substitution plus restitution
equals zero' (46).
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9, The purpose of the trope is ornamental: to please, not to teach.
The work of Pierre Fontanier, Les Figures du discours, one of the last
of the old rhetorical treatises, well exemplifies the model of metaphor
which is outlined by these nine postulates.® As Ricoeur reviews this work,
he identifies the major presupposition of this rhetorical treatment of
metaphor as its continued emphasis upon the 'hegemony of the word' <51) and
the subordination of the statement to the word in the constitution of
meaning. The result for metaphor is that it continues to be regarded as a
one-word trope, and its effect is attributed to the figurative use of a
word (54). Yet even within the work of Fontanier, Ricoeur finds traces of
a 'properly predicative theory of metaphor' (57), which necessarily
involves more than substitution and ornamentation. When Fontanier cites
examples such as 'consuming remorse' and 'his seething spirit','3 he is
referring to metaphors which do not name in a figurative way, but which
rather characterize and qualify something which has already been named.
Thus, even in attempting to account for metaphor as a word-based
phenomenon, he nevertheless implies that it is 'a sort of attribution,
which requires the whole sentence',10
A basis for each of the nine postulates listed above can be found in
the writings of Aristotle, though he himself did not develop them in this
way. He should not be held responsible for the faulty theory of metaphor
which resulted, though it can be fairly stated that he contributed to the
eventual decline of the status of metaphor by 'the central position
accorded the noun in the enumeration of the parts of lexis and the
reference to noun in the definition of metaphor' (47). But, as noted by
Ricoeur in Study 1, Aristotle himself provides many hints for correcting
the misguided substitution theory of metaphor with which his name is often
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associated.
Another defence of Aristotle may be found in Metaphor and Religious
Language, by J. M. Soskice. 11 She, like Ricoeur, denies that Aristotle
formulated a substitution theory of metaphor, though she admits that he
placed an undue emphasis on the word as the primary bearer of meaning.
But, in his defence, she keenly observes that Aristotle was not as
concerned with the philosophy of language as with assisting the public
speaker with his techniques of persuasion and the poet with his style.
Aristotle dealt with metaphor in order to help one recognize it when he saw
it and to become able to create it when needed.12
The distinction between a nominal definition, such as the one given by
Aristotle, and a real definition, which shows how metaphor is brought
about, is the starting point for Study 3, 'Metaphor and the semantics of
discourse.' As long as one talks of a nominal definition of metaphor, one
can be concerned only with a word and its meanings. But when one seeks a
real definition, which is concerned with 'generative causes' (65), then the
subject must shift from the individual word to the complex of discourse,13
Even though it is proper to speak of the word as 'the locus of the effect
of metaphorical meaning' (66), it must be recognized that it is the
sentence which produces this meaning effect.
This distinction between word and sentence as carriers of meaning
corresponds to the distinction between the two branches of linguistics,
semiotics and semantics. Semiotics, the science of signs, focusses on the
word and on language as system, while semantics, the science of sentences,
studies discourse and language as event (69),
The nature of discourse can be described by listing and discussing
some of its traits. Since discourse is dialectical, these traits come in
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pairs and may be summarized as follows. The first pair is that 'discourse
always occurs as an event, but is to be understood as meaning' (70).
Language as system has only a virtual existence. But, when a speaker makes
a statement, that is, puts language to use, this is an event, 'an instance
of discourse' (70). The event itself, as a combination of speaker,
listener, and situation, is not repeatable, but the meaning pole of
discourse can be preserved and restated in new situations.
The second pair concerns the functions of identification and predica¬
tion (70). The function of nouns is singularizing, that is, to specify,
out of all the possible entities in the universe, a single entity (or group
of entities) as the subject of a sentence. The verb, on the other hand, on
the basis of its universalizable characteristic, attributes something -
such as qualities, classes, relations, or actions - to this identified
subject. It is only as noun and verb are intertwined that a sentence is
formed, that a speaker says something about something. This combination of
a singularized subject and a universalizable predicate produces the
fundamental polarity of language' (71).
The third pair of traits of discourse is that of locution and
illocution (72).'" The first has to do with the act of saying something,
when a speaker intertwines the identifying and predicating functions of
discourse. But what he achieves in speaking is termed illocution. Making
a statement of fact, expressing a wish, swearing an oath - all of these are
i 1locutionary acts, in that they do something in addition to saying
something.
The fourth pair concerns sense and reference (73). This distinction,
introduced into philosophy by G. Frege, has already been disc.ussed in
Chapter 2, Section A. It may be further stated here that 'this distinction
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is a necessary and pervasive characteristic of discourse' (73). The sense
of words may be defined by referring to other words in the dictionary. The
system is immanent. But with the sentence, language as system is
transcended. The reference of a sentence, of discourse, points beyond
itself to a world.
The final pair of traits is the paradigmatic and syntagmatic spheres
of language (75). The paradigmatic, in the sphere of semiotics, concerns
the signs in the system and their inflections. The syntagmatic, which is
related to semantics, concerns the coming together of words to form a
sentence. The significance of this distinction is that '... if the
paradigm is semiotic and the syntagma semantic, then substitution, a
paradigmatic law, belongs on the side of semiology. Consequently, it will
be necessary to say that metaphor as treated in discourse - the
metaphorical statement - is a sort of syntagma' (76).
The result of these five distinctions is to establish metaphor as an
effect created by a sentence. The effect itself may sometimes be centred
upon a particular word, but it is always the result of several words acting
together. Metaphor, then, is a process which results from words (more than
one) coming together in an integrative relation to generate a new meaning,
which the word in isolation is incapable of producing.
The undoing of the classical theory of metaphor was pioneered by I. A,
Richards in The Philosophy of Rhetoric. ,E Ricoeur is heavily dependent
upon this work as he enunciates his own doctrine of this linguistic enigma.
Ricoeur opposes the substitution theory of metaphor elaborated by the
old rhetoric and renounces all nine of the postulates which undergird it.
Instead, he puts forward a tension theory and six tenets which counter
those of the classical theory. First, metaphor is a phenomenon of
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predication, not of naming, because it only has meaning in a statement.
'Metaphor depends on a semantics of the sentence before it concerns a
semantics of the word.'1*3 For example, consider the metaphor of Psalm
23:1a, 'The Lord is my shepherd.' None of the words in this sentence taken
alone by itself can be regarded as metaphorical. Rather, the metaphor
occurs when all the words are put together in one sentence, and the words
are then understood literally. 'The Lord is my shepherd' is metaphorical,
therefore, because the author is not a sheep, and the Lord is not a man
standing over him with a rod and staff. So 'we must not speak of words
used metaphorically, but of metaphorical statements. Metaphor proceeds
from the tension between all the terms in a metaphorical statement.'1'7
Second, the primary phenomenon of metaphor occurs not so much at the
level of words deviating from their literal meaning as at the level of the
sentence interpreted literally. Metaphor occurs because a literal
interpretation produces an absurdity or contradictory, which can only be
resolved by another interpretation, a metaphorical interpretation. ie
'Semantic incompatibility is more than a signal for interpretation, and is
in fact a component of the production itself... Semantic incompatibility is
an essential moment of the metaphor's production.'19 This metaphorical
interpretation makes sense for it 'twists' the meaning of the words in the
metaphorical statement.-20 The tension observed in metaphor is a result not
only of the two terms in the statement (subject and predicate) but also of
the two interpretations (literal and metaphorical) of the statement.
Ricoeur also objects to the proposition which tends to reduce metaphor
to a device which simply illustrates an idea. Metaphor does indeed embrace
the concept of resemblance, but it is a resemblance in which ordinary
vision sees no kinship.
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Metaphor is close to what Gilbert Ryle has called a
"category mistake." It is a calculated error, which
brings together things that do not go together and by
means of this apparent misunderstanding it causes a
new, hitherto unnoticed relation of meaning to spring
up between the terms that previous systems of classi¬
fication had ignored or not allowed.21
For example, Paul writes, 'You are our letter,' (2 Cor 3:2). Ordinary
vision does not see enough similarity between the categories of 'person'
and 'letter' to make such a bold ontological claim. But Paul, while
writing about letters of recommendation, commits a calculated error. He
links together the categories of persons and documents and produces a new
meaning. These categories do not normally go together but Paul detects a
kinship between them. In an instance of discourse, this new metaphor is
born, because Paul allows a 'hitherto unnoticed relation of meaning to
spring up' between two different terms, persons and letters.
In his fourth proposition, Ricoeur rejects the idea that substitution
is the process which solves the riddle of metaphor. Classical rhetoric
stated that the metaphor could be explicated simply by substituting the
word whose literal meaning corresponded to the figurative meaning of the
word used. 'But substitution is a sterile operation, whereas in a live
metaphor the tension ... elicits a veritable creation of meaning.'22 The
metaphor exists in the tension of the statement - that is, the tension
between the literal and the metaphorical interpretations of the statement.
Since the metaphor is not the one word which seems out of place in the
sentence, the process of substitution is inadequate to explain the
metaphor. The metaphor is grounded in the sentence, not in the word. This
again illustrates why Ricoeur prefers to speak of 'metaphorical statement'
instead of 'metaphorical word'.
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The metaphor, then, is created in a moment, by an author with an acute
sense for resemblance. His semantic innovation has no existence in
language before he forms it. And it only continues to exist because two
incompatible terms are linked together as subject and predicate in a
metaphorical statement. In this way, metaphors thrive on a certain
discordance. Because metaphor is created through unusual attribution, it
is a semantic process.23 Once again, it is clear that the process involved
is not naming but predication because metaphors do not name but rather
characterize what has already been named.In the example of Psalm 23:1,
'the Lord' is the subject and 'is my shepherd' is the predicate, The
tension created between these two conflicting fields of reference
immediately provokes one to ask: 'What is there about "shepherd" that
reminds the psalmist of the Lord? What characteristics of "shepherd" are
applicable to the Lord?' Likewise in 2 Corinthians 3.2, the reader is
startled by the collision of foreign categories. He is challenged to
detect the attributions of 'letters' which might pertain to 'persons'.
Ricoeur explains how this interpretation proceeds:
Metaphor is analyzed in accordance with two modalities
of semantic relationship. In effect, the expression
first functions 1iterally.Subsequently, it functions
iconically, by indirectly designating another, similar
situation...Thus, the iconic representation harbours
the power to elaborate, to extend the parallel struc¬
ture...One must therefore 'work out' the parallelism
between situations that will guide the iconic transpo¬
sition of one to the other.2-'
The fifth proposition of Ricoeur opposes the claim of classical
rhetoric which states that a metaphor does not create any new meaning and
can be translated by substitution. The collective force of Ricoeur's
first four postulates is now sufficient to demonstrate the fallacy of this
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claim. It is clear that in a tension-metaphor new meaning is created,
because 'the metaphorical meaning is non-lexical: it is a value created by
the context ... It is the clash on the literal level that leads one to seek
out a meaning beyond the lexical meaning.'Because metaphor involves a
tension in the entire statement, it is not possible to single out one
'metaphorical' word and replace it with another word whose literal meaning
fits the context and produces the same meaning. Therefore, 'real metaphors
are not translatable.'27 They are not translatable simply because they
create their own meaning. They may be paraphrased, though, but this does
not ensure that all of the metaphor's innovative meaning will be
explicated. However, 'good explication will maximize all of the possible
legitimate meaning of a metaphor.'2®
Concerning the ninth postulate of the old rhetorical model, which
states that metaphor is an ornament of discourse used for its emotive
value, Ricoeur holds a contrary point of view. A metaphor is far from
being an ornament, which adds beauty, decoration, or pleasing variety.
Rather, metaphor causes a clash, a tension, a contradiction. It creates a
new way of looking at things. It can have a disturbing effect initially
because it brings together two entities whose resemblance has not yet been
registered. Because metaphor elicits a tension which the reader must
resolve, it is safe to say that metaphor is not an ornament of discourse.
Although metaphor may have emotive impact, its main value is in the
cognitive realm. 'It offers new information. A metaphor tells us
something new about reality.'23 How does this happen? How does metaphor
accomplish this? As mentioned earlier, true metaphor brings together two
fields or categories not generally associated with each other. In this new
relationship, the one item begins to reveal similarities to the other, M.
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Black has explained it well;
A memorable metaphor has the power to bring two separate
domains into cognitive and emotional relation by using
language directly appropriate to the one as a lens for
seeing the other; the implications, suggestions, and
supporting values entwined with the literal use of the
metaphorical expression enable us to see a new subject
matter in a new way. The extended meanings that result,
the relations between initially disparate realms created,
can neither be antecedently predicted nor subsequently
paraphrased in prose.30
Thus, metaphor sheds its reputation as an 'ornament' and fulfils a lively
and creative role in discourse.
It is now possible to state Ricoeur's six points of a semantic theory
of metaphor. These propositions, influenced by Richards' revived
philosophy of rhetoric, are opposed to the old substitution theory
developed by classical rhetoric.
1. Metaphor is a phenomenon of predication, not naming.
2. The phenomenon of metaphor occurs at the level of the
sentence, not at the level of the word. Thus, there are
metaphorical statements but no metaphorical words.
3. Metaphor reveals a hitherto unnoticed kinship between
seemingly alien categories.
4. True metaphors exist because of a tension between the
literal and the metaphorical interpretation of a sentence.
5. Real metaphors are not translatable. They may be para¬
phrased, but their innovative meaning can never be fully
verbalized.
6. Metaphors generate new information about reality. The
unusual predication stimulates the reader to perceive new
relationships and new insights.
Another approach to a new theory of metaphor, in addition to that
advanced by Richards in his The Phi losophy of Rhetoric, is that of logical
grammar, suggested by M. Black, in Models and Metaphor. Ricoeur sees three
significant contributions to the theory of metaphor made by Black. First,
Black recognizes that the entire statement constitutes the metaphor, though
153
the emphasis falls upon one word, whose presence in the sentence causes it
to be metaphorical (84). The distinction is made between the focus and the
frame of the metaphor, the frame being the metaphorical sentence and the
focus being the word which is used metaphorically. This terminology
clarifies the relationship between the 'undivided meaning of the statement
and the focused meaning of the word' (85).
Black's second contribution is his demonstration that a substitution
theory is inadequate to account for the functioning of metaphor. Since all
of the words of the sentence are required to constitute a metaphor, it is
impossible to think that one can translate or even paraphrase a metaphor by
substituting a word used literally for the word used metaphorically. Such
a substitution would result in a 'loss of cognitive content'.31 Since a
metaphor is untranslatable, "... it carries new information; briefly, it
tells us something' (87).
Finally, Black's theory begins to explain how a metaphor works. The
metaphorical statement contains a principal subject and a subsidiary
subject. The subsidiary subject connotes a system of associated
commonplaces, which are then attributed to the primary subject. Some of
these implied characteristics are congruent with the primary subject and
are, therefore, applicable. Others are irrelevant or inappropriate and
are, therefore, eliminated from consideration. In this way, the features
of the primary subject are organized by reference to the subsidiary
subject.
The 'system of associated commonplaces' is both a strength and a
weakness in this theory. Its strength is that it accounts for the
'transposition' of meaning that Aristotle identified as being at the very
heart of the metaphorical operation. Its weakness is that, since these
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commonplaces are already widely known, the result is often likely to be
nothing more than 'trivial metaphors' (88). Furthermore, this theory does
not explain how one knows which features of the subsidiary subject are to
be transferred to the principal subject and which are to be rejected (89).
A more frontal attack on Black's theory comes from Soskice.32 She
notes that its greatest weakness is its insistence on two distinct
subjects, one subordinate to the other. This results in its application
only to metaphors of the 'A is a B' type, and is unable to cope with those
which consist of only a noun coupled with an adjective or a participle.
More serious still, "... the "two subjects" position invariably lapses into
a comparison theory and ceases to merit the title "interactive"'.33
The third and final approach to a semantics of metaphor which Ricoeur
reviews is the literary critical view advanced by M. Beards 1ey.3A His
theory states that the basis for metaphor is 'logical absurdity', in which
a given subject is paired with a modifier that initially seems incompatible
or contradictory, But living language is powerful enough continually to
extend the boundaries of meaningfulness, especially since words have
'inexhaustible connotative possibilities' (95). The abundance of
connotations assures that, with help from clues in the context, even the
most troublesome of metaphors can be 'explicated' (94). This principle of
'plenitude' (96) maximizes the meaning of a metaphorical statement, and it
implies that original metaphors create an 'emergent meaning' (96). Though
Beardsley's theory is attractive, it suffers the same fate as Black's, for
'potential range of connotations' is really little more than a 'system of
associated commonplaces' (98). Thus, Beardsley's theory is not fully
semantic, because it goes beyond the words of the sentence to a comparison
of things, in order to account for the production of metaphorical meaning.
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Though Ricoeur finds the theories of all three of these thinkers
(Richards, Black, and Beardsley) beneficial, he also finds all of them
deficient at certain places. At the close of Study 3, he offers a succinct
explanation of metaphor, which is perhaps his best short statement on the
subject:
I would rather say that metaphorical attribution is
essentially the construction of the network of inter¬
actions that causes a certain context to be one that
is real and unique. Accordingly, metaphor is a semantic
event that takes place at the point where several seman¬
tic fields intersect. It is because of this construc¬
tion that all the words, taken together, make sense.
Then, and only then, the metaphorical twist is at once
an event and a meaning, an event that means or signifies,
an emergent meaning created by language (98-99).
This statement, either explicitly or implicitly, correlates metaphor with
discourse and the five pairs of traits of discourse with which Study 3
began. The dialectic of event and meaning is made explicit here. The
intertwining of the functions of identification and predication are implied
in the phrase 'metaphorical attribution', which requires that, in a
metaphor, a subject is identified and a predicate is attributed to it. The
creation of a metaphor, furthermore, has both a locutionary aspect, as an
act of discourse, and an 11locutionary force, since it involves the 'self-
engagement' (73) of the author in the truth of the statement he is making
about reality, The fourth pair, sense and reference, is implied here, in
that the semantic fields are constructed on the basis of both a comparison
and contrast within language and a pointing to a reality outside of
language. Finally, the distinction between paradigm and syntagm is alluded
to in the phrase, "... all the words, taken together, make sense.'
Ricoeur, therefore, has built up a strong case for anchoring metaphor
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firmly within the realm of discourse. Metaphor is truly an '"instance of
discourse" par excellence' (97).
Study 4, 'Metaphor and the semantics of the word', does, in Ricoeur's
own words, "... appear to move backwards' (4), for its purpose is to
demonstrate the importance of the word in the formation of metaphor.
Following the sustained emphasis in Study 3 on the statement as the real
locus of metaphor, based on the work of English language theorists, it is
surprising to see Ricoeur review, somewhat approvingly, the work of French
linguists who stress the role of the word and its place in the system as
essential to the structure of metaphor.
Ricoeur does agree in part with their position.
[Aristotle's] definition of metaphor as transposition
of the name is actually not wrong. It allows metaphor
to be identified and to be classed among the tropes.
Above all, the traditional rhetorical definition cannot
be eliminated because the word remains the carrier of
the effect of metaphorical meaning. It should be remem¬
bered in this connection that, in discourse, it is the
word that assumes the function of semantic identity:
and it is this identity that metaphor modifies (4-5).
The general position of most contemporary French linguists is to
continue to view metaphor as a one-word trope, which is produced by
substitution and characterized by a deviation in meaning (101-2). This
tendency is a result of two major emphases - 'the monism of the sign and
the primacy of the word' (103) - which guide their discussions of language.
Ricoeur demonstrates this by referring to the work of H. Konrad and
S. Ullmann, who are heavily dependent upon and influenced by F. de
Saussure.3S All three of these writers define metaphor as a process of
denomination, and they try to account for the emergence of metaphor as an
event within the linguistic system, without reference to discourse.
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Konrad sees two aspects in the metaphorical process, generalization
and concretization. A metaphor generalizes, by identifying a
characteristic. It concretizes by attributing this characteristic to a
particular subject for the first time. The metaphorical term is so
appropriate that it can designate the new object with a minimum of shock.
Thus, 'metaphor names an object with the help of the most typical
representative of one of its attributes.'365 Konrad fails to see the
implicit predicative operation which is at work alongside of the explicit
denominative function which she addresses.
The work of Ullmann proceeds upon similar lines. The word is chosen
as the carrier of meaning, and the meaning of a word is the combination of
its name and its sense (111-2). The word has an openness which allows it
to bear several meanings and to acquire even more. The result is polysemy,
and polysemy itelf is resolved by reference to context, which 'sifts' (115)
the possible meanings until the one most appropriate is found. Metaphor
contributes to polysemy by naming things in a striking and surprising
manner. For Ullmann, then, metaphor never escapes the prison of the word,
for it is a naming game. He "... never confronts the truly predicative
operation' (119) which produces the lively metaphor.
Ricoeur points out the weaknesses of these approaches. Metaphor, as
change of meaning, can not be accounted for inside of a semiotic system,
for it is in the act of speech that these changes occur. '... Each
individual change is a leap that attests to the dependence of innovation on
speech' (121). What makes the attempts of Konrad and Ullmann plausible is
that metaphor does have some structural aspects. But it also has some
historical aspects, that can not be explained within the system. Thus,
' the word seems truly to stand at the crossroads of two orders of
158
consideration, thanks to its capacity for acquiring new meanings without
losing the old meanings' (122). The flexibility of the word allows this
'cumulative process' (122) to occur. Thus the word has a role to play in
the formation of metaphor, but the word alone, as a member of the semiotic
system, cannot completely account for the production of new metaphorical
meanings.
Since metaphor owes something to both the word and the statement,
Ricoeur suggests that ' . . . the real location of metaphor in the theory of
discourse would begin to define itself between the sentence and the word,
between predication and naming' (125). There are several reasons for this.
First, -the plurivocity of the word renders it 'an unstable structure' (127)
in a system where order is the rule. Its polysemy requires not a system
but a sentence to sort it out. Second, it is only in a context that the
meaning of a word can be specified. Words do have a degree of autonomy,
but they are always subject to the rule of the context in which they occur
(128). Finally, it is discourse itself which allows words to function
effectively. For words in isolation have only "... a potential meaning,
made up of the sum of its partial meanings... They have actual meaning only
in a given sentence, that is to say, in an instance of discourse' (129).
At the end of Study 4, Ricoeur describes how the relationship between
the word and the statement affects the functioning of metaphor.
For a sentence to make sense it is necessary that all
the acceptations of the semantic potential of the word
under consideration be eliminated except one, that which
is compatible with the meaning, itself appropriately
reduced, of the other words of the sentence, In the
case of metaphor, none of the already codified accep¬
tations is unsuitable; it is necessary, therefore, to
retain all the acceptations allowed plus one, that which
will rescue the meaning of the entire statement (131).
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Ricoeur concludes that the integrative power of the metaphorical sentence
is focalized in a single metaphorical word. In return, the word itself
depends upon the sentence for its contextualization. Thus, the place of
metaphor is between words and sentences (133).
Study 5, 'Metaphor and the new rhetoric', continues the detour through
the semantics of the word. This route now runs through the neighbourhood
of the New Rhetoric, especially as it appears among French writers. At
first the new rhetoric seems to be nothing more than a reformulation of the
old classical rhetoric, but it actually makes a new contribution. It
discusses metaphor in relation to figure and deviat ion, both of which serve
to advance the theory of metaphor beyond that conceived by Aristotle. But
the centrality of the word remains the primary theorem for these scholars,
just as it did for those reviewed and criticized in Study 4.
This study progresses on a format of question and answer. The first
question is: If metaphor is defined in terms of deviation, then from what
is it a deviation? 'Where is the "rhetoric degree zero" from which the
distance could be felt, appreciated, even measured' (137)? The new
rhetoric can offer three different answers. G. Genette suggests that the
deviation is the difference between what the author of the metaphor thought
and what he wrote.3"'' According to this approach, every metaphor is
translatable. The reader simply substitutes the absent word for the one
the author wrote, and the riddle is solved. But the task of interpretation
is to make sense out of the words that are present, and it is no help in
explicating a sentence to replace the troublesome words, especially since
the reader has no certain knowledge of what the author thought.
A second answer is proposed by J. Cohen, who works from the basis of a
relative, not absolute, degree zero.3'13 The language of science is the
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least figurative of all, and it offers a firm foundation from which the
figurative language in other disciplines can be plotted. If one translates
the figurative statement into the straightforward language of science, then
this 'identity of information' (141) corresponds to the zero degree, from
which the deviation of the figurative statement can be assessed. This
answer is not totally acceptable because it relies on an external factor
(the language of science) to clarify the figure (141).
A third answer is that a figure consists of a base which has not been
modified and another part which has undergone rhetorical deviation.353 The
invariant aspects of the base provide the starting point from which the
deviation in the remainder of the figure can be identified (142).
A second question in this chapter is: What does it mean to call a
metaphor a figure? As noted earlier, everyone uses metaphors to talk about
metaphor, because there is no non-metaphorical point at which to stand and
from which to view metaphor. The metaphor of figure is no exception, being
drawn from the semantic field of space (or shaped space). This suggests
that, as a figure, metaphor has both an exterior and a form, and that this
external form presents something like a milieu of spatiality overlaid
by a design' (144). To exteriorize thought is to express it in discourse,
and this is often done in figures of speech, which bring to light the
invisible features of thought (145). Metaphor, as the most powerful of the
figures, opens up a meaningful space for itself by means of the many
connotations which it is able to generate (147), But because, for the new
rhetoricians, metaphor depends upon its connotative ability and because
connotation is so closely related to substitution, this account of metaphor
as a figure of speech is unacceptable to Ricoeur (148).
The third question of Study 5 is this: How can one make sense of
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metaphor, if it is considered to be both deviation (a spatial metaphor.) and
a figure la metaphor of exterior form)? Ricoeur cites with approval (149)
the contribution of J. Cohen on this issue.The principle of pertinence
requires that, for a sentence to make sense, the predicate must say
something that is pertinent to the subject. To say that 'the sky is dead'
is impertinent because the attribution of life to such an entity is not
appropriate (152). Metaphor is guilty of 'semantic impertinence', because
it makes just this kind of predication. But metaphor carries with it the
ability to reduce this deviation - to create a pertinence - because it
finds its justification in the drawing together of two or more semantic
fields, which then allows the label to pertain to its subject (153). Thus,
the concepts of semantic impertinence and of the violation of a code go a
long way toward justifying the description of metaphor as a 'deviation' and
a 'figure'. The result is that, even though Cohen remains committed
ultimately to a word-based theory of metaphor, he recognizes that the
functioning of metaphor is properly a predicative process (156). And he
offers "... a semiotic equivalent of the semantic process' (157) of
metaphor which Ricoeur espouses.
Though recognizing some helpful features in the new rhetoric, Ricoeur
still prefers the tension theory of metaphor, which he proposed in Study 3,
because
... it alone gives an account, through the interaction
of all the terms present at the same time in the same
statement, of the product ion of the intersection that
the theory of the word-metaphor postulates. The cruci¬
al phenomenon is the augmentation of the initial poly¬
semy of words by means of an instance of discourse.
What compels the addition of a semantic variant that
did not exist before is the recoil shock where the
predicative structure and the semantic field meet."11
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Ricoeur, then, notes the change of meaning and increase of meaning which is
focalized on the metaphorical term in the sentence, but he holds tenaci¬
ously to the position that this effect is the result of the interaction of
all of the words in the sentence upon this metaphorical term. Theories of
word metaphor can observe this effect, but they cannot give a logical
account of it, Only a theory of metaphor as statement, a truly semantic
theory, can account for the production of metaphorical meaning.
Study 6, entitled 'The work of resemblance', is concerned with the
relationship of metaphor and resemblance. Ricoeur's thesis is clearly
stated at the beginning of the chapter:
I propose to dissociate the fate of resemblance from
that of the substitution theory and to reinterpret the
role of resemblance within the guidelines of the theory
of interaction set out in the third Study (173).
Resemblance is often associated with the theory of substitution, as is
seen in the sixth postulate of the old rhetorical theory of metaphor. All
figures have a 'reason' for the transposition of meaning which they effect,
and the paradigmatic structure of metaphor is that of resemblance (46).
This pact between resemblance, substitution, and metaphor is strengthened
by the work of R. Jakobson.42 He proposes that sentences, viewed as a
large sign, are the result of combination and selection. Syntax operates
with the combination factor, semantics with that of selection. 'In the
constitution of a message, one word is chosen among other similar words
within a group that constitutes a paradigm based on similarity' (176).
Thus, metaphor viewed as a semantic phenomenon, is cut off from any
predicative operation and is reduced to the role of a mere word, which may
be substituted for any other word in the group from which it is selected
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(179). In the words of Jakobson himself: 'Similarity connects a
metaphorical term with the term for which it is substituted.'"13
There is certainly an essential relationship between resemblance and
metaphor.4-'1 This was recognized even by Aristotle, who noted that "... a
good metaphor implies an intuitive perception of the similarity in
dissimilars.'4S But the characteristic of similarity in metaphor can not
be fully accounted for by the theory of substitution.
Instead, Ricoeur attempts to incorporate the notion of resemblance
into his interaction theory, His first point is that resemblance is better
explained as a process of predication than of denomination (194). The fact
of resemblance allows something new to be said by the metaphorical term
about the subject of the metaphor. Similarity begins the operation, but
metaphor is not exhausted by similarity alone. Secondly, it is metaphor
which enables one to perceive the similarity amidst the dissimilarity. In
fact, the "... resemblance is more constructed than seen' (195).
Furthermore, metaphor allows one to see the similarity 'despite difference,
in spite of contradiction' (196). By recognizing resemblance among
disparity, metaphor breaks down old boundaries and initiates new categories
of classification. Finally, metaphor makes visible new patterns of
relatedness 'in the interplay of identity and difference' (199). Thus,
Ricoeur succeeds in wrenching resemblance from the grasp of substitution
and connecting it with his own interaction theory of metaphor.
Study 7, 'Metaphor and reference,' crosses the boundary from semantics
to hermeneutics, from the study of the meaning of a sentence to the study
of the meaning of texts. The issue here is: 'What does the metaphorical
statement say about reality' (216)? The question of reference is not
addressed by semiotics, the science of signs, because signs, caught up in
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the 'interplay of differences and oppositions' (216), only refer to other
signs in the system. 'Sign differs from sign, discourse refers to the
world' (216). Or, semiotics is immanent; semantics is transcendent.
G. Frege, in his essay 'On Sense and Reference','1® clarified the
meaning of these terms. At the level of the word, there is a 'regular
connexion' (217) between a sign, its sense, and its reference. To a sign
corresponds a sense, and every sense presupposes a reference. In this way,
speakers can use words to identify objects. This distinction also works at
the level of sentences, which identify not objects but states of affairs.
The statement has a sense, what it says, and a reference, that about which
the something is said. 'Our intention in speaking or thinking... is the
striving for truth,... [which! drives us always to advance from the sense
to the reference,1'1'7 Thus, both word and sentence, each in their own way,
express a sense and designate a reference.
The question of reference posed by a text is more complex. In regard
to literature, sense is attainable, but reference is suspended. The poem
or novel does not designate a real state of affairs. The relationship of
literature to reference is not descriptive. Nevertheless, it does refer,
but it does so by means of its structure - its arrangement, genre, and
style (219). 'To interpret a work is to display the world to which it
refers.,.' (220). Ricoeur formulates his postulate of reference this way:
The literary work through the structure proper to it
displays a world only under the condition that the
reference of descriptive discourse is suspended. Or
to put it another way, discourse in the literary work
sets out its denotation as a second-level denotation,
by means of the suspension of the first-level denota¬
tion of discourse (221).
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The implication for metaphor is similar. The literal interpretation
of a metaphor fails, and sense is made only by means of a metaphorical
interpretation. These two levels of s^nse correspond to two levels of
reference. The first-level reference is abandoned, along with the first-
level sense. The real meaning of the metaphor is found in its second-level
sense and reference. 'A second-level reference, which is properly the
metaphorical reference, is set free by means of the suspension of the
first-level reference' (221).
There are objections, though, which can be raised against the
possibility of metaphor having a referential function. Following the
schema of Jakobson, one might argue that metaphor does not refer to the
real world. Rather, it refers, by means of substitution, only to other
words in the same field for which it can be replaced (223). A similar
claim is that metaphor is just another means by which the poet can play
with language for language's sake (224). It has no external reference or
cognitive value. Another line of objection comes from that type of
literary criticism which would hold that metaphor, like poetry and
literature in general, has emotive value, that is, the ability to project a
mood, and nothing more (226). But this is an effect of metaphor, and it
does not explain the creation of meaning achieved by metaphor. And the
previous objections overlook the fact that, though reference is suspended
or abolished at the literal first-level, this does not mean that there is
no reference at all.
This leads to the heart of Ricoeur's thesis on the relation of
metaphor and reference. The first-level reference is abolished because it
is linked to the first-level sense, or literal interpretation, of the
metaphorical statement. Because of a 'category mistake'-4® or a 'semantic
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impertinence'AS*, the literal interpretation breaks down. But the
destruction of a literal sense does not necessarily lead to nonsense. The
metaphorical interpretation is employed in order to generate meaning on the
rubble of the old literal interpretation (230). The split sense - a
divergence between the literal and the metaphorical meaning - carries with
it a split reference. The literal reference is abandoned along with its
sense. But in its place arises a second order reference to complement the
metaphorical sense. 'Such is the schema of split reference. Essentially,
it sets up a parallel between metaphorization of reference and
metaphorization of meaning' (231).
The question of metaphorical reference is taken up quite differently
by M. Black and M. Hesse,so whose works Ricoeur cites with approval. Black
identifies three kinds of models (scale, analogue, and theoretical), but it
is the third type which is most applicable to metaphor (240). The
theoretical models are not constructions or diagrams but rather a language
which is introduced to provide a new means of identifying entities and
discussing relations (241). They work with a logic of discovery instead of
a logic of deduction or investigation (242).
The working of a theoretical model is seen in the current research on
particle physics.51 A new £1 billion machine, a particle accelerator
called LEP, has recently begun operation near Geneva. It is designed to
investigate the existence and relationship of subatomic particles, by
generating high-speed collision between electrons and positrons. The
scientists involved hope to learn more about the recently discovered Z
particles, which '... will decay into quarks, the elusive fundamental
building blocks of matter....' Professor Kalmus, one of the British
scientists working on the project, said: 'We hope not only for the
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particles we know but to see new phenomena.... We're looking for something
that gives mass to the universe and so for the source of gravitation.'
Behind all of this experimentation are theories which set out the
structure and behaviour of the atom, Previous atomic theories have been
only partially correct, so new theories have been adopted and then revised
in accordance with later research. These new theories have predictive
potential, and they have led the scientists to 'look' (they will see,
perhaps, the effect of the particle but not the particle itself) for
certain particles in particular. Thus, these theoretical models have both
explanatory and predictive significance. They account for the activity of
particles already known, and they propose the existence of new particles
whose identity is suspected but not yet identified.
Theoretical models also organize and redescribe what is known about a
subject. In this way, they closely resemble metaphors. Some metaphors,
known as 'root metaphors' (244), are so radical that they organize related
metaphors into a network. For example, 'God is king', calls up not only
the power and majesty of God, but also other descriptions of God, such as
'Lord', 'Father', and 'Fortress'.32
The conclusion of the chapter on 'Metaphor and reference' turns to the
issue of metaphorical truth. For Ricoeur, metaphorical truth has a tensive
and dialectical character, which finds its focus in the copula 'is' (247).
The metaphorical 'is' simultaneously means 'is', 'is not', and 'is like'.
The first option, 'is' means 'is', suggests an 'ontological vehemence'
(249), in which the author of the metaphor affirms that there is a
resemblance between the subject and the predicate of the metaphor. He
perceives an identity in the midst of difference and proclaims this with an
'A is a B' type of metaphorical statement. This very assertion leads to
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the second possibility, that 'is' means 'is not'. For in laying aside
'ontological naivete' <251), the truth comes out that A is not B after all.
This is the unmasking of metaphor for which interpretation calls <252).
The 'is' and the 'is not' are resolved in an 'is like', for a simile is a
metaphor which has begun to be explicated. This inclusion of 'is like' at
this point can only occur after the notion of 'resemblance' has been
reclaimed from a substitution theory and restored to its proper place in
the interaction theory. This move was justified in Study 6 and paves the
way for the conclusion of Study 7. The truth of metaphor is paradoxical.
'The paradox consists in the fact that there is no other way to do justice
to the notion of metaphorical truth than to include the critical incision
of the <literal) "is not" within the ontological vehemence of the
<metaphorical) "is"' <255). This paradox is resolved in the 'is like',
which preserves the truth of both the identity and the difference expressed
by the metaphor.
The eighth and final study is 'Metaphor and philosophical discourse.'
This unit contributes less than the preceding ones toward a theory for
interpreting Pauline metaphors, yet a brief summary of its principle points
will round out this overview of metaphor.
The first topic is that of the relation between analogy and metaphor.
With regard to the relation of metaphor and the analogy of being in the
writings of Aristotle, Ricoeur concludes that there is little similarity in
their operations. 'The ordered equivocalness of being and poetic
equivocalness move on radically different levels' <261). Philosophical
discourse carefully controls and organizes the polysemy of its language,
while the work of metaphor in poetry seems to proceed with a reckless
abandon. Furthermore, analogy has a conceptual structure which differs
169
from that of metaphor. It always implies 'an equality of relations among
four terms' (271), something which is not necessarily true of metaphor. In
addition to retaining its own conceptual structure, analogy also 'receives
a transcendental aspect from the field to which it is applied' (270). The
sophisticated structure and transcendental character of analogy reveals
that, in terms of form and function, it is already 'a step beyond metaphor'
(272).
Next, the application of analogy to theology in the writings of Thomas
Aquinas is reviewed. Aquinas' problem was to describe a theological dis¬
course which could, at the same time, both preserve the concept of divine
transcendence and allow the possibility of communication between God and
man (273). 'Analogous attribution' was his proposal, because 'analogy
functions at the level of names and predicates, and it belongs to the con¬
ceptual order' (274), Through the use of proportionality, the distance
between God and man could be maintained, without the difference becoming
radically exclusive. It is at the point of proportionality that analogy
comes closest to metaphor (278). But it is at the point of predication
that their separation is most distinct, for analogy 'rests on the predi¬
cation of transcendental terms', while metaphor requires 'the predication
of meanings that carry their material content with them' (280).
The third enquiry is into the relationship between metaphor and
metaphysics. The point of departure is Heidegger's famous maxim: 'The
metaphorical exists only within the metaphysical.'33 This statement
suggests (at least) two propositions: 'the metaphysical transfer of the
sensible to the non-sensible, the metaphorical transfer of the literal to
the figurative' (281). The implication is that the reader should take
seriously the use of metaphor in philosophical discourse (283).
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A serious challenge to the efficacy of metaphor in philosophical
discourse is raised by J. Derr Ida,who aims at demonstrating the
limitless metaphoricity of metaphor' (285), Both the language and the
method of Derrida are obscure, but he seems to be saying that all language
was originally metaphorical. But, as metaphor was used so often, it died,
and now dead metaphor conveys only a literal sense, which conceals its true
conceptual power. One result is that "... discourse on metaphor is itself
infected by the universal metaphoricity of philosophical discourse' (286).
According to Ricoeur, the critique of Berrida attempts to "... unmask the
unthought conjunction of hidden metaphysics and worn-out metaphor' (285).
Ricoeur offers clarification to the theory of Heidegger and Derrida at
several points, as well as using their work to expound further his view on
the subject. Dead metaphor does indeed seem sometimes to result in the
simple process of denomination. But that is because the oft-used metaphor
has lost its tensive character and, along with it, its predicative
operation (290). The literal meaning of a word can be contrasted with its
metaphorical use, for that is one way of identifying metaphor. But the
literal sense should not necessarily be equated with the original sense.
It is a well known fact that words change their meaning with time. Thus,
the literal sense should be construed as its ordinary use in current speech
(291), Finally, as a corrective to both Heidegger and Derrida, Ricoeur
reminds the reader that it is not metaphor that carries the structure
of Platonic metaphysics; metaphysics instead seizes the metaphorical
process in order to make it work to the benefit of metaphysics' (294-5),
Ricoeur next considers the relation between poetic discourse and
speculative discourse. He suggests that the conceptual articulation of
speculative discourse becomes possible because of the metaphorical dynamism
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of poetic discourse (296). The 'semantic, shock' (296) engendered by
metaphor cails for expiication so as to produce conceptual knowledge. This
increase in knowledge is accompanied by a gain in reference (297). There
is a dual relation between reference and predication. First, strange
predicates can be applied to familiar referents in order to highlight some
new aspect. Likewise, familiar predicates can be applied to alien
referents '... in order to explore a referential field that is not directly
accessible' (298). In this way, the metaphorical statement operates in two
different semantic and referential fields simultaneously. This suggests
that meaning, exerting centripetal force on one field while submitting to
the gravitational tug of another, is not a stable entity, but, rather, that
it has a 'dynamic, directional, vectoral character' (299). This interplay
of forces provides a 'semantic sketch' which calls for a 'conceptual
determination' (299). Thus metaphorical statements, by means of a sort of
'ontological vehemence' (300), offer clues which require further
elaboration.
This elaboration is the activity of speculative discourse, which in no
way is to be linked with or identified with poetic discourse. They are
related, as stages on the way to a destination, but they must not be
blurred together, as Heidegger does (309). They are different levels of
discourse, which cooperate with one another but must always remain
distinct. Speculative discourse distinguishes itself in one particular
fashion, in that it is able to state its case unequivocally (or almost,
anyway), while metaphor is mired willingly and even gleefully in the
'duplicity of language.'5®
Metaphor is drawn out of its lair by interpretation, which is related
to speculative discourse and works with concepts. 'Interpretation is then
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a mode of discourse that functions at the intersection of two domains,
metaphorical and speculative' (303). It is influenced by two competing
forces - 'the clarity of the concept' and the 'dynamism of metaphor' (303).
Both are needed for the articulation of reality, but it is metaphor, la
metaphore vive, which enlivens discourse and calls for a work of
interpretation. Interpretation, in its attempt to explicate, would destroy
the metaphorical by means of the conceptual, but "... metaphor itself has
an immediacy and a vitality that mocks at all such reductive explanations
of the process.'ss
The final relation to be explored in Study 8 is that of metaphor and
reference. This pair was indeed the central topic of Study 7, but, at this
point, Ricoeur approaches it again from a more philosophical angle. The
notion of sense drives inexorably toward reference. 'Something must be for
something to be said' (304). But it is not necessary for the thing to be
demonstrated '... on the field of a verificationalist concept of truth,
itself bound up with a positivist concept of reality' (306). Rather,
reality can be 'set before the eyes'®-7 by means of metaphor. Metaphor,
which ultimately resides in the copula 'to be', means 'is, is not, and is
like' all at the same time. The 'is like' of imaginative resemblance
mediates the nai've realism of the 'is' and the reductionist tendency of the
'is not'. Thus metaphor can affirm the existence of entities which are
beyond the reach of empirical observation and can propose the possibility
of states of affairs which are not accessible to ordinary vision. This
metaphorical seeing of truth resides in the imaginative power opened up by
metaphor, operating under the theory of split reference. The truth of
metaphor, then, is similar to the 'tensional' truth of poetry (313).
In summary, then, the theory of metaphor advocated by Ricoeur is truly
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a tension theory. According to Ricoeur, there is a tension between the
words of the metaphorical statement itself. They come from different
semantic fields and create a clash when they are brought together. Also,
there is a tension between the literal and the metaphorical interpretations
of the sentence. The literal is absurd or contradictory and must be
discarded. In its stead, a metaphorical interpretation is established which
is able to make sense of the verbal conflict. It does so on the basis of
resemblance, which is also tensional, because it sees identity in the midst
of and in spite of difference. The literal reference is dissipated along
with the literal sense. The result is not no reference at all, but rather
a second level reference, a metaphorical reference to correspond with the
metaphorical sense. In this way, metaphor redescribes reality. It has a
cognitive function and is not merely ornamental or illustrative. Metaphor
says something about reality.
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SECTION B. LETTERS.
The tension theory of metaphor, proposed by P. Ricoeur and summarized
in the preceding section, can be applied to the explanation, understanding,
and interpretation of metaphors in 2 Corinthians 3. Such a theory will
allow one to identify metaphors when they occur in this text. Sometimes,
the reader of a passage fails to notice a figure of speech because he is
already familiar with the passage and because he already has in mind an
interpretation of the passage and its imagery.1 In such a case, the
metaphor is not reckoned as such because its force is already dissipated.
The absurdity it originally produced has already been explained away. The
metaphor has become a mere relic of the familiar interpretation which
explicates it.
The employment of the tension theory forces the reader to take a new
look at the text. It invites him to lay aside traditional interpretations
and to experience once again the original absurdity of the metaphor, the
clash of incompatible categories, the awkwardness of unusual attribution.
Then the reader is compelled to analyze his experience and the semantic
event which generated it. The tension theory also leads the student beyond
word studies toward an examination of the sentences in which these words
appear, for it is in the sentence that the tension of the metaphor occurs.
After having been confronted once again with the strangeness of the literal
interpretation ('Our God is a rock,' for example, provokes an astonishing
literal interpretation for a worshipper in the Judeo-Christian tradition),
the reader is challenged to develop a metaphorical interpretation of the
statement in question. While experiencing the tension between the literal
and the metaphorical interpretations, he might realize that this metaphor
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is very difficult to translate. His paraphrase may seem inadequate.
Having given a diligent and prolonged effort, the reader comes to the
realization that the metaphor says more than he can say. It communicates
more than he can verbalize. In this way, he will perceive that the
biblical writers have used metaphors (some metaphors, at least) as '... an
Instrument for the redescription of lived experience that permits us to see
new connections in things, or to decode the traces of God's presence in
history. ' 2
The text of 2 Corinthians 3 contains three metaphors to which
Ricoeur's theory will be applied. The first of these is 'letter', which
Paul develops in the paragraph comprising verses 1-3. Verse 1 opens with a
question: "Are we beginning again to commend ourselves?" This question
arises from the preceding paragraph <2.14-17), in which Paul might appear
to some to be boasting about his relationship with God. God causes Paul to
participate in a triumphal march by means of Christ (v. 14). God, through
the agency of Paul and his company, makes himself known everywhere (v. 14b).
7
'Everywhere' <ev navxt t6ji<o) is either hyperbole, meaning 'everywhere I
have travelled' or even (though perhaps still somewhat hyperbolical)
'everywhere I have travelled - and from those places to everywhere else!'.
Paul's efforts result in salvation and life for some and in destruction and
death for others (vv. 15-16). Then Paul avers that he is sincere, not a
'hawker' or a 'huckster' of the word of God (v. 17).
One possible interpretation would state that Paul supposes that some
of his Corinthian comrades might accuse him of boasting or bragging. That
someone might entertain such a thought is an indicator that there are those
in Corinth who are opposed to Paul, or at least suspicious of him. Paul
appears to be a bit sensitive to the charge of self-commendation, since it
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arises here and again in 2 Corinthians 5. 12 <• We are not commending
ourselves to you again but giving you cause to be proud of us, So
he poses the question that others will perhaps be asking. Paul would not
want to commend himself, nor appear to others to be commending himself,
because he prefers ultimately to be commended by the Lord <2 Cor 10.18).
So, by asking this question, he hopes to disarm or neutralize his
detractors in Corinth. According to this explanation, the occurrence of
auaxat\.xf| stticttoXi') in 3. 1-3 arises in the mind of Paul as he reflects on
what he has .just written and on the Jewish scriptures, which provide the
motifs for this section (2.14-3.6).3
Another explanation for the mention of oocttcxt t xt^ emicrcoA^ is
historically, rather than literarily, oriented. In verse 1, it seems that
there are opponents of Paul at work among the Corinthian Christians, and
that they would like to discredit Paul. Verse 1 implies that the opponents
have brought letters of recommendation to Corinth and that, upon their
departure, they requested (or will request) letters of recommendation from
Corinth. If the use of letters of recommendation was a common custom among
the early Christians, "■ then it is not surprising that the opposition would
ask the Corinthians if Paul had such documents. Because the response would
have been negative, they would have had an opening to attack the
credibility of Paul. The apostle naturally would have been concerned when
word of this verbal assault reached him. This may well have been the chain
of events which led up to the mention of letters of recommendation in 3. 1.
Paul takes up the challenge but deals with it in his usual elliptical
f ashion.
Whether the mention of ctuctt<xtxx^ emicrtoat^ originated in a literary
context with Paul himself or in a historical context among the Corinthians,
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the topic nevertheless appears in the text of 2 Corinthians 3. The chapter
begins with a question: 'Are we beginning to commend ourselves again?' The
question is not answered. Then he asks another question, which furthers
the concept of commendation by introducing the notion of letters of
recommendation: 'Or do we need as some do letters of recommendation to you
or from you?' Because the question is introduced by pui*|, there is the
suggestion that a negative answer is almost certainly expected from the
reader. It might be translated, 'We do not need, as some do, letters of
recommendation to you or from you, do we?' Here is revealed the main point
of 3.1-3, the central concept which gives rise to the metaphorical
exposition which follows: Paul does not need letters of recommendation.
It would have helped if Paul had given at least one reason why he
did not need letters of recommendation. He could have stated that God is
the only recommendation he needs, in much the same way as he later declares
that God is the one who qualifies him for ministry <v. 5), though the
appeal to God would not necessarily have been a strong argument in this
case. He could have recounted his call experience (Gal 1.1, 15-16, for
example!. Or he could have written that his recommendation comes from the
power and the wisdom of God, not the weakness and foolishness of men <1 Cor
1.25). But Paul does none of this.
Paul is not predisposed against letters of recommendation in general.
He demonstrates his acknowledgement of their validity by writing a short
one on behalf of Phoebe <Rm 16. 1-2) and another one for the delegates
carrying the collection to Jerusalem (2 Cor 8. 16-22). s Nor does Paul say
that he wishes he had a written recommendation but that he could not
acquire one. Paul does none of this. He states his thesis: I do not need
letters of recommendation. But he does not follow it up with any reasons.
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Instead of explanations, Paul makes a rather curious statement: 'You
yourselves are our letter.' It might seem a little strange for the man who
says that he does not need a letter of recommendation to produce one
anyway. The course of this argument is rather unexpected. After tacitly
telling them that he is not going to commend himself and that he does not
need letters for his commendation, he immediately starts writing about
having a letter. He then continues by describing the letter.
One might suggest that Paul is a sly old fox, or that he is confused
or inconsistent. A possible alternative is that Paul has switched points
of view. He does not have any letters of recommendation, and he does not
need any (v. 1). His case is closed. But in verse 2, Paul takes up the
Corinthian agenda. It appears that there is a crisis in the congregation
about these letters. Somehow or other letters of recommendation had become
a significant issue for these people. Perhaps some other Jewish or
Christian missionaries had arrived in Corinth, hoping to gain influence
with the church there by presenting letters of recommendation. Upon
learning that Paul still exercised some authority there, they sought to
undermine it by castigating him for having no proper credentials. When
Paul got wind of this, he casually inserted a little paragraph in his next
epistle to Corinth, stating that he did not need such letters, as some
folks apparently did. These 'some' (xxveq, v.1) might be the same as the
'many' (ov TtoXXoi, 2. 17), e but they need not be. 7 But they do seem to be
persons who made much of their letters of recommendation, and they tried to
convince the Corinthians to expect such from Paul and all other
missionaries who came to town.
This whole issue of letters of recommendation raises another question.
Why are Paul and the Corinthians concerned about these letters at this
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point in their relationship? The church there should have known Paul quite
well by now, for he had spent a considerable amount of time there (a year
and a half, according to Acts 18.11), had visited them a second time, and
had been in correspondence with them already not once, but three times. .
Why would they now expect to see Paul's letter of recommendation? What
could it add to their knowledge of Paul which had already been acquired
through their own reading and observation? It all seems a bit puzzling.
Even if outsiders had contested the legitimacy of Paul's authority, still
the Corinthians who had witnessed Paul's ministry should have been able to
vouch for his integrity and effectiveness as an apostle. They should have
been able to lay that issue to rest. But for some reason, probably the
criticisms of an accredited opposition, the problem of recommendation arose
and became known to Paul, and he addressed it in an epistle.
As noted above, the main point in 3. 1-3 is that Paul does not need
letters of recommendation. He gives no reasons. He simply declares that
he does not need them, and he contrasts himself with those who do need them
or use them.
It seems inconsistent that Paul proceeds to state that he has a
letter: 'You yourselves are our letter' (v. 2). The contradiction is
superficial, though, if understood in light of the provisional explanation
given above <p. 179). The apparent contradiction is a result of Paul's
attention to two different agendas. Paul for his part does not need them.
But if the Corinthians need them, then that is another matter. Paul seems
to be willing to discuss the matter for the benefit of the Corinthians,
even though it is of little consequence to himself.
The seeming inconsistency is also less troublesome when one realizes
that Paul is discussing two different kinds of letters. He does not need
180
literal letters of recommendation. He is consistent in his unwillingness
to present letters of recommendation that are written with pen and ink on
papyrus. The letter he does present, the Corinthian church, is quite a
different kind of recommendation. Paul is more eager to discuss the
metaphorical letter of recommendation. In fact, it seems in verses 2-3
that Paul the apologist/polemicist has laid down his quill and that Paul
the poet has picked it up. The controversy about literal letters of
recommendation has led to the idea of metaphorical letters. a The question
of credentials gradually fades into the background as Paul's imagination
brings 'people-letters' into the foreground.
'You are our letter.' This is a metaphorical statement. Paul has
mixed terms from two different categories, persons and documents.
Obviously, the persons in question, the Corinthians, are not literally
letters, ink and papyrus documents. There is a 'category mistake' here, to
use the words of G. Ryle.3 Paul has linked together these two categories
in a way in which they do not ordinarily overlap in normal conversation.
Persons are not usually likened to documents, and vice versa. Yet Paul has
caused these two categories to overlap throughout verses 2 and 3. This
juxtaposition of two different fields of language creates a tension, and it
calls for a work of interpretation.
Paul is not the first writer to pull together these two fields in this
way. The prophet Jeremiah speaks of a day when the Lord will do a new
thing for his people Israel:
But this is the covenant which I will make with the house
of Israel after those days, says the Lord: I will put my
law within them, and I will write it upon their hearts; and
I will be their God, and they shall be my people (Jer 31.33).
181
Judging from the context, the Lord is unhappy with his people because they
have broken the covenant, by disobeying the commandments. The covenant
refers to the agreement God made with Israel through the mediation of Moses
after God had brought Israel up out of the land of Egypt (Jer 31.32; Ex
34). The old covenant was written by Moses upon tablets of stone (Ex 34.1)
and consisted of the ten commandments (Ex 34.28). But the new covenant
would be written upon the hearts of the Israelites. The prophet uses the
contrasts of old/new, tablets/hearts, and external/interna 1 to talk about
God's ways of dealing with men. God had made an agreement with the Jews.
They broke their side of the bargain. God will cut a new covenant.
The idea of internalization is found again in Deuteronomy 6.6: 'And
these words which I command you this day shall be upon your heart.' The
author does not say 'shall be written' upon your heart, but the idea is not
far away. Moses does command the Israelites to write the commands on the
doorposts and gates (6.9). Perhaps they would become present upon the
heart and mind by means of talking about them (v. 7) and by seeing them
regularly (v.8). The point is that words from the physical world should
somehow be impressed upon the mind. Again there is a category mistake, and
one's imagination is required to comprehend the full meaning of this Old
Testament passage.
That which was implicit in Deuteronomy becomes explicit in Proverbs:
My son, keep my words
and treasure up my commandments with you;
keep my commandments and live,
keep my teachings as the apple of your eye;
bind them on your fingers,
write them on the tablet of your heart. (7.1-3).
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The exhortation to obey the commandments is to be effected, in part, by
writing them on the heart. The primary exhortation ('keep my words') is
supported by suggestions for its implementation. Figurative language
pervades the passage. The phrase 'write them on the tablet of your hearts'
is suggestive of the modern expression, 'to take something to heart.'
The theme of writing on the heart, then, occurs in the Old Testament.
There is a difference, though, between the passages. In Deuteronomy, the
writing is implied but not clearly stated. The author of Proverbs
explicitly exhorts the reader to write on his heart, and the content of
that writing is the commandments, presumably the same commandments given by
God to Moses on Mt. Sinai. In Jeremiah, however, exhortation is replaced
by promise. The prophet describes something that God promises to do for
man, rather than something which man must do for himself. So it is God and
not man who does the writing. The message that is written is not the same
covenant as before but rather a new covenant (Jer 31.31). The content of
this new covenant remains undefined, in contrast with the explicit
enumeration of injunctions contained in the old covenant. The emphasis of
the Jeremiah passage is that the writing will be performed by God, not man,
and on hearts, not stone tablets.
There are also interesting parallels in classical literature.
Bultmann notes several,10 the one most pertinent to our study being found
in an excerpt from The Phaedrus (276a-277a): 1 '
Soc. I mean an intelligent word graven in the soul of
the learner...
Phae. You mean the living word of knowledge which has
a soul, and of which the written word is properly no
more than an image?
Soc. Yes, of course that is what I mean . . . Then he
[the wise man! will not seriously incline to 'write'
his thoughts 'in water' with pen and ink. . .But nobler
far is the serious pursuit of the dialectician, who,
183
finding a congenial soul, by the help of science sows
and plants therein words which are able to defend
themselves and him who planted them, and are not un-
unfruitful, but have in them a seed which others
brought up in different soils render immortal, making
the possessors of it happy to the utmost extent of
human happiness.
Socrates, as portrayed here, affirms that speaking is superior to
writing, though writing itself is not completely devoid of value. 1=6 It is
apparent, though, that oral discourse is the preferred form of
communication and instruction. Yet there is a kind of writing which is
approved - metaphorical writing. This is accomplished by engraving words
on the soul of a person who has begun to learn (porvBdvovtoq), a soul which
is deemed fitting or congenial (mpootjxouaav) for further instruction. Such
knowledge may be regarded as a word which is alive and embedded in a soul
(Vpyuxov). In contrast stands the written word which is characterized as
nothing more than a lifeless image (e^TScoXov). The metaphor changes in this
section from documents to agriculture. Beginning with knowledge written on
the soul, the author soon mentions words sown in the soul. Socrates (like
Paul) picks up an image, develops it as far as he wants, and then discards
it in favour of another.
This excerpt from The Phaedrus, though similar to 2 Corinthians 3, is
not a direct parallel. Socrates is primarily contrasting written words and
spoken words, and he argues for the superiority of the spoken. While he
does once mention writing on the soul and this in a favourable manner, the
main imagery employed is the personification of the spoken word and the
metaphor of the seed.
There is a contrast between the weakness of the written word and the
efficacy of the spoken word, especially when the spoken word becomes
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inscribed on a congenial soul. Paul, on the other hand, in 2 Corinthians
3, makes no such disjunction between the written and the spoken. Rather,
his oral word is linked to his written word. His preaching produced a
church. The resulting equation is: I founded a church - I write a letter.
The church is now called a letter. Thus his oral word becomes his written
word; his preaching wrote a letter. Paul accepts the validity of both the
spoken and the written. His concern is with the proper means of writing.
Paul allows for the propriety of the written word and employs it often to
serve his purposes. But he argues for the superiority of things written by
the Spirit over things written by the hand of man.
Other writers, then, have drawn together these two semantic fields of
persons and documents. But Paul is the first to link them so imaginatively
with the verb 'to be'. He does it twice in 2 Corinthians: 'you are our
letter' <v. 2) and 'you are a letter of Christ' (v. 3). These metaphorical
statements are neat, terse, and concise unions of two realms of language,
using the 'A is a B' style of metaphorical utterance. The texts cited
above may have influenced Paul to consider this intersection of fields.
But these particular metaphors are the result of Paul's creativity, having
been "... cast in the furnace of the perceptive and prophetic
imagination.'13 While writing a letter to the Corinthians about a crisis
pertaining to letters, he twists the meaning of 'letter' by using it in a
metaphorical statement.
A semantic analysis of the metaphor, 'You are our letter,' reveals
the following points. Paul takes the Corinthians ('you') and attributes to
them an unusual predicate Care our letter'). This sentence does not make
sense at the literal level. People are not epistles. These categories do
not relate in the way Paul has structured them. People may write epistles,
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read, mail, or even 'eat' them (cf. Ez 3. 1-3; Rev 10. 1-11), but it is not
true (literally) that people are epistles. Considered in another sense,
people may be referred to as friends, enemies, relatives, neighbours, and
other such relational terms, but they may not be called epistles. Paul has
committed a calculated error. He has intentionally linked the semantic
fields of 'persons' and 'documents' in an unallowable manner. Therefore,
one can safely conclude that a literal interpretation is untenable.
But this discord at the literal level pushes one to seek a
metaphorical interpretation which might explain this transgression. One
must look for the 'hitherto unnoticed resemblance' between persons and
epistles."1 What characteristics of letters may also be properly
attributed to people? At this point, the common line of commentators will
be followed, which states that 'letter' in verse 2 is short for 'letter of
recommendation' , and that 'letter of recommendation' itself is a technical
term. Later, though, it will be suggested that this approach does not
exhaust the interpretative possibilities of this metaphor.
Letters in general have a sender, a recipient, a situation, and a
content. This is the essential structure of an epistle which is to be
transferred to that letter which is constituted by the Corinthians.
The sender of this letter of recommendation is Paul himself, the one
who is being commended. Self-commendation can be awkward or even abrasive,
as in the case of Muhammad Ali, the heavyweight boxing champion of the
world in the I960's and early 1970's. He announced, 'I am the greatest.'
The statement was true at the time, for he knocked out everyone who
challenged him, but it was not well-received by the general public. Ali
commended himself vociferously but did not make many friends in the
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process. Others, like Paul, prefer a more subtle approach.
Paul, who wrote several letters of the ink and papyrus type, also
wrote another kind of letter, 'a living letter.'13 As a result of his
preaching in Corinth, some had believed in Christ and a church had been
formed. It is this group of saints which he now calls his letter of
recommendation. So, in some way, Paul equates his preaching and organizing
activity with that of letter—writing. Paul the preacher is also Paul the
author incognito.
The explanation above is based on taking qpffiv as a subjective
genitive. Paul is the author and sender of the letter. An alternate
possibility is that qpffiv is an objective genitive, a letter about Paul
written by the Corinthians. Understood this way, the letter is a letter of
recommendation, one which they wrote on their own heart. It would be this
heart-written letter which is in Corinth, commending Paul to 'all men'. If
the letter in verse 2 is indeed 'commendatory', then it is certainly about
Paul. But such an interpretation does not require that such a letter be
written by the Corinthians. If the letter is commendatory, though, it is
more likely to be one written by Paul, for the issue apparently was not
whether the Corinthians would or would not recommend Paul. Rather, the
issue seems to be the proper means of self-commendation. Paul's point on
commendatory letters is that he does not need papei—letters since he has
people-let ters.
The identity of the receiver of this metaphorical letter of
recommendation is a mystery. ie It was probably not the Corinthians, for
that would require them to be a letter to themselves. It was probably not
the opponents, because, in 2 Corinthians, Paul is not otherwise attempting
to commend himself to them. Rather, he is defending himself against their
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attacks and forging a polemic of his own against them. In such a
belligerent situation, an item like a letter of recommendation, which is
associated with friendship and not enmity, would have been totally out of
place. There is a possibility that the letter of recommendation, which the
Corinthians are, could have been intended for no one in particular, but
rather for the general public. In this case, it would have been like a
'wanted* poster, which is addressed to anyone in the locality who knows how
to read. If this were the case, the letter may have served either an
apologetic function or an evangelistic function. As an apology, it would
have presented a defence for Christianity, by portraying examples of what
faith in Christ can do. As an evangelistic tool, it would have invited its
'readers' to believe in Christ also. None of these three suggestions is
particularly persuasive, though, and perhaps this question must remain
asked but not yet answered.
The question of the content of the letter of recommendation is perhaps
not so difficult to deal with. In short, the character of the Corinthians
themselves is the content of the letter of recommendation which they
constitute. They have received what Paul has 'served' them: life instead
of death (3.6-7), a verdict of acquittal instead of guilt (3.8), the gifts
of glory, freedom, and the Spirit (3. 17-18). Thus, the Corinthian
believers are now different from what they were before. As a result of
their faith in Christ, it is becoming apparent that Jesus Christ produces
humane people, not stony-hearted people (3.3). His people are motivated
more by the indwelling Spirit and his promptings than by written laws and
their requirements (3.6).
Now, as for the fourth and final feature of a letter, its situation,
it may be said that this too is an enigma, which raises more questions than
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answers. This metaphorical letter was written when Paul was in Corinth, a
year or two before the writing of the literal letter in which the
metaphorical letter is mentioned. The letter was written in the past, and
it still exists. It is the existence of the metaphorical letter which
calls for the writing of the literal letter. It seems that some poachers
are trying to seduce the Corinthian congregation, and Paul wants to prevent
this. Part of his strategy is to point to the church there as his letter
of recommendation. But it is difficult to see how this is advantageous to
him. Both the Corinthians and the intruders already know that Paul
pioneered this church. There could have been no dispute over an issue like
that. Rather, the issue is whether or not he still should have a voice
(the loudest voice) in their affairs. Is he still the big brother who
gives advice and settles squabbles? The opponents (and probably some of
the locals also) answer in the negative. Paul's rejoinder that the
Corinthians are his letter of recommendation seems somewhat out of place.
Furthermore, it is debatable what kind of recommendation was constituted by
this church for Paul. It had divisions, a grievous moral offender,
insensitive and uncompassionate members, and a faction whose loyalty to
Paul was certainly wavering. One is mystified as to why Paul would want to
call this church his letter of recommendation, especially at this time,
when his relationship with them was less than rock solid. Thus, the
situation surrounding this metaphorical letter of recommendation is not at
all clear. Further elucidation is required, but not now available.
The foregoing similarities between literal letters and figurative
letters are sufficient to justify an analogical explication of Paul's
metaphor, 'You are our letter.' An analogy of proportion, Aristotle's
fourth class of metaphor, is (like a simile) an expanded metaphor. It is a
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metaphor which has been reflected upon in an attempt to spell out the
logical force of the metaphor. Metaphor generates meaning in figurative
terms. Analogy expresses meaning in conceptual terms.
The metaphor currently under consideration, 'You are our letter,' can
be paraphrased in the form of a four part analogy (as a is to b, so c is to
d). As a letter of recommendation validates the credentials of other
ministers, so the Corinthians validate the credentials of Paul. Or, what a
literal letter of recommendation does for the credibility of the opponents,
the Corinthians (a metaphorical letter) do for the credibility of Paul.
Paul seems to indicate that, though he calls himself the least of the
apostles, he still feels that he is equal to any of them in terms of
apostolic documentation. He can produce credentials as good as (or better
than, since God prepares Paul's documents) the rest of them. Paul's
credentials may be of a different order, but they are equally impressive.
The statement, 'You are our letter,' completely breaks down under the
weight of a literal interpretation, as noted earlier. The Corinthians are
not a papyrus document with Greek characters inscribed on them. The letter
which the Corinthians are is written not p£\avoq xai xaAdpou (3 Jn
13). The statement can only be rescued by a metaphorical interpretation,
which acknowledges that the Corinthians are not a letter. Rather, they
are, in some ways, like a letter. The metaphor, 'You are our letter,'
occurs, therefore, in the tension between its literal interpretation, 'You
Corinthians are a written document, ' and its metaphorical interpretation,
'You Corinthians are not a letter, but you are like a letter.' The literal
meaning is absurd and calls forth another interpretation which can salvage
the statement. The literal meaning self-destructs in a significant
contradiction. But the metaphorical interpretation transforms this
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nonsense into a meaningful utterance.
The emphasis so far has been on the noun and the pronoun, 'our letter'
and 'you'. It might be helpful here to take note also of the copula 'are'.
When 'are', along with the other words in the metaphor, is given its
lexical value in the sentence, the result is nonsense. Thus, the literal
interpretation proves itself inadequate. The metaphorical interpretation
of the statement, however, proceeds by twisting the literal meaning of
'are' into the figurative meaning of 'are not', and 'are like'.'"' The
literal meaning, 'You are our letter,' immediately provokes a negative
reaction, ' You people are not documents.' But the salvaging process goes
on to suggest, 'Though persons are not epistles, perhaps they are like
epistles.' So this opening statement of the extended metaphor goes through
three interpretive stages:
1. You are our letter.
2. You are not a letter.
3. You are like a letter for us. 1,3
What does it mean to say that the Corinthians are like a letter of
recommendation for Paul? First, it suggests the presence of both readers
and documents. Documents written with ink can be read and understood and
can thus serve as means of conveying information. A letter of
recommendation, more specifically, serves to commend a person known by the
author but unknown to the recipient. Our text does not tell us who the
third party is in this case, but it does imply that the saints at Corinth
can commend him to them. Whereas documents can only communicate by means
of the written word, persons can communicate by the spoken word. Second,
this metaphor suggests that the Corinthians possess the proper kind and
amount of information to transmit a legitimate recommendation. In order to
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produce such a letter, the writer must know something about the person's
past accomplishments, his abilities, his character, and his potential for
further effectiveness. The Corinthians were capable of doing all of this
for Paul. Alter two personal visits to Corinth and at least two letters to
them, they were well acquainted with this apostle and were indeed able to
vouch for him to all questioners. Perhaps Paul has a subtle purpose
underlying this metaphor: 'You are our letter. Go ahead and commend me to
the "some". Why have you not already done so? It is only proper and
fitting that you speak up for me.'
'You are our letter, written on our heart.' Paul further affirms that
this letter has been written on a specific writing surface. It is
inscribed on the heart. Again the tension arises. Either 'written on
paper' or (something like) 'love' in the heart would have been acceptable.
But writing on the heart is a mistake. There are no letters written on the
heart. Writing on the heart is a fiction. But it is a fiction which
allows Paul to redescribe reality. To the ordinary eye of a disinterested
onlooker, the Corinthian church is just a religious group, which meets
periodically to worship God. But for Paul they are that and so much more.
They are his work, his seal of authenticity, his letter of recommendation.
Their existence as a body of believers announces to the world not only the
Christian faith but also Paul's place within the new order which God has
begun. He is an apostle, their apostle, and their church witnesses to that
fact. This attestation is such an intimate reality that it is just like a
letter written on his heart. Certainly Paul is not thinking here of the
internal organ which pumps blood, but rather of the inner man, the
innermost core of one's being, the centre of one's thoughts and emotions.'3
It is there that the letter is inscribed,
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On whose heart is the letter written? There is a troublesome textual
variant here. The weight of manuscript evidence favours qpSv, which is
also the harder reading.-20 A few manuscripts < ^ 33 88 436 1881 ethr'°)
read upSSv which seems to make more sense in this context.21 Because upSSv
has some good, though limited, manuscript support and since it appears to
fit the sequence of thought better, it may well have been in the original
c
text. How then did qpffiv enter into the textual tradition? It might have
occurred as a result of the public reading of the epistle. When it was
read aloud to the church in Corinth, the reader might have changed the upffiv
to qpSSv in order to make clear that the reference was indeed to the
Corinthian listeners. The Corinthians were ' you' when being addressed by
Paul, but they were 1 us' when being addressed by one of their own number.
The qpoSv which originated in the public readings might then have been
carried into the written text, when additional copies of the epistle were
produced for the Corinthians. So then the autograph may well have read
c
upffiv, which a few manuscripts maintained. But most manuscripts would have
followed the wording of the first copies, since they did not have access to
the autograph. These first copies were those which had been altered to
give the right sense when read aloud in liturgical situations. If this
indeed was what actually happened, then it reveals a rather innocent
editing of the autograph, an emendation performed in an attempt fully to
elucidate and appropriate the meaning of the text. It shows an early
interpretation of the text by those to whom it was addressed. This
willingness to interpret means that the Corinthians, and perhaps others in
early Christianity, did not feel themselves slavishly bound to an exact
preservation of each word of their religious documents. They adapted the
text to make it meaningful for their own situation.
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J. Weiss suggests that the whole phrase under discussion, e yyeYP^P^v1!
ev xatq xapdfaxq upSSv (r)pfiW), is a gloss. He believes that the phrase
completely defaces the verse in which it stands. It is, he claims, simply
a case of a later scribe adding words in order to fill out the sense of the
passage as he understood it. Weiss states that such expansions
(Wucherungen) and clarifications (Verdeutlichungen) occur repeatedly in the
Pauline corpus, especially in Second Corinthians. Such glosses are
unfortunate, and sometimes even unbearable. Other examples he cites are:
xffi 0eg$ (2 Cor 2. 15) and xapSioaq (2 Cor 3. 3). 22
Bultmann thinks Weiss might be correct, though he hesitates to give
him his full support.23 Bultmann recognizes that it is 'absurd' to think
of the Corinthians, who are the letter, being written on their own heart.
In order to save the phrase and make some sense of it, he gives it the
meaning that God has written something on their hearts, meaning simply that
the Corinthians are Christians.
>
Omitting the EYYe'YPalJlP^VTl phrase does make verse 2 read more smoothly:
'You are our letter, known and read by all men.' It does reduce the
overloading of imagery, making the language more manageable. It also
eliminates the problem of understanding how the Corinthians are written on
the Corinthians' hearts. It also eliminates, if drastically, the necessity
t t
of choosing between upfiW and rpjfiSv. Still it is possible to keep the phrase
and make sense of it. Now the need for 'making sense' of a potentially
absurd phrase may appear to be an additional reason for omitting it, on the
basis of a belief that the text should be self-explanatory: that is, it
should make sense without the reader having to struggle with it. But that
is exactly the problem one faces when dealing with ancient texts.
Sometimes they just do not make sense on a cursory or superficial reading.
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Sometimes they still do not make sense after one has studied them, because,
among other reasons, the reader may not have, nor be able to acquire, the
necessary historical or lexical information which he needs for a full
understanding of the text. More importantly, though, is that the meaning
of a sentence is a 'resultant', something which issues forth from the
' interinanimation' of all the words in the sentence. *-4 The reader is
challenged to understand how all of the parts of a sentence function
together dynamically to achieve their unified and integrative effect. That
metaphor calls for a work of interpretation has already been stated. Thus,
some effort is required to understand it. One is justified in keeping the
phrase and struggling to grasp its meaning.
There has been so much discussion about which pronoun 0 our' or
'your') is the correct reading that many commentators have completely
overlooked the metaphorical character of the expression as a whole. An
epistle written on the heart (ours, yours, or anyone else's) is a startling
concept. The heart is neither the proper location nor the proper surface
for letter—writing, though one could chisel a splendid letter on a stone or
a stony heart! 'Written on the heart' is a statement that self-destructs
in contradiction, because Paul brings together seemingly unrelated
categories (hearts/letters). The absurdity of the literal interpretation
calls for a metaphorical interpretation which can rescue the sense of the
sentence.
A saying of Jesus, as recorded in the Synoptics, can be mentioned here
as a helpful parallel:
You brood of vipers, how can you who are evil say
anything good? For out of the overflow of the heart
the mouth speaks. The good man brings things out of
the good stored up in him, and the evil man brings
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evil things out of the evil stored up in him (Matt
12.34-35, NIV).
Writing on the heart for Paul is comparable to the fullness of the heart in
the teaching of Jesus. For Paul, what is written on the heart, though it
can not be seen, can be known and read by all men. Similarly, Jesus
teaches that the heart is known by the words and deeds that it brings forth
out of its fullness. In both cases, the heart, though unseen, can be known
by others.
Finally, 'written on the heart' excludes such meanings as 'stamped on
the forehead' and 'tattooed on the arm.' The message is not to be seen in
the outer man. It would not be noticed by a casual observer. It was en¬
graved on the heart and would only be apparent to those who were
acquainted with the Corinthians. 'Written on the heart' is there¬
fore a phrase used by Paul to limit and define his meaning.2'5 Paul is
saying that the hearts of the Corinthians, having been worked on by the
Spirit, are the letter which has been written.
'Known and read by all men' continues the mixing of semantic fields.
Letters can be known and read. People can be known. But 'people can be
read' is a category mistake. It calls for the verb 'read' to be used in an
other than normal fashion. It is a metaphor. Paul is stating that the
Corinthians, as letters, are known and read by all. The ' all' is hypei—
bole, an exaggeration used to emphasize the public nature of Paul's creden¬
tials: the Corinthian church is open for inspection and available for all
to read, in contrast to a letter which comes rolled or in an envelope and
is addressed to and read by only a few.
The language here is reminiscent of the saying attributed to Jesus in
Matthew 16. 3: ' You know how to interpret the appearance of the sky, but
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you cannot interpret the signs of the times.' Some people can 'read' the
weather, even though the sky is not written in a human language. Likewise,
people can 'read' other people by interpreting their attitudes and actions.
For example, in Ivanhoe the Black Knight announces to Locksley, 'I have
been accustomed to study men's countenances, and I can read in thine
honesty and resolution. '^ Perhaps Paul is giving another implicit
exhortation: Live the right life so people will read the right message.
Verse 2 is full of figurative language - perhaps too full. It must
be remembered, though, that Paul is not writing polished poetry. He is not
aiming to be the poet laureate of ancient Corinth. He is writing a letter,
and the letter is not meant to entertain but to persuade. Paul is trying
to persuade the Corinthians to warm up to him again and to acknowledge him
as their apostle. The language he uses to do this is thought-provoking,
even if less than elegant.
The main issue in verse 3 is the little phrase ETii<JToXf| XpicrcoO. The
letter of Christ which the Corinthian Christians are - is it a Himmels-
brlef or a letter of recommendation? Is it written by Christ (authorial
genitive) or about Christ (objective genitive)? If it is a letter of
recommendation, does it recommend Paul or Christ?
Bultmann characterizes the epistle as a Himmelsbrief, a letter written
by God to men.He compares it to the scroll handed down from heaven to
Ezekiel (Ez 2.8-3.3), which had writing on both sides of it. The heavenly
voice commanded Ezekiel to eat it and then to go and speak to the house of
Israel. A similar idea occurs in Rev 1. 17-20, when the Lord God Almighty
commands John to write a letter to each of the seven churches of Asia. God
was the author, and John was the amanuensis. Bultmann concludes that Paul
here is using the mythological image of the Himmelsbrief, but that it is
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not very effective because it was probably conceived in a blink of the eyes
and was not made to coordinate with the context.220 J. Weiss, though, is
not convinced that Paul wrote his letters unreflectively on the spur of the
moment:
Die gewdhnliche Vorstellung, daS Paulus seine Briefe
so in einem Zuge, ohne Pause und ohne Meditation impro-
visiert hatte, ist eine literarische und psychologische
Uniiberlegtheit, fast mdchte ich sagen eine Respektlos-
igkeit gegen den Verfasser. Man unterschatzt die geis-
tige Leistung, die in diesen unglaublich gehaltvollen
Werken steckt.33
Rissi contends that verse 3 refers to a letter of recommendation, not
a Himmelsbrief. Paul is continuing to use 'epistle' as he has in the
previous two verses. This epistle can only be a recommendation for Christ,
since the Corinthians proclaim Christ, not Paul or anyone else. Paul is
commended only by the fact that he founded the church there. The church
proclaims and commends Christ, not Paul. Thus Rissi takes Xptax6q as an
objective genitive.30
Furnish, on the other hand, reads the genitive as authorial.31 He
notes that the emphasis is on the origin and existence of the letter, not
on its content. The remainder of verse 3 confirms this opinion. Paul
continues the metaphor by describing how the letter was written (by the
Spirit) and where it was written (hearts). Since he does not mention the
contents, one must conclude that this aspect of the letter was less import¬
ant than its origin and existence. It does seem, then, that Furnish is
>
correct in understanding £Tn,<JToXf| XpicrtoO to refer to an epistle authored
by Christ, As such, it serves to recommend both Christ, the sender, and
Paul, his servant.
The phrase, 6iaxovr)6eiCTa ucp r||i<Sv, has also attracted several different
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interpretations from the commentators. Hughes and Ktlmmel think it refers
to the scribal function.312 Bultmann says it means "cared for by us" or
"attended to by us, '33 though he goes no further in specifying its sense.
Furnish suggests that it could indicate the role of courier, but then
concludes that it is not very important exactly what function Paul meant by
the term. The really significant point is that Paul's role in founding the
Corinthian church, that of Sidxovoq, is subordinate to the role of Christ,
who is the Lord. Both here and in 1 Corinthians 3, Paul characterizes
his work with the Corinthians as a necessary but insignificant task when
compared with the mighty work of God.
> > >
The next phrase in verse 3, eyyeYpocpp^vri ou p£Xocvr aXXa Ttveujiorcx 0eoC
CSSvtoq, sets out quite a sharp contrast between a letter written by men
with inert materials and one written by the Spirit, which is living and
powerful and far superior to anything of human authorship. Paul is subtly
informing his readers that, while the 'some' may rely on man-made letters
of recommendation, he depends totally on the sufficiency which comes from
God (v. 5) and on the recommendation which really matters - the one from
the Lord (2 Cor 10.18).
The final phrase of verse 3, oux ev irXot^tv Xx0fvcuq aX>? ev TtXa^iv
xapSxoaq crapxxvaxq, has also caused some difficulty. It is almost certain
that the wording arises from allusions to Old Testament passages (Ex 31. 18;
Prov 3,3; Ez 36.26). The problem is with the three consecutive words in
the dative case, nXa^xv xapSfaxq aapxtvoaq. Schmiedel, Bachmann, and
Weiss3* want to smooth out the reading by eliminating xocpSxa as a gloss,
while Windisch, Bultmann, and Rissi3"5 strike out rnXcS^, in order to create a
neat antithetical parallelism.
But Furnish rightly notes that there is no textual warrant for
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striking out either ttX<5c| or xapSia. 37 All three datives must be retained
in the text. The antithesis must remain unevenly worded: rnXa^iv Xi0ivcaq/
TtXa^iv xapStcxiq crapxivoaq. This parallelism may not be neat, but it is
Pauline. Paul has constructed other antithetical parallelisms which are
not neatly and evenly balanced. For example, in 2 Corinthians 3. 3, there
is: p6Xavi / nveupaxi 0eotS and in 1 Corinthians 2. 13, Paul
contrasts 5i6ocxxotq av0pco7itvr|q aocpxaq X6YOxq/5x6axxoTq rcvetipocxoq (Xd-yoiq).
2 Corinthians 3. 1-3 may not exhibit stylistic perfection, but it is
evidence of a Christian writer exploring and employing language at several
levels in order to describe that which he had experienced in his
relationships with God and his fellow believers.
As stated earlier, it is possible that emicrxoAt'i (vv. 2-3) refers to a
letter of recommendation. The context both suggests and allows this inter—
pretation. Whether the is objective or subjective, the letter of
recommendation would still have been about Paul, either written by him or
by the Corinthians.
It is possible that, in addition to this, ethcttoXt^ just means ' letter'
in general and does not refer to a letter of recommendation or any other
specific kind of letter. As a letter, it is something written by hand and
therefore a result of human labour. The metaphor, 'you are our letter',
could be then be explicated by an analogy different from the one proposed
above. As a man writes a letter, so Paul has worked for Christ. As the
letter is evidence that the man wrote, so the Corinthian church is evidence
that Paul laboured there. The very existence of the Corinthian church is
proof that Paul has done the work of an apostle.
In interpreting the metaphor in this way, the concept of work intrudes
into the discussion. 'Work' (Vp-yov) itself is used metaphorically by Paul
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to describe his activity as an apostle of Jesus Christ. If 'letter' is to
be explained in terms of 'work', it is because 'work' is an organizing
metaphor in Paul's religious vocabulary, and 'letter' is one of those
metaphors it organizes. As Ricoeur says, ' organizing metaphors gather
subordinate metaphors from a lower level and diffuse concepts at a higher
level.'313 'Work' is a paradigm of Paul's productive activity for Christ.
It gives him language to verbalize what he is doing. It affords a concrete
expression for activity that sometimes yields only intangible results.
The most exemplary occurrence of 'work' as a paradigmatic expression
of Paul's activity is in 1 Corinthians 9. 1: oo x6 ^pyov pov upefq eaxe ev
xupto; This is a rhetorical question, and the presence of the negative
requires that the question be answered affirmatively. 33 Thus the question
may be reworded as a statement: 'You [Corinthians] are my workmanship in
the Lord.' Though ^pyov often means 'work, action', it can also, as here
in 1 Corinthians 9. 1, have a more passive sense and be translated 'work¬
manship, achievement. '40 Paul, then is establishing the fact that the
Corinthians, as a Christian church, are the result of his labour. The
pronoun pou identifies Paul, in contrast to any of the other apostles, as
the one who started the Corinthian congregation. This church exhibits the
craftsmanship of Paul. The Corinthians should not doubt the authenticity
of Paul's apostolate, since he had done the work of an apostle among them'.
'In presence of the finished structure that draws the world to gaze, it is
too late to ask if he who built it is an architect.'41
3
But the text also includes a prepositional phrase <ev xupfm) which
acknowledges the divine activity. Though the RSV translates 'in the Lord',
an instrumental dative ('by means of the Lord') would be more accurate than
the locative. Paul is not emphasizing that whatever he does takes place in
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the sphere of the Lord, but rather that the founding of a church is always
the work of God. So, in a way, Paul is stating that the Corinthians are
his workmanship, but not really his - they are the work of God, with whom
he is a ouvep-ydq (1 Cor 3.9). The Corinthians, then, are Paul's workman¬
ship, in that they were converted under his preaching, and not that of
someone else. But they are ultimately the result of God's creative activ¬
ity, in which Paul only played the role of helper or assistant (Si&xovoc;).
1 Corinthians 9.1, on this reading, specifies in nuce the relationships of
God, Paul, and the Corinthians. It is God who creates churches. Paul is
his co-worker, but in a subordinate role. And the Corinthians are the
Vpyov, the result of God and Paul working together.
As examples of the types of work Paul has done, he can say elsewhere,
'You are God's house for which I laid the foundation', and 'You are the
farm in which I plant the seeds' (1 Cor 3). In all of these examples, Paul
identifies himself as God's co-worker. Paul and God labour together, and
the Corinthians are the result. This is also the case in 2 Corinthians 3,
where Paul first says 'you are my letter' (v. 2) and then adds, 'you are
Christ's letter' (v. 3). The Corinthians are a letter. The fact that
there is a letter is a sign that the author has been working. This letter
has a joint author. Both Paul and God had a hand in its writing, though
the hand of the latter is bigger and stronger!
This is perhaps an example, also, of Paul correcting his own theology.
He makes a statement, which is true, but it is not 'the whole truth'. In
order to prevent a misunderstanding or overemphasis on one aspect of the
truth, he adds a complement or a corrective.
For example, the text of 2 Corinthians 3 suggests this kind of
clarification. 'You are my letter. Well, you are Christ's letter, really,
202
but I assisted in the writing. ' The passage in 1 Corinthians 3 implies a
similar expansion. 'You are my building. Well, you are really God's
building, but I laid the foundation for him, like a wise master builder.
You are my farm. Well, you are really God's farm, but I planted the seeds
for him, and he made them grow. ' This kind of writing suggests that Paul
reflected on what he had written, modifying and amplifying as he was guided
by the Holy Spirit.
It is possible, then, to understand Into'ToX^ in 2 Corinthians 3. 2 to
refer both to letters of recommendation and to letters generally as a
product of human work, 'Work' is an organizing metaphor referring to
Paul's apostolic activity, and 'letter' is a subordinate metaphor which
relates to it. 'You are my workmanship' is the paradigm, and 'You are my
letter' is a specific example of this paradigm. It is no coincidence that,
in both 1 and 2 Corinthians, when Paul the apostle is under attack, Paul
the workman is summoned to provide evidence of the work he has done.
A fair question to ask at this point is: Could Paul or did Paul
intend both of these meanings of 'letter'? Is it not more reasonable to
think that he only meant one sense of the word? Or, stated differently, to
what extent was Paul aware of the two possible interpretations which have
been advanced? Was the ambiguity intended, or was it even recognized?
The difficulty in answering these question is obvious. What Paul
thought or intended is not accessible to the reader. The author is not
present to comment on his text. But the question can be pursued anyway,
because, even though the writer is not available, his text is extant, and
his other writings are extant also. And, while certainty is not possible,
it is a reasonable approach to guess and to criticize the guesses. The
interpreter might get it wrong, but, then, there is always a risk in
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interpretation.
The question of authorial intention can not be summarily dismissed,
for several reasons. First, what is in the text is in some way a reflec¬
tion of what Paul thought, though there is always the problem of possible
glossation. He intended something, and he expressed it more or less well
in his text. Second, the text is a work, a human work, the accomplishment
of a person, and it is unfair to regard it as an anonymous object in which
its author has no rights at all.
Nevertheless, the factor of authorial intention in interpretation must
be subordinated, since Paul is not present, and his intention is accessible
only through the text, with, of course, some help from Acts and other New
Testament writings. Therefore, the question must be settled primarily on
the basis of what the text allows, not on what the author intended. What
Paul intended was an event, and it vanished with the act of the writing of
his epistle. What is inscribed in the text is not the author's intention,
but rather the sentences he formed to express that intention. Thus an
intention of the author is directly dependent on the text, and is the
construct of a reader interacting with the text.
The guide, then, is what the text allows. And this allowance is
broader now than it was for the original audience of 2 Corinthians, because
written copies of several different Pauline epistles are available for
examination. An interpretative possibility, perhaps unintended by Paul and
unnoticed by the Corinthians, may be opened up by a clue from another pas¬
sage or another epistle. This meaning need not be rejected, for it is
entirely feasible that Paul may have meant more than one thing as he wrote.
And, if such a meaning arising from a text is true, then it may have to be
accepted, as there is no access to what the author intended other than the
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author's text and that is what is in dispute.
The existence of the letter argues for the activity of the writer. As
such, the letter does not commend Paul so much as it proves that he has
been writing. The content of the letter is less important than the
existence of the letter. There is visible evidence of his apostolic
activity in Corinth. Whatever may have been the controversy about the
proper criteria for being an apostle, Paul repeatedly argues, by means of
his 'work' metaphors, that he is an apostle because he has done the work of
an apostle.
In 2 Corinthians 3, then, Paul is speaking metaphorically about the
church in Corinth and its relation to himself. He is pointing to the
congregation as evidence of his work as an apostle. 'Letter' may properly
be understood as a generic letter, the existence of which authenticates his
apostolicity. The notion of ' letter' is invoked by Paul to attest to his
role as apostle, and as apostle of the church in Corinth.
Therefore, it may be concluded that 'You are our letter' may be
legitimately interpreted in more than one way. This metaphor exhibits a
surplus of meaning. This multivalent expression should not be termed
'ambiguous', though, because with ambiguity the context demands that one
reading be accepted and the other rejected. No such demand is evident
here. The immediate context, 2 Corinthians 2. 14-4.6, certainly allows that
'letter' (v. 2) may be explained as a letter of recommendation. The larger
context, the Pauline corpus and its 'work' metaphors in particular,
substantiates the validity of taking ' letter' as a generic letter. Both of
these possibilities are allowable, and both are the result of a reader
confronting the text and asking it questions. The rights of the text have
been respected, and the role of the reader has been recognized. But one
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can not say that the metaphors of 2 Corinthians 3.1-3 have now been fully
translated. They will continue to diffuse concepts, images, connotations,
and suggestions, and readers will continue to discover and articulate them.
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SECTION C. GLORY.
In 2 Corinthians 3, Paul uses the term 5o£a frequently. It is a key
word in the chapter, but its meaning is not clear. It is translated in the
RSV in 2 Corinthians 3 by three different terms: brightness (v. 7),
splendour (vv. 8-11), and glory (v. 18). This attempt by the RSV to trans¬
late 86^a is more a statement of the problem than a resolution of it. For
56^a is a multi-faceted word. Like much religious language, it is poly-
semous, having many significations. It is a sign pointing in differing
directions. The interpreter's task is to identify which way or ways it
points for Paul in 2 Corinthians 3.
The commentators are occasionally helpful in defining 56£a, though
some of them, like Paul himself, use the word freely, as if the reader
already had a thorough understanding of its meaning. 1 The purpose of this
section is to contribute to an enlightenment of this opaque term and to
investigate its use in metaphorical statements. In Part I, a history of
the usage of 56£a is explained. In Part II, the particularly Pauline use
of the term is investigated by referring to several passages where its
meaning is more or less clearly indicated. Part III is an attempt to
discern the overall significance of 66£ot in 2 Corinthians 3. Part IV is an
exploration of two Pauline 56£a metaphors.
I. HISTORY OF THE USAGE OF 66£ot. 56
In non-biblical Greek, 56^a generally means 1 opinion, ' either an
opinion held by the subject or an opinion about the subject held by others.
It gradually developed toward signifying a favourable opinion. In this
sense, it can be translated 'reputation' or 'renown.' It was later used to
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sum up in a word 'the concept of supreme and ideal worth'. 3
In the Septuagint, 56is often the translation for -mi). When
used of physical things, this Hebrew word sometimes means 'weight,
heaviness'. It was used literally of things, but came to be used
figuratively of persons, meaning 'honour, respect.' A heavy man would be
respected for his physical strength and prowess. A wealthy man would be
honoured for the weight of his riches. Because a strong or wealthy man
could often acquire important positions in society, 13333 came to be
T
applied also to leaders and to men in high position. Perhaps as a result
of its application to prominent figures in Hebrew society it was considered
suitable to be applied to God also. The 31333 may then be
T : :
thought of as that which makes God impressive to man, the powerful force of
his self-manifestation. These manifestations were often associated with
clouds (Ex 24.5), thunderstorms (Ez 1. 1-28), and fires (Ex 3. 1-6). Thus,
the nature of the I 1 IPT ~T1 333 itself is to be conceived of as a fiery
radiance, often shrouded in a cloud. The story of Moses' awesome encounter
with the glory of the Lord (Ex 33-34), however oblique it may have been,
was the story of a private experience. Such an experience was not intended
for the whole nation. These 'rare visionary moments1'1 were not considered
suitable for the people at large. 1123 is often translated by 56£a in
T
the Septuagint.
In the LXX, 56£ot has a 'peculiarly biblical meaning.' It is never
used in its classical Greek meaning of 'opinion', and only rarely does it
mean 'reputation' or 'honour'. Occasionally it signifies 'splendour' or
'power', but its predominant meaning occurs in relationship to God. In
this sense, it may indicate the honour attributed to God by reverent men.
It may also depict the power of God as it is displayed in the creation (Ps
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18.2, LXX).
The 66|a 0eoO is the 1 divine glory' which reveals the
nature of God in creation and in His acts, which fill
both heaven and earth. . . . Thus the 'divine radiance'
at the giving of the Law, or in the tabernacle or the
temple, is very properly to be rendered 66^a. ' e
In passages like these, 5 0eol5 comes very near to signifying the
presence in a physical form of the essence of God himself.
The New Testament writers' use of 56£a resembles the Septuagint use,
not that of the classical writers. In the New Testament, as in the
Septuagint, it no longer means 'opinion.' It does mean 'honour, respect'
and can also signify 'power' and 'radiance.' In the New Testament,
however, the word is used for the most part in a sense for which there is
little Greek analogy but for which there is some attestation in Hellenistic
Judaism. That is to say, it denotes 'divine and heavenly radiance, the
loftiness and majesty of God, and even the being of God. 's
The foregoing review of the history of 56^a reveals some insights
about the senses of a word. (1) Words have an openness which allow them to
acquire additional meanings. 7 (2) Some meanings of a word may become
obsolete and die out. (3) New meanings need not be related to or
derivative from previous meanings. (4) The context in which a word appears
contributes more to one's understanding of the meaning of that word than
does a knowledge of that word's history. That is, context is more
important than etymology in determining the meaning of a word. s The
meaning of a word is not necessarily stable as it passes through time. It
is subject to changes in meaning. Though etymology may perhaps be helpful,
it is contextual markers which ultimately decide the sense of a word when
it is used in discourse.
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II. PAUL'S USE OF 66£a.
In the Pauline epistles, 56£a is strewn about regularly and is used
with a variety of meanings, running the gamut demonstrated in the LXX and
the rest of the New Testament. The different meanings, along with
examples, are listed below.
A. 'Honour, respect, good reputation.'
In 2 Corinthians 6.4-10, Paul is commending himself as a minister of
God. He mentions hardships he has endured (vv. 4-5). In verses 6-7, he
lists virtues he has exhibited. Then he summarizes in a series of
antitheses what he has experienced. Two of these antitheses are:
6x6 66£r)<; xai a-cxpiaq,
6xd( 6uaq>qpiaq xai eocpqpiaq (v. 8).
The RSV clearly points out the opposition contained in these pairs:
in honour and dishonour,
in ill repute and good repute.
There can be little question here that 56£a should be translated honour. 3
It is clearly contrasted with the antonym of the more common Greek word for
honour, The suggestion of the text is that when Paul is preaching
the gospel, he is sometimes treated with respect by some people and with
disrespect by others. Though Paul is treated dishonourably by some people,
he is always honoured by God. When the apostle is not present, he is also
held by some to be of good reputation (eu<pqpta) and by others to be of bad
reputation (Sucnpqpia). Or, speaking vernacularly, 'Paul is all right,' and
'Paul is a pain in the neck.' The terms are certainly opposite in meaning,
and they strongly influence one to take the other pair <56^a/txp^) as
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opposites also. But Plurnmer objects to translating 5o^a as 'honour'
here. 10 He prefers to use the more common translation 'glory' and
interprets the antithesis as simply a good/ bad pair. Plummer maintains
that, if Paul had intended a true opposition, he would have written ' xxpfjq
xax axxpxaq' , a pair which appears in Romans 9. 21 and 2 Timothy 2. 20. It
is true that there are certain standard linguistic conventions which
writers often employ to convey clearly their meaning. But it is equally
true that they sometimes mould language for a specific purpose and use
words creatively. Paul was a free man (2 Cor 3, 17), and this time he chose
to do it differently than others might have done it.
Furnish11 notes a Pauline passage where axxpx'a stands in obvious con-
1 5 5
trast with 6d^o<: crTtelpExax ev axxpxa, sysxpExax ev 5d^r| (1 Cor 15.43).
O
Another text that clearly contrasts 6o^a and axxpxoc is Psalm of Solomon
C 7 7 7
2.31: o avxcrxSv ejie exq 6o£av xax xoxpf(;<2v xmspr|<pd:vouq exq cotoXexocv axSSvoq
' > C 7 ■>/ ~>
ev axxpxa, oxx oux tyvaaav ocuxdv. These texts, along with 2 Corinthians
6.8, show that Paul is well able to vary his style and to create new word
pictures when he desires. Therefore, both the surrounding context and the
clear opposition to axipxa combine to define Sd^a in 2 Corinthians 6.8 as
'honour. '
dd^a carries a similar meaning in Romans 8.17-18, where Paul contrasts
'the sufferings of the present time' (v. 17) with the Sd^a which will be
revealed in the future <v. 18). Most of Paul's sufferings were inflicted
upon him by men who did not honour him or the gospel he preached. Yet he
is convinced that this disrespect he received from men will more than be
offset by the honour which God will bestow on him in the coming age. In
the phrase, ' xf^q SouXex'aq xfjq <p8opSq' , the apostle contrasts an igno-
7
minious situation with a noble and honourable estate (xf|v e\EU0epxo:v xffq
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56^qq Rom 8.21), The tension between <p9opdc / So^a is somewhat similar to
that of ammXevoc / 56£a in Romans 9.22-23. In fact, both <p0opd and arcc&Xeia
can be translated in the same way: ruin or destruction. 12 The sense of
56£a as honour is further seen in Philippians 3. 19, where it is opposed to
aicrxuvri - shame, disgrace, ignominy. 13 The reference is to the many men
"... who find their honour in that which redounds to their shame.'1'1
Another clear example of 56£a meaning 'honour, respect' is Philippians
3.21, where 'our lowly body' is contrasted with 'his glorious body.'
Tameivcoaiq should be understood as 'the privations, persecutions, and
afflictions' which Paul has suffered as a minister of the gospel, resulting
in his 'present oppressed and lowly position.'1-5 The body which has been
yielded to God as a living sacrifice (Rom 12. 1) '... is exposed to all the
passions, sufferings, and indignities of this life.'15 However, the body
of his 56^a is quite unlike this. It has the honour accorded it through
the resurrection power of God, the dignity attending one who is seated at
the right hand of the throne of God, as a result of the exaltation
conferred by God (Phil 2.9). The contrast laid out in Philippians 3.21
between toots tvcocriq and 66^oc is thus to be understood as one of lowliness /
exaltation or indignity / dignity or dishonour / honour.
These examples show that Paul uses 6of;cx in its Hellenistic sense of
honour, respect, good reputation. This meaning is best displayed in the
various antitheses constructed by Paul.
B. 'Radiance, brilliance.'
Paul seems to be equally familiar with the lexical value of
'radiance' for 66^a, which would have come to him through the LXX. This
meaning is best observed in 1 Corinthians 15.40-41, where Paul is referring
to the brightness exhibited by the heavenly bodies. Each appears with a
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different 5o^a, a different degree of radiance. The sun, the moon, and the
stars have their own individual brilliance, each different from the other.
This brilliance is called S6^a, and it is a somewhat different sense from
that of honour described above. In this passage, 5o£cx has to do with the
visible manifestation of light, of the gradation of the illumination of the
celestial bodies.
This meaning is seen elsewhere in the New Testament. For example, in
Luke 9.31-32, 5o^a refers to the bright illumination of the appearance of
Jesus, Moses, and Elijah on the mountain during the transfiguration. Acts
22. 11 reports that Paul was not able to see 'because of the brightness
(66^a) of that light. '
A6£a, as brilliance or illumination, does not automatically exclude
the sense of honour or respect. Gold, a radiant metal, is an honoured sub¬
stance. Brilliant scientists are honoured with the Nobel prize. Sir
Walter Scott plays on both of these meanings in a passage from Ivanhoe, in
which Rebecca asks Ivanhoe why he continues in jousting and chivalry:
'What remains to you as the prize?'
'What remains?' cried Ivanhoe, 'Glory, maiden, glory!
which gilds our sepulchre and embalms our name. ' 1
C. 'Glory, majesty' as an attribute of God.
The use of S6£a as a term to signify the honour and brilliance of God
originated in the Septuagint, where it was chosen to translate
T
Because Paul was familiar with the Septuagint, he sometimes uses the term
in this same sense also.
Romans 3.23. 'Since all have sinned and fall short of the glory of
God, . . . . ' From Adam onward, men have disobeyed the command of God, and,
as a result, they 'feel themselves far from the bright effulgence of God's
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presence.'13 Glory here signifies the presence of God and suggests also,
in keeping with the Old Testament concept, that this presence has a bril¬
liant lustre. The emphasis, though, of 56^a here is on the presence of God
himself. In his commentary on this verse, C. H. Dodd has written:
'Man was created to bear the likeness of God; ideally
he is "the image and glory of God" (1 Cor xi.7). This
gives us the clue to the meaning of the present passage.
The glory of God is the divine likeness which man is in¬
tended to bear. In so far as man departs from the like¬
ness of God he is sinful.'19
Thus Dodd takes 5o^a in Romans 3.23 to signify the divine likeness which
man is meant to imitate through obedience to the divine will. It makes
little difference here whether one thinks S6^a points more to the fact of
God's presence or to the brilliance of that presence. Both are closely
intertwined, and the reference is certainly to the majesty of God.
' £ } i 3 ->
Galatians 1. 5. r) 56£a etq tobq oaffivctq tffiv cn&vcov, aptjv. 'To whom
be the glory for ever and ever. Amen. ' This is typical of the doxologies
found in the Pauline corpus. Similar examples occur in Romans 11.36 and
16.27. In these doxological formulae, Luther asserts that men are being
exhorted to give glory to God by approaching him reverently. Thus glory,
for Luther, denotes reverence. 20 Equally important is the point put
forward by Lightfoot. Rather than a wish or a command, the doxology is an
affirmation that the glory is a characteristic of God. It is pre-eminently
his. 'Glory is the essential attribute of God, ' :21 Lightfoot is not
specific as to the nature of the divine glory, but is certainly correct in
viewing 6o£a as descriptive of the nature of God. In doing so, he is
recognizing the close link between TOD and 56^a which was forged by
T"
the translators of the Septuagint. Both of these terms point to the
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presence of God.
Philippians 1.11. '... filled with the fruits of righteousness which
come through Jesus Christ, to the glory and praise of God.' 'God's S6^a is
his majesty in itself; ^nocvvoq is the praise of that majesty. ... The whole
work of redemption is the manifestation of the divine 66£cx. ' 22 Again glory
signifies what God is in himself, yet that 'what he is' is not made
specific in this or in any other Pauline passage. There are clues, how¬
ever, which can guide our understanding of 66^a 0eoO. Here Paul affirms
that it is revealed in the saints through the righteousness which fills
them. Men are partakers of the divine glory. When believers receive by
faith righteousness and glory, they are led to give praise to God. The
glory of God given to men results in the praise of men given to God. This
Pauline theme is more fully developed by the author of Ephesians, who makes
the linking of So^a and ^rcaivoq one of the themes of the epistle (cf. Eph
1. 6, 1. 12, 1. 14).
This 56£a which denotes the majesty of God is also revealed as power,
for it is the glorious power of God which raised Christ from the dead: 'We
were buried therefore with him by baptism into death, so that as Christ was
raised from the dead by the glory (So^ot) of the Father, we too might walk
in newness of life (Rom 6.4).' This passage emphasises the glory of God as
it is externally manifested in the resurrection. Thus 56£a here is the
divine energy intervening in human affairs and in some way making manifest
thereby the character of God. Paul here suggests that glory has an exter¬
nal as well as an internal significance.123
Paul further depicts 66E;oc 0eo£> as 'the riches of his glory' (Rom 9.23,
Phil 4. 19; cf. also Eph 1. 18, 3. 16). Perhaps it was in thinking of God as
a king that Paul was led to write of wealth in connection with the glory of
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God. But the point here at least is that there is a rich abundance of the
glory of God. It is not limited to a manifestation in Israel alone or
among the Jews only. 'The riches of his glory' in this passage helps to
support Paul's position that God's mercy extends to all people, both Jews
and Gentiles. One may agree with Barclay that the analogy Paul constructs
in Romans 9, 19-24 is not especially fortuitous. Yet the passage does
illuminate the concept of glory. There is an extravagance about glory, and
it has been made known unto men. The 'superabundant bounty' coming from
God supplies both earthly needs and heavenly benefits. This thought is the
immediate cause for Paul's thanksgiving in Philippians 4.20.
The meaning of 56Ea as an attribute of God may be summarised as
follows. It can be translated as glory or majesty, and it refers to God's
essential character. It points to God without describing him in detail.
Ao^a signifies the presence of God, especially as it is manifested to the
world through the life of believers. It has a close connection with
praise, power, and riches. Yet 66E« 9eob remains a difficult term to
understand, It is a thick word, not easily seen through. Paul uses it
often but does not define it. He supposes that his readers already have a
good understanding of 5o^a and its many meanings. Part of the difficulty
in understanding Paul today is that, although we stand inside a common
tradition, we do not share a common situation with the early Christian
community. Their language, theology, and metaphors are sometimes foreign
to us, but there is common ground which allows interpretation to begin,
III. THE MEANING OF 66Ea IN 2 CORINTHIANS 3.
The significance of SoEa in this passage is not easy to establish,
This text is closely related to the narrative in Exodus 34. 27-35, in which
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Moses goes up on Mount Sinai, remains there with the Lord for forty days
and nights, receives the ten commandments, and then descends to proclaim
them to the people of Israel. This narrative is obscure, the actions of
Moses are not easily comprehended, and this is the only instance in the OT
where a man's face is reported to have glowed after a divine encounter.
Another reason for the difficulty is ascertaining the train of thought in
2 Corinthians 3 and its connection with its wider epistolary context. The
implications for meaning arising from the relationship between word and
context have been discussed elsewhere, yet it is necessary to point out
here that this is a dynamic, rather than a static, relationship. That is,
the meaning of individual words can affect the sense of a text, and the
overall meaning of a text can shape the meaning of individual words.
Furthermore, authors sometimes 'bend' language in order to fit their
thoughts, thereby giving words a somewhat different meaning.26
The meaning of 56£a will be affected by one's decision as to the nature
of the passage at hand. Is it polemic, apologetic, expository, or even
hortatory? There is also the difficulty resulting from the plurivocity of
the word. A<5£a has several distinct, though not altogether unrelated,
meanings from which the interpreter may choose. Nevertheless, in spite of
these difficulties, an attempt will be made to set out some of the meaning
of 5oEa in 2 Corinthians, where the apostle uses the word nineteen times.
Eleven of these are in chapter 3 and will be dealt with later, but first a
brief survey of the other eight occurrences will be presented.
1.20. 'For all the promises of God find their Yes in him. That is why
we utter the Amen through him, to the glory of God.' It is to God and
for his glory that the early church uttered amen.27 gy this affirmation,
217
man recognises 'his own abject resourcelessness and magnifies the sovereign
grace of his Creator and Redeemer. ' ;i:e By both word and deed, God is
glorified by the obedience of his people. In this verse, 56£a points
both to the majesty of God and the honour which Christians show him.
4. 4. 'In their case the god of this world has blinded the minds of
the unbelievers, to keep them from seeing the light of the gospel of the
glory of Christ, who is the likeness of God. ' Plummer interprets 5o£a as
'honour.'30 Others understand it to mean radiance, because of the number
of terms referring to light and vision in the passage (xocpAbe, av y&C,®,
>
(pcotictpoq, eix<dv).31 Schmiedel affirms the meaning of 'light' for 56Z,<x here
by pointing to the bright light of the Resurrected One which Paul
encountered during his conversion experience as reported in Acts 9, 22, and
26.3:2 The glory of Christ is certainly meant to be distinguished from the
glory of Moses expounded in chapter 3.
4. 6. 'For it is the God who said, "Let light shine out of darkness,"
who has shone in our hearts to give the light of the knowledge of the glory
of God in the face of Christ.' AoLoc, as in 4.4, probably means radiance. 33
It also suggests the majesty of God. But the emphasis is primarily upon
the power of God as evidenced through his saving acts.3'* God manifested
his glory in Christ by raising him from the dead. This glory is now to be
seen in the face of Christ. The permanence of the glory of God on the face
of Christ is a strong contrast to the fading glory on the face of Moses.
4. 15. 'For it is all for your sake, so that as grace extends to more
and more people it may increase thanksgiving, to the glory of God, ' The
glory of God means the honour of God, 8eob here being an objective genitive
(the honour which men give to God) rather than a subjective genitive (the
honour which God possesses, which he has within himself). As the gospel is
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proclaimed (v. 4) and men come to believe in Christ (v. 13) and give thanks
to God (v. 15), so God is honoured. So here 56E;a 0soO is the honour and
praise and thanksgiving offered to God by men,
4. 17, 'For this slight momentary affliction is preparing for us an
eternal weight of glory beyond all comparison. 1 Again 66^oc means honour.
Paul and his missionary band suffer many bodily afflictions which cause
their outer man to be 'wasting away'. These afflictions, mentioned in
verses 7-12, are temporary, lasting only for the moment. They are light
compared to the eternal weight of glory of heavenly treasure they are
producing in Paul and his company. Glory must mean 'honour' here in order
to contrast with affliction. The apostle was dishonoured by the
afflictions laid on him by men. But someday he will receive honour
conferred on him by God, because he focuses on the unseen realities of
eternity, not on the visible things which are only temporary (v. 18).
6. 8. ' In honour and dishonour, in ill repute and good repute.' A6|a
here certainly means honour, as demonstrated earlier in this section (pp.
a
210-211). The contrast with a-cipfa coupled with the antithesis 5uo<pr)pia /
3
eu<pr]pia which follows places in the realm of personal relations. The
words in this semantic field point more to one's reputation than to one's
character, more to what others think of him than to what he is in himself.
So the word signifies the positive regard and high appraisal conferred by
men, and perhaps God. It may be translated honour, respect, or dignity.
8. 19. 'And not only that, but he has been appointed by the churches
to travel with us in this gracious work which we are carrying on, for the
glory of the Lord and to show our good will. ' As in the preceding passage,
56^a again means honour. Though at first glance the phrase 66^a xupfou
/
_
may bring to mind the OT concept of mrr to3 and the signification
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of the majestic and mysterious presence of the Lord, yet the context again
filters out. this meaning and permits the notion of 'honour' to come
through. In this passage, the administrative section of the epistle, Paul
is eager for all of his plans concerning the offering for the Jerusalem
church to be carried out smoothly. This ministry of distant converts
sending funds to needy brethren at headquarters is being carried out
ultimately for the purpose of (mpoq) bringing greater honour to God, For
whenever Christians supply the needs of each other, it results in honour
being attributed to the Lord (Mt 5.16; cf. Mt 25,31-46).
6. 23. 'As for Titus, he is my partner and fellow worker in your
service; and as for our brethren, they are messengers of the churches, the
glory of Christ. ' H. D. Betz has cited several ancient epistles in support
of his claim that 'glory <.6o^a> was firmly connected with the practice of
sending and receiving envoys. The authors were vague about what is meant
in specific, but no doubt reference is made to certain privileges.'3'3
Since 2 Corinthians 8. 16-24 functions as a letter of recommendation for the
sending of Titus as Paul's envoy to the Corinthians, it is not unusual then
that 6o^cc appears here also. But its function is not easily discernible.
Betz suggests that it serves two purposes. (1) Though it is given as a
compliment to the brothers, it is actually an exhortation to the brothers
"... to be representatives of a kind of glory (56^a) consistent with that
of Christ.'3r Their appearance, conduct, and speech ought not to bring
reproach to the name of Christ. <2) It also urges their hosts to accord
the brothers the same privileges as they would Christ himself.33 In so
doing, they would be effectively glorifying Christ as well as fulfilling
the hospitality code of the early church. If Betz is correct in his sug¬
gestion about the place and purpose of 66L« in a letter of recommendation,
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then one can again conclude that <56^a in 8.23 means 'honour.' The unnamed
brothers, envoys of the churches, are being diplomatically urged to conduct
themselves in an honourable manner. If they are indeed the 5o^a Xpio-toC,
then they must act as if they are. Their deeds ought to bring honour and
not shame to Christ. Furthermore, their hosts should honour and respect
each envoy as if he were Christ himself. Though the hosts were not previ¬
ously acquainted with their guests, they should still grant them privileges
that are appropriate to bearers of this 'honorific title' conferred upon
them by Paul.33 Although Betz proposes these possibilities, he is reluc¬
tant. to make great claims of certainty for them, noting that the meaning of
So^a XpvoTob in this context is somewhat fuzzy. 'The very vagueness of the
expression may reflect the language of diplomacy, where vagueness is a
virtue. ' 40
2 Corinthians 3. The meaning of 56£a in this chapter varies, shifting
from one emphasis to another. All of the various meanings appear in the
chapter, but in each instance one meaning emerges as dominant while the
others recede without disappearing. Paul exploits to the full this pluri-
vocity of the word, emphasizing first one meaning of 56^a and then another.
In verses 7-18, Paul considers Exodus 34.27-35. Windisch has
identified this passage as a Christian midrash. •*'' Georgi has gone a step
further by analysing it as a midrash which Paul has re-worked by making
certain changes and glossing it freely. Georgi thinks that the original
midrash had been composed by Paul's opponents in Corinth, a group of
Hellenistic Jewish Christian missionaries. Paul got hold of it, thoroughly
revised it, and sent it back to Corinth in order to refute his opponents.
Klauck regards Georgi's thesis as highly improbable, since it depends to a
large extent on conjecture and hypothesis and there is no manuscript
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evidence to support it.*3 Furnish says the raidrash theory is unnecessary
to understand and explain the text as it stands today. Regardless of one's
view of the history and literary integrity of the text, one must still
construct an interpretation of So^oi in 2 Corinthians 3.
In 2 Corinthians 3. 7a, ev 56^r) seems to be best understood as the
radiant and mysterious presence of God with Moses, In Exodus 24. 15-18, the
writer describes the appearing of the glory of the Lord to Moses while he
was on the mountain for forty days and nights receiving the tables of
stone. 1 Now the appearance of the glory of the Lord [ TYITP 11
tfjq 56^r^q xuptool was like a devouring fire on the top of the mountain in
the sight of the people of Israel' (v. 17). God's glory as revealed on
Sinai was like a raging fire, producing both a bright light and a great
heat. The narrative in Exodus 34, apparently drawing on Exodus 24 (most OT
commentators think that both are ' P' material), presupposes that the bright
light of God's presence appeared to Moses, thereby illuminating his face.
So in 2 Corinthians 3. 7, s^evi^r) ev 66^r) must refer primarily to the pres¬
ence of God on Sinai, and secondarily to the brilliant illumination accom¬
panying that presence. In 7b, the priority of these two connotations is
reversed. The main emphasis of Tfjv 56E,av tob itpoaconou auxoO is the bril¬
liant illumination of Moses' countenance, and the 'presence of God' is a
secondary meaning.
In this way we see one sense of a word suggesting another sense. AA
A6£a as the majestic presence of God (7a) gives rise to 56^a as brilliance
(7b.>, just as the mil1 nil as devouring fire (Ex 24.17) suggested
the idea of light, introduced in Exodus 34.29,35. This is an interesting
and perhaps ironic development, because a key word for Paul throughout 2
c
Corinthians 3 is 56E,a, and rj So^ot xopxou does not appear in the LXX of
222
Exodus 34.27-35. The verb form So^b^m is found in Exodus 34, but in each
of its three occurrences it refers to the illumination of Moses' face and
not to the splendour of God. The glory of God is certainly implied,
though, since, if Moses was glorified, then it was God who glorified him.
Both Exodus 24 and Exodus 33 give out clues that indicate that Moses
viewed the glory of the Lord and that his face later reflected this glory
as he descended the mountain. Even though 66!;a does not occur in Exodus
34, it does appear in 2 Corinthians 3. And its meaning in 3.7 shifts
subtly from presence of God in 7a to illumination in 7b.
At least two questions arise in verse 8. What is the sense of q Sia-
xovia xoO Ttveupoctoq? And in what way is it ev So^r)? If q Siaxovia toO
Trveupaxoq is taken as a subjective genitive, then it points to the ministry
which the Spirit performs. Paul might be suggesting that the Spirit of God
was at work in the life of Jesus, extending even to his death and
resurrection (Rom 1.4). Since Paul also attributes the resurrection to the
glory of God (Rom 6.4), one might conclude that both Spirit and glory
accompanied Jesus both during this life and beyond. If this is the sense
of the subjective genitive, then one would not have been surprised if Paul
had written, ' Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is glory. '
The ministry which the Spirit performs is also directed toward the
believers, whom Paul urges to walk by the Spirit (mvEupati TiepiTtaTEttE, Gal
5. 16). As they do so, the Spirit transforms them and 6o£qq Eiq Sb^av (2
Cor 3.18). Thus, the work of the Spirit in the believer is also a glorious
affair. So, with reference both to Christ and to Christians, q Siaxovia
tod Ttvebpatoq ev Sb^rp
If q Siaxovia toQ mveupatoq is, however, a qualitative genitive, as
Furnish suggests, then it would refer to the ministry which 'deals in the
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Spirit'. Such a ministry is one in which the Spirit, instead of death
and the letter, is the predominant feature. It is characterized by
believers' receiving of the Spirit and by the Spirit's powerful operation
in their lives.
It is not necessary to choose between the two alternatives. It is
possible to take 'the ministry of the Spirit' as both a subjective and a
qualitative genitive. That it is possible to interpret another of Paul's
genitive phrases in two different senses has been demonstrated by M.
Hooker, with reference to jriarxq XpxoroC. dS She points out the necessity
of allowing this phrase to refer to both the actual faith of Christ himself
and the faith of men who believe in Christ. In the case of q Siaxovxa toO
TtvetipaToq, it is also desirable to understand it as both subjective and
qualitative genitive. Such a choice is compatible with Paul's theology,
and it reveals the richness of his use of religious language. In cases
like this, it is more advantageous, and perhaps more accurate also, to
proceed onward from debates about 'either/or' to an embracing of 'both /
and'. One should not be offended or surprised that Paul can say one thing
and mean two. This kind of plurivocity can lead the reader to discover new
horizons of meaning in religious texts. While the interpreter should
perhaps be sensitive to the author's original intention, he should not be
restricted by this intention. Rather, he should explore the text and open
it up in such a way that it comes to mean all that it can mean in his own
situation. For it is quite possible for a text to contain truth that only
a later audience can recognise. 47
In verse 9, Paul compares two glories. There was glory in the min¬
istry of Moses, even though this ministry resulted in condemnation for
many. Here 56£a again points to the presence of God on Sinai and to the
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light accompanying his presence. But there is a more abundant glory in the
ministry of righteousness. Through faith in Christ men receive Sixaiocruvrp
Since the resurrection glory of Christ was more brilliant and abiding than
the fading glory on Moses' face, Paul concludes that the ministry which
leads men to righteousness is likewise more glorious than the one which
leads men to condemnation.
In fact, the new ministry is so brilliant that it causes the brilli¬
ance of Moses and the old ministry to appear as if it were not even illumi-
ated <v. 10). But someone may object that the ministry of Jesus would not
outwardly appear to have been very glorious, since he suffered the accursed
crucifixion death of a criminal. But the New Testament constantly refers
to the glory of his resurrection as a sign of the true glory of his
ministry and as a vindication by God of that ministry.
But an even weightier objection is that the ministry of Paul did not
appear to be glorious. He had difficulties with Peter and the Jerusalem
church. He was hounded by Jews and Romans. He encountered many hardships
(2 Cor 4.8-9, 6.4-10, 11.16-33) and even had a prison record. There are no
reports of Paul's face glowing, let alone glowing brighter than Moses'.
It becomes apparent, then, that So^cx here in verse 10 can no longer
mean light, at least in any literal sense. It must refer again to the
glory of the presence of God. For it was through suffering that God mani¬
fested his glory in Paul, and this happens inwardly in the heart, not
outwardly on the face. Paul had a greater glory than Moses in that he
had a greater experience of the presence of God. The theophanies were few,
and their light left but a fading glow on the face of Moses. But Paul knew
the eternally abiding presence of God. God comforted him in all his
afflictions (2 Cor 1.4), supplied all his needs (Phil 4.19), and provided
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him with every blessing in abundance, so that he always had enough of
everything and abounded in every good work (2 Cor 9,8). Because of the
revelation of God in Christ, Paul knew God more personally and intimately
than Moses did, and, as a result, Paul's ministry was more glorious than
Moses'.
Paul's use of So^a in verse 11 is much the same as in verse 9. The
temporary thing (the whole complex of theophany, covenant, ministry) was
blessed with glory, that is, with the presence of God, The permanent thing
(the whole complex of Christ and the new covenant), however, is also
blessed with the presence of God. Paul affirms that the old covenant is in
no way superior to the new and claims rather that the new is much more
superior and glorious than the old,
There is no mention of 56^a again until verse 18, where it appears
three times. In summing up his comments on Moses, Paul affirms that all of
us believers have unveiled faces and are beholding the glory of the Lord,
It is impossible to overlook the contrast between one man with a veiled
face (Moses) and the many with unveiled face. But how is it that Chris¬
tians behold the glory of the Lord? Except for a few resurrection appear—
ances, the Lord had not been manifest to believers as he was to Moses. And
certainly their faces were not illuminated as Moses had been, How then can
Paul say so boldly that all of us see the glory? He is speaking metaphor¬
ically, We see the glory of the Lord when we see Christ imaginatively
pictured (TtpOYpdcpo, Gal 3. 1) before us in the preaching of the gospel. We
see the glory of the Lord when we hear in faith of Christ's life, death,
and resurrection.
The transformation from glory to glory means to be transferred from
the lesser glory of the old covenant to the greater glory of the new
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covenant, and from one stage of the greater glory to yet further stages.
Or stated differently, one is transformed as one moves from the less
personal knowledge of God available through the law to the more intimate
realization of the presence of God within us through faith in the gospel of
our Lord Jesus Christ.
IV. TWO 6o^oc METAPHORS IN 2 CORINTHIANS 3.
After the preceding overview of 56£cn in the Old Testament and in the
Pauline corpus, it will be useful now to select two 56^a metaphors from 2
Corinthians 3 and give them a thorough semantic treatment. These two
metaphors are: rj xob Trpoaamou auxoO (v. 7) and q So^a xupxou (v. 18).
The starting point will be a discussion of the relationship between
polysemy and metaphor, of which 56£a provides a good illustration.
Ao£cx is a word that exhibits polysemy par excellence: it has several
different senses and is able to acquire even more. Because 66£a and all
other words in ordinary language are capable of polysemy, there is a basis
for symbolic discourse and metaphorical predication. A6£oc, like any
other word in the system though, has only virtual sense until it is used in
discourse, when one or more of its meanings are actualized, or when a new
meaning is created for it through its use in a metaphorical statement.
In discourse, when So^a is put to work, its meanings are both actual¬
ized and restricted by context. As an integral part of a sentence, it con¬
tributes to the overall sense and reference of the statement. Ao£a will
not mean everything it can mean in a dictionary, but only what is suggested
and allowed by the sentence in which it is used and by the context of which
it is a part.®0 The context is not limited, though, to its 'linguistic
environment' but includes also the 'horizon of reality" surrounding the
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text.®' For the purposes of this discussion, the 'linguistic environment'
of 6o^cx is the Pauline corpus and 2 Corinthians 3 in particular. The
'horizon of reality' is that situation common to both writer and reader,
the Judeo-Christian tradition as transmitted by the church through the
Scriptures,
The objection might be raised that all of this emphasis on the poly-
semous character of words will lead to ambiguous and equivocal meanings of
the text. This is always a potential problem in the use of religious lan¬
guage, but it is the task of interpretation, in its broadest sense, to 'use
all the available contextual determinants to grasp the actual meaning of a
given message in a given situation.'®2 Thus a fundamental trait of poly¬
semy is its dependence on a context for both the selection and activation
of its meanings.
The relationship between polysemy and metaphor is reciprocal. Meta¬
phor contributes to polysemy by adding to the reservoir of potential mean¬
ing of a word, and it is polysemy which contributes in part to the possi¬
bility of metaphor itself. The lexical value of a word is augmented by the
accretion of meanings resulting from dead metaphor. A dead metaphor is a
live metaphor (tensive, creative, startling) which has been worked to
death. It has been repeated so often that its users have forgotten its
metaphorical origin and use it only in its now generally accepted sense.
This standardized usage is added to the lexical value of the word, and the
polysemy of the word is thereby supplemented.
Polysemy contributes to the possibility of metaphor by means of its
accumulation of already accepted connotations. When a word is used
metaphorically, it brings with it a set of characteristics which help to
generate the clash or tension in the metaphorical statement. But a lively
228
metaphor 'does not merely actualize a potential connotation, it creates it.
It is a semantic innovation, an emergent meaning. ' S3 Or, stated
differently, metaphor requires all of its accepted meanings plus one, the
one which will rescue the sentence by making sense of the semantic
impertinence. A6£a is an example of this interplay between polysemy and
metaphor. It is polysemous, as any lexicon will indicate and as the prece¬
ding word study has illustrated. A6^a is also used metaphorically, though
it is not properly called a metaphor until it is used in a metaphorical
statement. But when 66^a is the focus of a 'semantic discrepancy'in a
sentence, then it takes on a new meaning. Thus the sentence is the
catalyst for new meaning, but the word itself ' is the depository of the
creativity of language, ' ss
The development of the plurivocity of 56£cx has already been investi¬
gated, so a discussion of S6£a as metaphor is now in order. The metaphoi—
icity is sometimes overlooked by New Testament scholars. This occurs
because of several reasons. First, the text is often so familiar that the
shock of an aberrant attribution is greatly reduced, or even eliminated
altogether. 5(3 The reader is thus anaesthetized by means of critical study,
and is not aware of some of the semantic subtleties of his text. Second,
the student of the New Testament fully expects to confront figurative
language in his text. Since religious documents are so interspersed with
figures of speech, and all religious language must be, the presence of a
metaphor may be neither surprising or disturbing. Finally, the language of
the New Testament has been thoroughly lexicalized. Because it is a closed
text and relatively small, the task of defining all the different meanings
of 56^a as it appears in the New Testament can be more easily attempted.
Thus, the chance of discovering and experiencing a metaphorical twist of
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meaning is rather remote. The wide range of meanings for So^a in the New
Testament has already been identified and catalogued.
The present task, then, is to re-sensitize the reader to the oddness
of the use of <5oE;a in 2 Corinthians 3, to inject an antidote to counteract
the numbness and loss of sensitivity resulting from critical study, to
present some of the nuances of meaning suggested by the metaphorical usage
of 66£<x in the text.
The first usage to be considered is: ^ So^oc xoO npoadmou ocuxoO ('the
glory of his face', 2 Cor 3.7). The reference is to the face of Moses and
his mountain top encounter with Yahweh (Ex 34.29-35). While Paul uses the
noun So^cx in conjunction with the face of Moses, the LXX uses the verb
So^dCoa. Both are expressing the notion of 'brilliance' or 'radiance'
which came over the face of Moses as a result of his speaking with the
Lord.
The 'glory of his face' is metaphorical, but it is not a metaphor
originated by Paul. Rather, it is a metaphor from the Jewish scriptures
and tradition which is taken over by Paul and used for his own purpose.
To say that there is light radiating from one's face is not literally true,
though this is asserted both by Paul and his Old Testament source. Faces
are illuminated by light. They are burned by too much light (sunburn).
But they do not emit light. Paul even intensifies the ontological vehem¬
ence of this metaphor by stating that the light was so bright that the sons
of Israel were not able to gaze steadfastly upon Moses' face (2 Cor 3.7).
In writing this, Paul goes beyond that which is written in the Pentateuch,
though it may be said that Exodus 34.30 approaches what Paul says.
The figurative meaning of 'light', used by the biblical writers, is
still current today. 'The bride is simply radiant.' 'His face glowed with
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excitement." "Her eyes sparkled." All these statements are attempts to
convey the emotion one sees expressed on the face of another. "Light on
the face' or 'his face lit up' are attempts to describe positive emotions.
One can also say, 'What a glorious day!', meaning that the sun is shining
brightly today. So, even in current idiom, 'glory' can mean brilliance,
and 'light' on the face can suggest excitement or enthusiasm. These usages
are pointers toward the significance of 'glory on the face.'
Two examples from modern literature may illuminate this sense. Chai—
lotte Bronte, in Villette, writes of M. Paul: 'A great softness passed
upon his countenance; his violet eyes grew suffused and glistening under
their deep Spanish lashes,'®3 Bronte, in writing of M. Paul's expression
of the experience of the powerful emotion of love, expressed it as a
sparkling of the eyes, Eyes do not literally light up when one is in love,
but something happens to one's countenance, and a 'radiant face* is perhaps
as apt a description as is possible. Brontd, like others before her, used
the motif of 'light on the face' to'" attempt to translate into language the
effect of being in love. As the popular song of the I960's said, 'the look
of love' is real, but not easily described. The look can be more easily
recognized than talked about.
Dale Carnegie uses similar language to describe the enigmatic Charles
De Gaulle: '... although De Gaulle was dignified and cold in appearance,
yet inside him there was a flame that could burst out into a brilliant
light. 189 It is obvious that 'flame' and 'light' are being used
figuratively of De Gaulle. He was not a fire-breathing man with a pilot
light inside who could ignite when the gas was turned on, Rather, the
writer was using the metaphor of light to contrast De Gaulle's occasional
warmth of personality with the often austere appearance of his face. This
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attribute was described in terms of something like a 'light' which came
forth from De Gaulle. it was not a literal light, but there was some kind
of change which became apparent to onlookers.
This is perhaps the sense of the pericope in Exodus 34. The narrator
reports that Moses, after having remained 40 days and nights on the
mountain, finally descended again to the camp. When the Israelites saw
him, they noticed that there was something different about his appearance,
'and they were afraid to come near him' (v. 30). The story teller/writer
attempts to describe this change of countenance by saying that Moses' face
was radiant. He explains the reason for this new development: Moses had
been speaking with the Lord <v. 29). The Hebrew text three times states
Moses' face was radiant < "| ) p^, vv. 29, 30, 35). This is translated as
5o^dt,o in the Septuagint, Paul revises this somewhat when he writes, tj
66E;a xob xpoa&JTOu auxob.
'The glory of Moses' face' is a metaphor, though maybe not as odd or
startling as, 'You are our letter'. It is an old metaphor, originating in
the Old Testament and 're-cycled' by Paul. Max Black, using the metaphor
of 'volcano' to talk about metaphor itself, identifies three kinds of
metaphor: active, dormant, extinct.*50 'The glory of Moses'face' is perhaps
a dormant metaphor, because it erupted first in the Old Testament and Paul
is now trying to awaken it again.
A6£a <2 Cor 3.7b) probably denotes 'brilliance' or 'radiance'. Paul
affirms that there is glory on the face of Moses. But it was not literal
light radiating from his countenance. Several reputable Old Testament
commentators, acknowledge the ontological vehemence of this language by
simply referring to the 'shining of his face'*5' and 'the reflexion of the
Divine glory upon his face.'*52 They never mention 'metaphor', and they
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seem quite comfortable to take these statements as literally true, or, if
they do not mean them literally, they give the reader no clue that both the
Old Testament text and their comments on it are to be understood in any
sense other than literal.
1 Corinthians 15.40-41, as mentioned earlier,is probably a literal
usage of 66^a in the sense of 1 brilliance' .
There are celestial bodies and there are terrestrial
bodies; but the glory of the celestial is one, and the
glory of the terrestrial is another. There is one glory
of the sun, and another glory of the moon, and another
glory of the stars; for star differs from star in glory.
Each of the heavenly bodies has its own degree of relative luminosity, as
it appears to the earthbound viewer of the sky. But the glory of the face
of Moses was not radiance in this sense. To understand it this way, or to
think that the ancient Israelites understood it this way, is to misintei—
pret the language.®"*
This metaphor needs to be 1 unmasked' . Beyond the nal'vete of the
literal interpretation lies the contradiction which leads to the breakdown
of the literal interpretation. In dealing with metaphor, Ricoeur notes
three stages of interpretation: 'it is', 'it is not', and 'it is like'.
The 'it is not' is the unmasking, the recognition that these terms do not
fit together in their ordinary senses. Faces do not radiate light, let
alone a light so bright that it scares away one's friends, and that it must
be covered with a veil. Lamps and torches emit light. Faces do not.
Something has gone wrong.
mpQ appears only in Exodus 34.29-35 in all of the Hebrew Bible,
It is usually translated 'veil', though it may have been a face mask worn
by a priest during his religious duties.®® 'When the priest put on the
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mask he assumed the "face" of the deity and this identified himself with
that deity. ' 66 When he took off the mask, he removed the pretence and was
identified with himself again.
Unmasking a priest is not totally unlike unmasking a metaphor. Unmas¬
king a metaphor is lifting the facade, looking beyond the superficial fas¬
cination of the words at play. It is resisting the ontological vehemence
of the metaphor. It reveals the words by viewing them in their ordinary
meanings, apart from the clever cloaking of the poet.
The 'is' and 'is not' place a tension on the metaphorical utterance
which is ultimately resolved by an 'is like' or an 'as if'. Metaphor
'cleverly bypasses given categories in order to reveal similarities in the
field of our experience.'6,7 The 'is like' of 'the glory on Moses' face* is
that Moses' face was so expressive of emotion after his encounter with
Yahweh that it was as if his face was shining. The writer is attempting to
convey the magnificence of Moses' appearance as he descended the mountain.
To do so, he uses the language of 'a shining face'. As for Moses, he did
not know what his face looked like. But for the Israelite onlookers, it
seemed as if his face was glowing with excitement after his mountaintop
experience.
The overemphasis on the literal interpretation has led some commen¬
tators in a different direction. By not recognizing the metaphorical
nature of the language employed, they search for a source for the
(physical) light on Moses' face. Thus Driver states that Moses' face was
radiant because it reflected the divine glory, of which Moses had only seen
the afterglow while he stood in the cleft of the rock and looked on the
back of God (Ex 33. 21-23). ee The Hebrew text and the Septuagint do not
state explicitly (though they strongly imply) that there is a cause-effect
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relationship between the report of Moses beholding the 1 back' of the Lord
and the narrative of his face becoming radiant. Nor is it certain, in
following a more literal interpretation, that Moses, in the Exodus
narratives, even beheld the glory of the Lord, The glory of the Lord is
linked consistently to the face of the Lord, and the Exodus text explicitly
states that Moses was not permitted to see the face of the Lord, although
he was permitted an oblique glance at the back of the Lord <Ex 33.21-23).
On this reading, it is unlikely that Moses saw the glory on the face of the
Lord, and thus it is also unlikely that the glory of the Lord was the agent
which illuminated the face of Moses. Nor does the story state that Moses'
radiant face was a 'reflexion' of the glory of the Lord.
Although there is a shortage of explicit statements surrounding the
connection between the glory of the Lord and the glory of Moses' face,
there is a plethora of suggestiveness. A brief survey of three pericopes
in Exodus 33 will help to clarify the mysterious language of Exodus 34,
The first is verses 7-11, in which Moses would enter the tent of
meeting. When he did so, 'the pillar of cloud would descend and stand at
the door of the tent' (v. 9), thus signifying to the onlookers that the
Lord was speaking with Moses. For them, it was a visual event. For Moses,
the emphasis is upon the audible, though this talking was enacted 'face to
face' (v. 11). This pericope speaks freely of oral contact with God, but
it betrays a reluctance to make explicit any visual perception of God. The
Israelites were permitted to see the cloud, but they seem to have had no
immediate encounter with the Lord, as Moses had.
The second pericope (vv, 12-16) continues the emphasis on the oral
communication between Moses and God, They are depicted as conversing
freely with one another, and any visual element in their relationship is
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again suppressed. This suggests that the proper approach to God is audial,
not visual.
The third story (vv. 17-23) seems to be a reversal of the previous
two, since it depicts a visual event. Moses is not permitted to see the
full radiance of the divine countenance. But he is granted a guarded and
restricted vision of the glory of the back of the Lord.
The three narratives, taken together, present a paradoxical account of
Moses' interaction with God, It is portrayed as an immediate experience of
the divine presence. On the one hand, Moses spoke with the Lord face to
face, but, on the other hand, he was not permitted to see the face of the
Lord. A face to face conversation without seeing the face is a paradox!
The writer is describing Moses' encounter with Yahweh as an immediate
experience of the divine but at the same time as an almost unspeakable
occurrence.
When reading Exodus 34 in the light of this understanding of Exodus
33, the gaps of the former may be filled in by the suggestions of the
latter. Moses descended with a radiant face. Had he seen the Lord or not?
The text tends to indicate that he did, without saying so explicitly, 'Man
shall not see me and live' (Ex 33.20), but how else can one describe an
intimate, personalized experience of the divine? The writer hesitates to
use the language of direct vision to denote that Moses had been in close
contact with God. So he conveys it indirectly by saying that Moses' face
glowed, suggesting (without stating) that Moses had seen the face of the
Lord, and that this vision is what had thereby illuminated his own face.
The 'descent' narrative goes on to state that Moses was radiant
' because he had been talking with God' (Ex 34. 29). The explicit reason
given for the illumination is Moses' speaking with God, not his seeing him,
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though the seeing is not totally excluded. This is similar to the
statement in Exodus 33.11: 'Thus the Lord used to speak to Moses face to
face, as a man speaks to his friend,' The audial is highlighted, and the
visual is suppressed, though not eliminated. The relationship of God and
Moses was less one of immediate vision than one of direct communication.
In the book of Exodus, Moses is a man who has been honoured by God. Moses
is portrayed as a man with a hot line to heaven. He had a reputation
(561;a) for being able to communicate directly with God. He was also
honoured by the people for the just and wise laws he gave them.
An overemphasis on the literal illumination of Moses' face is also
apparent among New Testament scholars who comment on 2 Corinthians 3.7-18.
The view of Bruce is typical: 'As Moses reflected the divine glory to which
he was exposed, so Christians, beholding the surpassing glory which shines
in the gospel, which is nothing less than the glory of the Lord himself,
reflect that glory....'7'-' He recognizes the unspoken connotations of the
passage, but fails to see the metaphorical nature of the language employed.
When the texts state that Moses face shone, this is metaphorical, and it
means something like the assertion that Moses had a fantastic religious
experience on the mountain and the excitement was expressed on his face,
In a more contemporary metaphor, one might say that Moses was so full of
his religious experience that awe and wonder were oozing out of his pores.
But no dermatologist could have taken samples and proved or disproved this
claim, just as no photographer could have recorded any higher than normal
light level on the face of Moses. Rather these are metaphors which are
making true statements about religious affairs.
When Paul speaks of 'the glory of Moses face', he is speaking
metaphorically. He knew (or is this too confident a claim?), as did the
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Israelites of Moses' day, that Moses did not diffuse light beams from his
face. The 'glory of his face' does not mean that Moses was a walking
torch. Rather, as 56^a was a term fit for the presence of God, so 56E,a was
a fit term for the appearance of Moses who had .just come from the presence
of God. As God honoured Moses by speaking with him so the tradition
honoured Moses by speaking of the 66£<x on his face, as a way of stating
that Moses stood in a special relationship with God. As 'special
relationship' summarises the friendship between the United Kingdom and the
United States, so 66^a summarises the honour and esteem and brilliance of
both God and Moses and the quality of the friendship between them.
Moses, because he was close (spatial metaphor) to God, wrote right
regulations. He was a brilliant lawgiver. He was honoured by his fellow
countrymen, who said he had So^a on his face. This is the exact opposite
of the contemporary negative metaphor - 'egg on the face' - for one who has
shamed himself by speaking an unwise word.
The relationship between the veil and the glory is difficult to
establish. Propp states that Moses' face was burned and disfigured by the
fiery heat of the divine 6o^a (Ex 24. 17), and that the veil was 'to spare
the people the gruesome sight,'71 Furnish suggests that Moses was 'sparing
his people the agony of seeing the last of the splendour.'72 Quite a
different reason is proffered by Windisch, who says that Moses veiled his
face so that the divine 66£a would not be profaned by commoners' viewing
it, 73 C. Hickling would agree, citing Moses' 'reverential motives' for
veiling the 56£a.7A All three proposals are plausible, though none is con¬
vincing. The reason for the veiling, unstated by the Exodus narrative and
left undefined by Paul, remains a mystery, though one final comment may be
offered. The veiling of Moses' face corresponds roughly to Moses' being
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hid in the cleft of the rock. If Moses was thus able to see only the
afterglow of the divine glory, as the Lord passed by, then Israel was able
to see perhaps only the overflow of the divine glory on Moses' face. Thus
Israel could only bear some of the radiance, of which Moses got more.
If 'glory on the face of Moses' <v.7) is metaphorical, then 'the glory
of the Lord' <v. 18) is certainly metaphorical also. Some might object that
glory is the essential attribute of God and therefore proper to him. If
glory is the ineffable presence of God, 75 then perhaps this is so. But the
book of Exodus and 2 Corinthians 3 speak of it not abstractly but rather in
concrete terms - light, fire, radiance. It is just this concrete sense
which creates the tension which is characteristic of its usage in
metaphorical statements.
Others might object that 'the glory of the Lord' is not a metaphor but
rather a technical theological term within the Jewish literature.7e This
is true. But all the while it is a ' dormant' metaphor, which can
occasionally set aside, though perhaps not too far away, its technical
character and once more act like the volcanic expression it once was.
2 Corinthians 3. 18 is just such an occasion.
qpefq 5i ndvxeq avaxexaXuppdvm npooc&TtG) xf|V 86£av xupfou
xaxonxpiCdpevoi xf|v auxf|v eixdva pexapop<poi3pe8a &nd
5b£qq e'iq <56£av xa8&nep and xupfou nvetipaxoq.
As noted earlier, 77 this verse is enigmatic. The ambiguity of the present
middle participle, xaxonxpxCdpevoi., cannot be resolved convincingly, and so
will be translated, in this discussion, as 'behold/reflect'.7® The
> 3
syntactical function of tf|v auxf^v Eixbva is in question and will be omitted
from this discussion. The first half of the verse is the primary focus:
'All of us with unveiled face behold/reflect the glory of the Lord.' The
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phrase, q 86^a xoptou, appears in the Pauline corpus only here and in 2
Corinthians 8. 19.73 The focus statement alludes to several Old Testament
passages. The 'unveiled face' is a motif suggested by the narrative of
Moses and his veil (Ex 34.29-35). 'Beholding the glory of the Lord' is
3
perhaps an allusion to Moses: xr^v 66^av xopxou evSsv (Num 12.8). 'Reflect¬
ing the glory' is possibly (though not surely) an allusion to Exodus 34.29.
'Volcano' can be the source of a metaphor for 'metaphor' and also the
source of a metaphor for God.eo With reference to Exodus 13.21, in which
the Lord is reported as journeying with the Israelites in a pillar of cloud
by day and a pillar of fire by night, M. Noth says that '... the phenomenon
of the pillars of cloud and fire presumably goes back to observation of an
active volcano.'01 It is possible, alternatively, that fire became for
Israel a symbol of God because of the large flaming torch carried at the
head of the Israelite procession through the wilderness. Whatever its ori¬
gin may have been, TUPP ~TlZLZ) came to denote 'the appearance of the
T
divine majesty' or 'the visible manifestation of the Deity.'®2 The fire is
often recorded as shrouded in a cloud, since it was thought that no human
could bear to view the full radiance of the divine glory. 'The fiery cloud
thus formed an imposing visible symbol of the spiritual presence of God.'33
When 'glory' is attributed to God, it is a metaphorical predicate.®*1
«
To say that God has weight ( ~T 1 _H jD = 56£a) is a misnomer. It is a
T
semantic incompatibility. But to rescue the statement by saying 'God has a
weighty reputation' is acceptable. He has a heavy reputation with the
Israelites because they believe that he makes good things happen for them,
Yahweh was thought to be influential in human history. Israel believed the
Exodus and the Conquest were a result of his intervention on their behalf.
This was seen, not only in the fiery clouds, but also in his mighty acts.
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Because Yahweh had reputation and influence, he was one to be hon¬
oured. Just as men tend to respect their fellow men who have a good repu¬
tation, so the Israelites honoured their god. They did so by having feasts
in his honour, and by offering him gifts and sacrifices, just as famous men
today are f§ted and lavished with gifts. They said many words of praise to
him and about him. They made him famous in all the land. They also wrote
and sang songs in his honour, to show their appreciation and acknowledge¬
ment of his weighty reputation. Eventually, the word of God to Israel
would be that he would be more pleased by obedience to his commandments
than by words of praise and sacrifices offered to him.
Because Yahweh had weight, he was one to be listened to and obeyed.
He spoke only to certain chosen ones. Moses was one of the special few
with whom it is reported that God spoke: 'The Lord used to speak to Moses
face to face, as a man speaks to his friend' (Ex 33. 11; Nu 12.8). Thus
Moses became a spokesman for God to the people, who listened to the words
of God transmitted to them through their intermediary. Because Yahweh was
heavy, his words were treasured. They were written down on stone tablets,
and preserved in the ark of the covenant.
A6£a 8so(S (the LXX translation for if~lIT!"1 T lUlID) can be both a
T ; ;
subjective and an objective genitive. As a subjective, it refers to the
bright light and fiery cloud which accompany the presence of God. It also
connotes the weight of his reputation and the importance of his influence
in human affairs. As an objective genitive, it refers to the high regard
in which he is held and the praise which is given him. Aotioc is thus
metaphorical when attributed to God, for it does not apply literally.
As pointed out above, there are enough similarities between 2
Corinthians 3.7-18 and Exodus 34.29-35, to lead some scholars to identify
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the former passage as a midrash, or rabbinic style interpretation, of the
latter. es But the Corinthian passage has several elements which cannot be
accounted for on the basis of Exodus 34. et5 It is perhaps more accurate,
then, to say that Paul's writing is not properly a midrash, because it does
not serve to elucidate the text by means of a running commentary. But it
does have some midrashic features, which arise from Paul's adaptation of
the material.
Another possibility is that Exodus 34. 29-35 may be thought of not as a
full and complete narrative but rather as a 'reported story'.The concept
of reported story, as a possible genre of Old Testament literature, is
proposed and explained by Antony Campbell:
. . . some of the Old Testament narrative texts contain
neither the record of the oral telling of a story nor
the skilled fashioning of a story as a work of literary
art but, instead, provide the report of a story. Such
a reported story would contain the basic elements of
character and plot as well as key details but would pass
over much that could be easily supplied from the story¬
teller' s imagination. . . . the reported story would be
... a condensation or an ... aide-memoire for other
storytellers. The intention of the reported story, as
literary genre, would be to communicate the gist of a
story so that it might be recalled or retold. '1313
It is conceivable that Exodus 34.29-35 is just such a reported story,
and that the Corinthians are already familiar with it. What Paul is doing,
then, in 2 Corinthians 3 is not re-telling the story or commenting on it
but rather using 'the storyteller's imagination' to fill in some of the
details of a cause and effect sequence and to apply the narrative to his
own situation.
According to Exodus 34.30, the Israelites were afraid to approach
Moses because his face was shining. Paul expands this by saying they were
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unable to gaze on Moses face because it was so brilliant (v. 7). Exodus 34
gives no reason for Moses donning the veil. Paul supplies one: 'so that
the Israelites might not see the end of the fading splendour.' (v. 13)
Paul then makes the Exodus narrative of contemporary interest to his
readers by applying it to the unbelief of the Jews in contrast with the
experience of the Christian ministers.
The possibility of Exodus 34.29-35 being a reported story and 2
Corinthians 3.7-18 an expansion (though a brief one) of it might explain
both the brevity of the former and the unique augmentation of the latter.
c
When Paul writes q 56^a xupfou in 2 Corinthians 3. 18, xtipioq refers to
God, and 56£a connotes bright light. This phrase seems to emphasize the
bright light which is the Lord, which shines forth from the Lord, which is
associated with the Lord. It is similar to Til fP n 1 IK <Ps 27. 1), and it
T :
is not an unusual Old Testament notion. When Paul uses it here, he is
referring to something (presumably visible) which the Christian can
behold/reflect. This is parallel to the glory of Moses' face, which Paul
interprets as a bright light upon which the Israelites could not gaze
intently because of its brilliance. Because of xorcomTpi Ceo, S6C,oc xupfou
refers more to God's radiant appearance than to his famous reputation.
God is a light, a very bright light. He is not really a light. He is
like a light (Ricoeur's triad again). Light is a word which gives one the
ability to start talking about God. Light is necessary for life. It
allows people to see where they are going. God is necessary for life. He
makes things happen. He helps people ' see' where they are going, His
words are a lamp for the feet and a light for the path (Ps 119. 105).
2 Corinthians 4.6 informs the reader that God is shining a light into
the hearts of believers:
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For it is the God who said, 'Let light shine out of
darkness, ' who has shone in our hearts to give the
light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the
face of Christ.
But how can this be? Is there a heavenly flash light directed toward every
Christian? This is probably not what is intended here. Rather, it should
be pointed out that this light is not a visible phenomenon, and that these
illuminated hearts are no more literal than Moses' shining face. This is
metaphorical language.
A reading of the above verse poses at least two issues which bear on
the explanation of rj 6o^a xopfou in 3. 18. First is the relationship
between the glory of God and the face of Jesus Christ. The glory of God is
the glory not of a hidden God but of a revealed God, who has made himself
known in Jesus Christ. 'Thus the glory of God is none other than the glory
in the face of Christ.'30 It is 'set before the eyes' in the crucifixion
and resurrection of Jesus. The glory and power of God are revealed in the
weakness and shame of the cross and in the triumphant event of resurrec¬
tion, 31 The 'face' (mpocroMTOv) of Jesus Christ might be better translated
as the 'person' of Jesus Christ, in the same way that D]Q can be trans-
V T
lated 'face' or 'person'. For the face of Jesus Christ is no longer vis¬
ible, but one's mind can gain knowledge about him as a person.
The second issue is the relationship between the glory of God and the
hearts of the believers, Glory in the face of Jesus may suggest but does
not mean light on the face which the Christian can behold/reflect in any
kind of literal sense. Rather, it is the wondrous majesty of God which is
known when one becomes acquainted with Jesus through the preaching of the
gospel, The enlightening of the heart <2 Cor 4,6) is reminiscent of the
writing on the heart <3.3), and it reverses the results of the hardening of
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the thoughts (2 Cor 3,14a), the veiling of the old covenant (v. 14b), the
veiling of the hearts (v. 15) and the blinding of the minds (4. 4).S2: The
enlightening may also be a fulfilment of Isaiah 35.2: 'They shall see the
glory of the Lord.' The connection between seeing and knowing has long
been recognized. Thus, seeing the glory of God in the face of Christ <2
Cor 4.6) is somewhat similar to having Jesus portrayed before one's eyes
(xoa5 3<p0oc\poi>q ^Iqoottq XpiCTtoq irpoeypdcpr), Gal 3. 1) by the preaching of the
gospel (2 Cor 4.4). Furthermore, a parallel for seeing the glory as
roughly equivalent to hearing the gospel is cited by Furnish: psyaXevov
<56Lqq sTsov oi o<p8c<Apoi amffiv xcu 56£<xv (pcovfjq auxoO ^xouoev to o?iq autffiv
(Sirach 17. 13).34
In summary, then, 56^cx is seen to be polysemous. Its journey through
Greek literature is characterized by a development of meaning from
'opinion' to 'reputation', 'honour', 'dignity', and even 'wealth', 'power',
and 'praise' . From its use in the Septuagint it acquired meanings such as
'radiance' and 'brilliance', and especially its peculiar connection with
the presence and majesty of God.
A6£a is also metaphorical. When it is used with reference to Moses'
face, it is being used metaphorically. It does not mean that his face was
visibly lit up like a light bulb. Rather, it is a writer's way of saying
that Moses' face looked very different as a result of his speaking with the
Lord. There is no reason to assume that Moses was literally reflecting a
visible light, nor to conjecture that such a reflected light issued forth
from the radiant majesty of God. Rather, 56|a, as 'brilliance', is seen to
be a good word for talking about both the awe and wonder on Moses' face and
about the presence of God.
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c
When used metaphorically of o xuptoq in the Septuagint, it came to be
associated with the presence of God, especially as it was experienced
through theophany. The sense of 56£a as a dazzlingly bright light seemed
c
well suited to references to the magnificence of God. When r) 5o£a xupi'ou
is mentioned in 2 Corinthians 3. 18, it conjures up all of the associations
of light, brilliance, honour, and majesty. But 'beholding the glory of the
Lord' is not the same as viewing the brightness of the sun. It is a vision
of a different order. The glory of God is 'seen' on the face of Christ.
The face of Christ is made 'visible' when the gospel of Christ is
proclaimed. Preaching is picturing. And, from the listeners' point of
view, hearing is seeing. One sees the glory of God on the face of Christ
when one hears the good news of justification by faith in Christ. Thus the
glory of God in the New Testament is connected more to the message of
Christ than to an emanation of light.
There is, though, an oddity in talking about the glory of God in con¬
junction with the story of Christ, for his life ended in a cruel cruci¬
fixion. The glory of God and the cross of Jesus do not correspond well.
But crucifixion was not the end. It was followed by resurrection and exal¬
tation. Thus the glory of God is 'the glory which shines through suffei—
ing. 'The glory of God, which accompanies the ministry of the new
covenant and which is beheld/reflected by those who believe in Jesus, is
both a present and a future reality.
The believer already knows that God is present with him, even in the
midst of suffering and tribulation (2 Cor 4.7-11), The glory of God is the
power of God which strengthens the Christian in such times. One sees the
glory when one realizes that God is at work in the believer's own life and
in the lives of others.
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SECTION D. LIFE AND DEATH.
To speak of God is to speak metaphorically. 1 The anthropomorphic
language of the Bible is not to be taken literally, as if he were really,
after all, just a super man. This language is not, we may suppose, lit¬
erally correct nor empirically verifiable. Yahweh is not really a man who
tends sheep, nor can the size of his 'hand' be measured. Nevertheless to
speak metaphorically of God is to speak of him. Man need not remain silent
about the Divine. If one could not speak metaphorically, one would in most
(if not all) cases be forced to remain silent.2 But metaphors enable
writers to become articulate when they would otherwise be tongue-tied. 3
In the Christian tradition, it is believed that what the Bible says
about God, though it be metaphorical, is still true. That which is true
corresponds to that which in reality is. What the Bible says about God is
true because it is an expression of what God has revealed to man about
himself. Man is not silent about God, because God has not been silent
toward man,'1 God has made himself known through the prophets and apostles,
and ultimately, through Jesus Christ. The Bible, interpreted Christo-
logically, is the written record of the testimony of these men about Jesus
Christ, the Old Testament prophets as they looked forward to him, the New
Testament apostles as they looked backward to him.
They wrote in order to talk about God, the God who had made himself
known to them.
In his operation God is revealed to us. All we can know
of God according to Scripture testimony is his acts.
All we can assert of God, all attributes we can assign
to God relate to these acts of His. And so not to his
essence as such.s
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Because there is a distance and difference between man and God, there
is also a corresponding 'inadequacy of all knowledge of the revealed God,'®
Yet the biblical writers wrote, in spite of their less than perfect and
complete knowledge of God. They used the language of earth to talk about
the things of heaven.
Paul is one person who wrote about God. In 2 Corinthians 3 he names
'the living God'. This is a metaphor. It expresses metaphorical truth.
It is not a metaphor coined by Paul, but rather one originating in the Old
Testament. Paul uses this phrase, but he does not necessarily use it
uncritically. 'The living God' appears only three times in his epistles,
but on each occasion it serves a particular function.
When Paul utters the phrase 'living God', he is saying something about
God. It means first of all that there is a God. Something must be for
something to be said. Paul, in his epistles, never questioned nor proved
the existence of God. That God exists is a reality for him which required
no discussion. Paul is more concerned with speaking about God's activity
than about God's existence.
Paul attributed the predicate to the subject 8e6q. This charac¬
teristic should be considered metaphorical, because God is not living in
the same sense that a plant or animal or human is living. God may have
breath (mveOpa), but it is not oxygen or carbon dioxide. Paul borrows a
word that is properly predicated of earthly organisms and applies it to the
heavenly being. This transporting of non-theological terms into a theo-
ogical context gives Paul a way of saying something about God,
To say 'God is alive' is the same kind of statement as 'the sky is
dead'.7 The sky is not an object of which life or death can properly be
predicated. Neither is God an entity which can appropriately receive the
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literal designation of 'dead' or 'alive'. To say that someone (something)
is alive presupposes that it will also die. The biblical writers and the
Christian tradition following them have never understood God to be one who
has such a tenuous existence.
Humans have life 'signs' which can be monitored, They have life
'support' machines which can enable the body to perform the necessary
functions to sustain life. Humans also die. The heart fails, the lungs
stop, the brain ceases to operate. Life is gone, and death now reigns, to
use a Pauline personification and regnal metaphor. But God is not alive in
this sense. This is not to say that God is dead. He is neither dead nor
alive, in physical terms. He just is, and He keeps on going. The
predicates of life and death are not suitable for his description.
But life is attributed to him, nonetheless. Paul had to say some¬
thing. So he spoke about God as 'the living God'. Paul stands in a
religious tradition, and this tradition uses metaphors as one means of
speaking about God. One of their metaphors is 'the living God'. Paul
borrows this metaphor from the Hebrew scriptures, where it appears thirteen
times. An investigation of Old Testament passages where 'the living God'
occurs will provide a background for understanding Paul's use of this term.
The living God is the God who gives life to those who trust him. This
is seen clearly in the cycle of narratives about the prophet Elijah, An
examination of the material in 1 Kings 17-19 will reveal an antithesis of
life and death in Elijah's career and will provide a helpful introduction
to these themes as they appear in the other Old Testament passages. Though
the title, 'living God', does not appear in the Elijah story, its usage in
this context would have been completely appropriate.
In 1 Kings 17.1, the prophet Elijah predicts that there will be no
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rain in the land for a while and instead there will be a drought, a symbol
of death, as a divine judgment on the disobedience and idolatry of his
people. But God preserves the life of his faithful servant, first at the
brook Cherith (vv. 2-7) and later at the home of the widow of Zarephath
(vv. 8-16). Then the widow's son becomes ill and dies, but his life is
restored by the prayer of Elijah and the power of God (vv. 17-24).
Chapter 18 begins with Elijah's announcement that he is going to see
King Ahab, a move which will endanger the lives of both Elijah and Obadiah.
But the lives of these godly men are spared (vv. 1-16). This is the
Obadiah who had saved the lives of one hundred of God's prophets by hiding
them in caves and secretly sending them supplies (vv. 3-4). At the contest
on Mount Carmel, the prophets of Baal are unable to get a response from
their deity, so they are put to death. But Yahweh answers by fire, one of
the symbols of the living God (Dt 5.26; cf. Ex 34). Following the contest,
it is Yahweh who sends the rains, symbolic of life and the renewed favour
of God upon his people.
At this point Jezebel threatens Elijah, and he has to flee for his
life (19.1-3). But again God spares the life of his faithful prophet and
reminds him that there are also seven thousand other Israelites who have
been true to Yahweh (vv. 4-18). This narrative concludes with Elisha being
called into the prophetic service of God, to replace Elijah (vv. 19-21).
The narrator has skilfully woven the threads of life and death into
the fabric of his narrative. It is the false prophets who are put to
death. Yahweh, though, preserves the lives of Elijah, Obadiah, the one
hundred prophets hidden in the cave, and the seven thousand loyal
worshippers. The death and renewal of the widow's son is a small scale
replica of the drought and rain which occur in the land. Throughout the
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narrative, Yahweh is depicted as the giver of life and the rescuer of the
righteous, while death is the due penalty for idolatry. It is perhaps
significant that this account does not report the eventual death of Elijah,
but it ends with him still alive, passing his mantle on to a younger man,
In the individual narratives and in the cycle as a whole, life in all of
its symbolism is reported to be the work of Yahweh. Though not called the
'living God', the judgement that he is such may fairly be drawn from the
material presented in this biblical passage.
Where expressis verbis God is called 'the Living God', it will be noted
that there are three different Hebrew constructions which are rendered by
this one English phrase.
The following five references are a translation of □-iTin cprr?K
For who is there of all flesh, that has heard the voice
of the living God speaking out of the midst of fire, as
we have, and has still lived (Deut 5.26)?
This question, addressed to Moses by the children of Israel, concerns the
the theophany during the giving of the covenant.® 'The Lord spoke ... at
the mountain out of the midst of the fire, the cloud, and the thick dark¬
ness' (v. 22). God spoke to the people with a loud voice, and then he gave
the two tablets of stone to Moses.® God is a speaker, and God is an
author. The combination of both oral and written presentation emphasizes
both the divine origin and the divine authority of the covenant.10 But the
Israelites were so afraid at hearing his voice that they asked Moses to
listen to the divine voice and then report it to them, so they would not
have to hear it any more. Evidently it was a terrifying and dreadful
experience for men to hear the voice of the living God.11 In this passage,
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'living God' stands in opposition to 'all flesh', which ' ... characterizes
living creatures, in tacit contrast to God, as frail, unsubstantial, and
dependent.'12 The living God, the God of Israel, is the one who appears in
the desert in the midst of fire, cloud, and darkness, and speaks to his
people. Other passages emphasize that no one can see God and live, but
here the danger is hearing the voice of God.13 Nevertheless, this
narrative reports that Israel not only saw the glory of God (v. 24) and
lived but also heard God and survived. This passage, in presenting Yahweh
as one who reveals himself to his people and who speaks to them,
underscores personhood and communication as characteristics of the 'living'
God.
In 1 Samuel 17.26, the shepherd boy David asks the men of Israel about
Goliath:
'For who is this uncircumcised Philistine, that he
should defy the armies of the living God?'
Then again in verse 36 David, upon whom 'the Spirit of the Lord came
mightily' (16.13), promises King Saul that he will kill Goliath,
seeing he has defied the armies of the living God.'
Later David arrives at the battle lines and is amazed that the Israelites
are being intimidated by Goliath. David, in reminding the Israelite
soldiers that they are the armies of the living God, implies that they
should be bold and not fear the Philistines, Then as David approaches
Goliath to do battle with him, he again predicts victory, (16.13):
'This day the Lord will deliver you into my hand,... that
all the earth may know that there is a God in Israel,...
for the battle is the Lord's and he will give you into
our hand' (1 Samuel 17.46-7).
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For Israel, the living God is Yahweh, and he is distinct from the deities
of the surrounding nations, whose idols have no breath in their
mouth.'1'1 But to say that Yahweh is the living God does not merely mean
that he is alive and breathing. Rather, it points to his 'reality and
power'.15 The living God shows his power by enabling David and his armies
to defeat the Philistines.15 The result is deliverance for Israel and
censure for those who mock Yahweh.17' Thus, in this passage, the living God
refers to the God who is present with his people and powerful to deliver
them. He is a God of action.
The next occurrence of 'the living God', is in Jeremiah 10.10:
But the LORD is the true God;
he is the living God and the everlasting King.
At his wrath the earth quakes,
and the nations cannot endure his indignation.
Because this passage (10.1-16) looks like a collection of 'piecemeal
contributions',1® questions have been raised about its authenticity and
integrity. But, in its present form, it does bear marks of a thematic
unity. The passage concerns the contrast between Yahweh, the true and
living God of Israel, and the mere idols made by the hands of a
craftsman. 1 The contrast is thorough and searching. The idols are but
pieces of wood, cut from a tree in the forest, carved by a craftsman,
covered with gold and silver, and clothed with violet and purple garments
(vv. 4-9). Because they are but the work of men, they cannot speak and
move about (v. 5). They are stupid and foolish (v. 8). They are not
creators, but are themselves fabrications. They will perish, along with
those who made them (v. 11). These images are false, and there is no
breath in them (v. 14). Therefore the prophet Jeremiah concludes that they
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are worthless and illusory. Their punishment can only be destruction (v.
16).
But Yahweh, the living God, is 'not like these' (v. 16). He is
different in every way. The living God is ever active in the affairs of
men and ever living, unlike the gods of some ancient Near East religions,
who '... were thought to suffer death during the course of the annual cycle
of nature and subsequently to be revived,'20 The prophets of Israel,
rejecting all such notions of a dying and rising God, heaped scorn on such
man-made idols. Instead, they acknowledged Yahweh as the living God, the
one who created the universe (vv. 11-12). It is he who speaks to his
people (v. 1). And it is the living God who will bring judgment upon all
nations (vv. 10, 15; cf. 9.23-26). Furthermore, when the prophet proclaims
that Israel is the tribe of Yahweh's inheritance (v. 16), he implies that
God initiates and maintains a personal relationship with his people.
There are problems, though, associated with interpreting this
reference to 'the living God' as a statement that Yahweh is powerful, for
there is a less than obvious irony generated here.21 It is possible that
this passage is the result of the prophet's meditating on the powerful
intervention of God on behalf of Hezekiah when he was under siege by
Rabshakeh, the officer of the Assyrian king Sennacherib.22 But during
Jeremiah's time, 'the gods of the other nations had regularly conquered
Israel and demonstrated the powerlessness of Yahweh. The whole Jeremiah
tradition is a desperate attempt to explain that powerlessness.'23 One of
the prophet's proposals is that the destruction of Israel is a result of
the wrath of God, inflicted on account of disobedience, rebellion, and
idolatry (chapters 23, 24, 30). If indeed '... 10.1-16 represents the
expression of a small cult huddled together to preserve its ideological
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distinction* ,:24- then it is also true that there were still some (if not
this group, then others) who believed that the living God was able to bring
about the return of his people to their land (c. 31). That would be a time
of renewal, and God would make a new covenant with his people, putting it
in their minds and writing it on their hearts. Paul mentions the new
covenant and the writing of God on the heart.
The author(s) of Jeremiah 10.10, then, were able to contrast the
living God with dead idols, even though as they wrote he appeared to be
powerless. They looked back to his mighty deliverance of Hezekiah, and
they anticipated another such event for Israel in the future. Even in the
midst of tragedy, they were able to portray the living God as the god who
creates, speaks, and acts in the affairs of men. For the Hebrew prophet,
the life of God is seen in the power and the voice of God.
EP70 TTirVK.
But 'the burden of the LORD' you shall mention no more,
for the burden is every man's own word, and you pervert
the word of the living God, the LORD of hosts, our God
(Jeremiah 23,36).
The entire twenty-third chapter is an indictment of Israel's priests and
prophets, who have failed in their task of shepherding God's people (vv. 1-
4). They have perverted the word of the Lord (vv. 16-21). But Jeremiah
reminds the prophets that God is near and not afar off and that, if they
had really wanted, they could have heard the word of the Lord and then
proclaimed the truth (vv. 22-3). Because they abused their speaking
privileges and brought the prophetic office into disrepute, Jeremiah now
forbids them to use the formula, 'the burden of the Lord', which , in this
context means 'the word of the Lord'.'-5 The 'burden' is a word of God
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which is given only to a true prophet, but it was being confused with
the private opinions of individual men which they gave out as if they were
a "word of Yahweh".'2s In this passage, the living God is set forth as the
God near at hand who communicates with his people. Once again, the 'living
God' refers to the 'near God', the 'present God', and the 'God who speaks'.
It occurs four times: 2 Kings 19.4 and 19.16 and Isaiah 37.4 and 37.17.
The account in 2 Kings 19 is virtually identical with that of Isaiah 37, so
it will be used as the basis for the discussion.27 In the biblical account
of the encroaching Assyrian army, their king, Sennacherib, dispatches
Rabshakeh to taunt Hezekiah so that he will surrender Jerusalem without a
fight. Part of his tactic is to mock the local deity. He implies that
Yahweh is just as impotent as the deities of other nations, whom Assyria
has already conquered.2® Rabshakeh delivered his message orally and in
writing.2® After Hezekiah, king of Judah, received the message, he sent off
a communiqud to the prophet Isaiah. The end of Hezekiah's message is found
in 2 Kings 19.4:
'It may be that the LORD your God heard all the words
of the Rabshakeh, whom his master the king of Assyria
has sent to mock the living God, and will rebuke the
words which the LORD your God has heard; therefore lift
up your prayer for the remnant that is left.'
After receiving the message from the king, Isaiah sends Hezekiah a word of
the Lord which exhorts him not to fear Sennacherib, for he will soon be
destroyed (vv. 5-7). Then Sennacherib sends a second message to Hezekiah,
warning him not to trust in his God for deliverance, because the gods of
the kings of the lands which he has already defeated had not delivered them
(vv. 8-13). 'Assyria herself by the destruction of the hand-made idols of
The second Hebrew form of 'living God'
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the people has proved the emptiness of heathenism.'30 At this point,
Hezekiah himself goes up to the temple to pray:
(15) 0 LORD the God of Israel, who art enthroned above
the cherubim, thou art the God, thou alone, of all the
kingdoms of the earth; thou hast made heaven and earth.
(16) Incline thy ear, 0 LORD, and hear; open thy eyes,
0 LORD, and see; and hear the words of Sennacherib,
which he has sent to mock the living God. (17) Of a
truth, 0 LORD, the kings of Assyria have laid waste the
nations and their lands, (18) and have cast their gods
into the fire; for they were no gods, but the work of
men's hands, wood and stone; therefore they were
destroyed. (19) So now, 0 LORD our God, save us, I
beseech thee, from his hand, that all the kingdoms of
the earth may know that thou, 0 LORD, art God alone. '
As in Jeremiah 10.10, so in this passage 'there is a forceful contrast
between the living God and the "no gods" of the nations'.31 The idols,
'lifeless and helpless', have eyes but cannot see and ears but cannot
hear.32 If Hezekiah's god is but another monument of wood and stone, then
he might well be dubious of any divine deliverance.33 But the king
recognizes a qualitative difference in Yahweh, the God of Israel. 'His
prayer expresses his faith that Yahweh is no idol.'3* Yahweh has created
the universe, and he now rules over it (v. 15). For this reason, Hezekiah
was confident to call upon Yahweh and to acknowledge him as the living God,
He had a hope of heavenly help, not from foreign gods, whose man-made
images had been destroyed, but from Yahweh, whose credibility was still
intact. Yahweh was ever 'living' and everlasting and ever able to rescue
his people. Isaiah predicted deliverance for Hezekiah, because the God who
had revealed himself in the mighty acts of creation was surely strong
enough to overcome the Assyrian army. The prayers of Isaiah and Hezekiah
were not a last resort in the face of utter hopelessness and desperation.
Rather, they are authentic appeals to the God who sees, hears, and acts.
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In this excerpt from 2 Kings 19, Sennacherib 'blasphemes' Yahweh,3S but
Hezekiah and Isaiah trust him, because he is known to Israel as the god who
is accessible to sincere seekers like Hezekiah and as the god who
communicates to true prophets like Isaiah. In this narrative, the metaphor
'the living God' suggests 'the God who is accessible' and 'the God who
communicates'.
The third and final Hebrew form of 'living God' is
It occurs four times in the Masoretic text, firstly in Joshua 3.10:
And Joshua said, 'Hereby you shall know that the liv¬
ing God is among you, and that he will without fail
drive out from before you the Canaanites, the Hit-
tites, the Hivites, the Perizzites, the Girgashites,
the Amorites, and the Jebusites.'
The living God has already made himself known to Joshua, Yahweh has spoken
to Joshua and made him his 'authorized spokesman' (3.7>.3e So in Joshua's
first speech, he informs the people of Israel that the living God is
present with them, and that he will confirm his presence to them by giving
them military victory over all the inhabitants of the promised land.
The gods of the other peoples were but idols, incapable of intervening in
the course of history. But Yahweh, the living god, designs and directs
human affairs.3® By constructing the narrative in this way, the Israelite
narrator emphasizes that his god, the living God, dwells with his people,
that he speaks to his people (even if only through a mediator), and that he
acts decisively on behalf of his people.33 This text underscores the
'Theologisch ist ihr Anfang das wichtigste StUck der
Erzahlung. Es geht um den Nachweis, da8 ein "leben-
diger Gott" inmitten Israels ist, d. h. ein gott, der
handeln und sein Ziel erreichen kann. '37"
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presence, power, and tele-communications of the living God.
Yet the number of the people of Israel shall be like
the sand of the sea, which can be neither measured nor
numbered; and in the place where it was said to them,
'You are not my people', it shall be said to them, 'Sons
of the living God' <Hosea 1.10).
The essential theology of Hosea is that 'Yahweh's sovereign power can
overcome anything.'AO He can change despair into hope, He can cause the
few to become the many. He can change 'my people' into 'not my people' and
then back again. 'Sons of the living God' refers back to the Exodus
tradition of Deuteronomy 14.1, where Moses declares to Israel, 'You are the
sons of the LORD your God.' In the Exodus event, God had established a
special relationship with Israel. The prophet reminds his readers of this
in Hosea 11.1, where God says, 'When Israel was a youth I loved him. And
out of Egypt I called my son.' But Israel, through their rebellion and
disobedience, had damaged that relationship to such an extent that in Hosea
1.9, the Lord declares: 'You are not my people and I am not your God.'
The promise of Hosea 1.10 is that some-day Israel will again enjoy that
special father/son relationship with God. 'You are not my people' shall
become 'sons of the living God.' 'Sons of the living God' (1.10) is a
contrasting metaphor to 'children of harlotry' (2,7).41 Instead of
allegiance to Yahweh, Israel had made alliances with false gods. 'Living
God' is an ancient Hebrew name for the divine one, and it evokes the
traditional doctrine that God is both creator and life-giver.For Hosea
in particular, the living God is, according to 6.2 and 13.14, the one who
gives life, the one who possesses might over the powers of destruction, and
the one who thereby distinguishes himself from the Baals.For Hosea to
speak of the 'living' God suggests that God's final word to Israel is an
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offer of life.'44- In this prophecy, then, the term 'living God' signifies
the 'God of power' and 'the God who gives life'. His power is manifested
in the creation, in the calling of Israel, and in the reversal of human
circumstances and relationships.
Psalm 42.2. The first three verses of this psalm provide the
immediate context for this occurrence of 'living God':4S
<1) As a hart longs for flowing streams,
so longs my soul for thee, 0 God.
(2) My soul thirsts for God, for the living God.
When shall I come and behold the face of God?
(3) My tears have been my food day and night
while men say to me continually, 'Where is your God?'
Delitzsch suggests that this is a lament, in which the psalmist is far from
Jerusalem and unable to return.4S He is surrounded by people who mock
him.4,7 His longing for the living God is parallel to a thirsty deer
desiring a drink from the running water of a cool brook.4-® The flowing
stream is a full, running water-course in contrast to one that is stagnant
or empty.4'3 As only the running water will quench the thirst of the deer,
so only will the living God satisfy the psalmist. The living God is thus
distinguished from other deities who, for the worshipper of Yahweh, are
nothing more than a dry creek bed. The comparison of living God and
running water is found again in Jeremiah 17.13:
0 LORD, the hope of Israel,
all who forsake thee shall be put to shame;
those who turn away from thee shall be written in the earth,
for they have forsaken the LORD, the fountain of living water.
Those who ignore Yahweh will be embarrassed ( 1U/2L"1 ; literally, 'dried
* *
up'), They are like thirsty men trying to drink from a dry burn during a
drought. But to turn to Yahweh is like a drink from a refreshing spring,
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whose waters flow cool and clear. The psalmist, then, longs for God
because he knows in God he will find genuine satisfaction. His thirst will
be quenched when once again he beholds the face of God.so Thus it is the
living God who is accessible to his people and who is able to satisfy them,
The final occurrence of the title, 'the living God', is in Psalm 84.2:
(1) How lovely is thy dwelling place,
0 LORD of hosts!
(2) My soul longs, yea, faints
for the courts of the LORD;
my heart and flesh sing for joy
to the living God.
This psalm is a pilgrim song, and it was probably composed just before the
exile, or it at least contains some material from a pre-exilic tradition.31
It may have been written by the author of Psalm 42. The psalmist expresses
his awe and joy at worshipping in the house of the Lord. When he says that
even the sparrow can find a home at the altars of the Lord (v. 3), he
implies that everyone, even the most humble and insignificant of men, is
welcome to come and worship. This psalm continues by describing the
benefits which accrue to the worshippers of Yahweh: blessing, strength,
favour, and honour (vv. 5-12). Yahweh, the living God,S2 is portrayed in
this psalm as the all-sufficient God, who satisfies man's deepest needs.
He is both the source and the giver of life. Just the thought of going to
worship Yahweh in his temple is enough to make the psalmist break out in a
'resounding testimony' of joy and exultation.53 As in Psalm 42, the living
God in Psalm 84 is portrayed as a personal God and the God who satisfies.
This survey of the Old Testament use of the title, 'the living God',
reveals an array of significations, which can now be summarized. The
living God stands in sharp contrast to dead idols, made and adorned by the
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hands of men. These will perish, but the living God is an enduring
reality. In the polytheistic world of the ancient Near East, Yahweh is
designated by Israel as the living God because he is the one who is aware
of the distresses of his people, is attentive to their cries, and is
powerful to deliver them from their foes. The living God is Yahweh, the
God of Israel, and is thus distinguished from all the surrounding pseudo-
deities. In relation to Israel, the living God is known to be present with
his people, near and not far away. The encounter of some of Israel's great
men with the living God was so intense and profound as to be narrated in
terms of personal dialogue: the living God had heard their prayers and
praises, and they in return had heard his voice. The living God is also a
God of power, as revealed in the creation, the conquest of Canaan, and in
David's victory over Goliath. Finally, the living God is described in the
Psalms as the God who satisfies man's inner longings. The powerful God had
become the personal God. In summary, then, the metaphorical language of
'the living God' suggests that God is near and accessible, that he acts and
speaks, and that he has the power to deliver and to satisfy. All of this,
and perhaps much more, would have come to mind for both Paul and at least
his Jewish-Christian readers when he wrote and spoke of the living God.
When Paul attributes life to God, this is an aberrant attribution. It
is metaphorical. It is metaphorically true. It is not an exhaustive
description of God, but it is true as far as it goes, It is the task of
the biblical interpreter to expound the possibilities of articulation which
this metaphor proposes. To say 'God is alive' is not to say everything
that can be said about God, but it is an attempt to say something, and a
pointer to much more that can be said.
262
One way to spell out the meaning of metaphors is to examine how they
are used in contemporary circumstances. Templeton has noted the
metaphorical use of death in the following situation. A man who is
intensely concentrating on a book may be described as 'dead to the
world.'-"1 He is so involved in reading that he is unaware of the world
around him and unconcerned about its affairs. Thus 'death' may be
translated as ' unawareness' or ' indifference',ss and its antithesis,
'life', may be rendered 'awareness' or 'concern'. In thinking
metaphorically about life, then, the living God may be thought of as 'the
one who is aware and concerned' , or 'the caring God.' God is not dead to
the world. He loves humanity and is concerned about their welfare. God
also cares about people's sinful condition and their broken relationship
with himself. Because he cared, he acted to make things better,
But when the time had fully come, God sent forth his
Son, born of woman, born under the law, to redeem
those who were under the law, so that we might re¬
ceive adoption as sons (Gal 4.4-5).
God was aware of man's situation and concerned about it. He did not sit
idly by on heaven's throne. Rather he sent his son to put things right.
This son is Jesus, the man from Nazareth. Jesus did his job well.
'Therefore God has highly exalted him' (Phil 2.9). In considering the
mission of Jesus, Paul learned about God. He discovered that God loves men
and cares about their well-being. In this way, it can be said that the
living God is the caring God.
Another contemporary metaphor is 'This party is alive!', A lively
party is one in which there are people present, talking and celebrating. A
lively party has action, in contrast to a dead party in which people remain
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isolated and do not interact freely with another, God is 'alive' when he
is seen to be talking with his people and interacting with them. In
addition, the living God celebrates. In fact, he leads the way in the
triumphal march (2 Cor 2.14).
It is possible at this point, to subject the phrase 'the living God'
to a metaphorical analysis, as proposed by Ricoeur. To say 'the living
God' is roughly equivalent to saying 'God is alive'. Following Ricoeur's
paradigm of metaphorical analysis, one might say:
1. God is alive,
2. God is not alive,
3. God is known by men as if he were alive.
The living God - God is alive. This is a clear and consistent theme
in the writings of the Old Testament. He is not like idols of other
nations. He is not an inanimate object, whose only power is its evocative
value. The Israelites viewed Yahweh as the 'living' God, one who was not
only alive, but also active. They detected his actions in the course of
history. There is truly an 'ontological vehemence' in their writings about
God, They do not merely assert that God exists. Rather, they talk about
what God does - his actions in history, his revelation to Israel, his
speaking with Moses.
It is certainly true that Israel included many manufactured items in
its worship and cultic ritual - the Temple itself, and inter alia the Ark,
the altars, the candlesticks. Yet Israel's God - in contrast to those of
surrounding nations - was not an idol made by men. Nor was it represented
by such idols, a practice forbidden by the ten commandments and condemned
by the prophets. Their God was a living God and could not be reduced to
physical materials. In fact, rather than an artifact created by man,
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Israel regarded Yahweh as the artificer who had fashioned them. The living
God, for Israel, did not depend on man for his existence, Rather, they
depended on God for their very origin and well-being.
The assertion that 'God is alive' may at first glance seem 'nai've and
uncritical'®6 to modern man. The 'God is dead' theology has raised
questions about the relevance of God in contemporary culture. Yet to use
the biblical phrase 'the living God', implying both 'God exists' and 'God
is alive', is the beginning of belief. Both the Old Testament writers and
Paul used it to affirm their commitment to a Divine Being. They had
observed the activity of God in history, and their writings bore witness to
it. In their texts, they used figurative language to express their
experience and knowledge of God. Such language has a 'semantic plus-
value', which gives it 'its capacity to be open towards new aspects, new
dimensions, new horizons of meaning,'®'7 But all of the latent potential of
meaning pent up in the phrase 'the living God' is a result of the phrase's
'ontological vehemence' which is grounded in the commitment of the biblical
writers to God, or his commitment (in their view) to them. This faith may
have been 'na'ive and uncritical', but it was rooted in conviction.
The language of the biblical writers, including the phrase 'the living
God', may be investigated critically by modern readers. It need not be
accepted 'as is' without being subjected to a work of interpretation. This
critical process leads to a movement from the 'it is' to the 'it is not'.-
'There is no grammatical feature that distinguishes metaphorical
attribution from literal attribution.'®® So sometimes metaphor is
mistaken, taken literally and becomes 'believed poetry'.®3 It is this
process which 'inclines it [metaphor! towards abuse, and so towards
myth.'eo It is possible to mistake 'the living God' thus: to interpret it
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literally, to think of God as one who is like us. It is the inadequacy of
such a literal interpretation which leads one to reject it and to assert
'it is not'. To attempt a literal interpretation and to find it wanting
requires that one either reject the statement as nonsense or produce a
metaphorical interpretation which will rescue the sense of the sentence.
Since there is no grammatical marker that directs one to either a literal
or a metaphorical interpretation, it is appropriate to try both until one
makes sense of the text.
As one moves from the literal to the metaphorical, the ontological
vehemence is replaced by a critical suspicion. With respect to 'the living
God' , one is inclined to say that God is not alive, as plants, animals and
humans are alive. 'The living God' is not an idol - a man-made product.
God is not to be created in the image of man.
Nor is God just a bigger and stronger (but somehow invisible) man who
goes about his business either in heaven or on earth. He is radically
different. He is above and beyond the reach and imagination of man. The
Hebrew prophets were aware of this, as hinted in the following passage:
For my thoughts are not your thoughts,
neither are your ways my ways, says the Lord.
For as the heavens are higher than the earth,
so are my ways higher than your ways
and my thoughts than your thoughts. (Is. 55.8-9)
God is not alive, if life is characterised by the various functions of
the human body which are necessary for human life - circulation,
respiration, digestion, etc. Unmasking the metaphor of 'the living God' is
rejecting this notion of God. The critical rejoinder is that God is in no
way to be conceived of in terms of a man-like form or image. God is not
'alive', if that means that the Divine is born, exists for a while and then
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dies.
Again it should be emphasized that this linguistic analysis of 'the
living God' in terms of 'God is alive1 and 'God is not alive' does not
coincide with the concerns of a 'God is dead' theology. That movement
assumed that the concept of 'God' was no longer relevant to a modern, post-
critical man, who had outgrown his need for a divine being.
The present work is distinguished from this in that it is a semantic
analysis rather than a developed theology, though it may contain the seeds
of such a theology. Such an analysis respects the ontological vehemence of
the predication, 'the living God', while it reflects critically on the
meaning of such language. On the one hand, one tends to believe in the
metaphors which one creates. One implies that ' it is so' when one
continues to use them. On the other hand, a labour of interpretation is
sometimes (if not always) required in order for the metaphor to become
meaningful to others. In accord with Ricoeur's philosophical wager,®1 the
present writer is committed to the position that an analysis of language
about God will provide a better understanding of God and a firmer base for
belief in God. The task is . . . 'to arbitrate between ontological nai'vete
and the critique of mythified metaphor. '
This is accomplished by the move from the 'it is' of an uncritical
belief and the 'it is not' of critical reflection to the 'as if' or 'it is
like' of metaphorical interpretation.
To speak of God 'as if' he were alive opens up many possibilities of
articulation. The survey of the Old Testament use of the phrase 'the
living God' clarifies the picture of God as one who speaks and one who
acts. It continually emphasizes the 'personal' character of God. It shows
that he is to be known and understood as one who relates personally to man.
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In his brief discussion of the living God, Earth spells out some of the
implications:
Who God is and what He is in His deity, He proves and
reveals not in a vacuum as a divine being-for-himself,
but precisely and authentically in the fact that He
exists, speaks, and acts as the partner of man, though
of course as the absolutely superior partner. He who
does that is the living God. And the freedom in which
He does that is His deity. It is the deity which as
such also has the character of humanity.63
Significant for the present purpose is Barth's statement that it is as
a living person that God ' . . . exists, speaks, and acts as the partner of
man'. That the living God 1 exists' is, of course, assumed by all the
writers of the Old Testament. That he exists as the partner of man is
especially implied by the two references to 'the living God' in the Psalms
<42.2; 84.2), in which the psalmist yearns to have fellowship with the
living God. The speaking of the living God to man comes through most
clearly in Deuteronomy 5. 26 and Jeremiah 23,36, and in Hosea 1. 10 in which
the people of Israel are called 'sons of the living God'. The action of
'the living God' is characterized in 1 Samuel 17.26, 36 and 2 Kings 19.4,16
(cf. Is 37.4, 17). All of these Old Testament passages depict a god who
exists, speaks and acts in relation to man. These betray a '... belief in
an active Providence, to which the Hebrews gave a more significant and
moving name, 'the living God' . 64
Now this name, ' the living God' is more personal and more biblical
than those of modern theology, such as 'the Absolute, the Infinite, the
Unconditional, or the First Cause'.66 These names denote a view of God as
something completely static and unchangeable, which ' ... is in conflict
with the biblical insistence on the living God, 'The scriptures portray
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God less as an object with identifiable properties, than as a person who is
an 'active revealer ... who has spoken to us, and does not cease to speak
to us. 'Thus God is 'living' when he is seen to be involved with human
relationships. e'e The divine one may be viewed as a 'living' God because,
in certain ways, he is like a person, in that he speaks to humanity, he
acts graciously on their behalf, and he is available for fellowship with
them. This helps to explain why 'life* is such an apt predicate to
attribute to God.
At this point, the Pauline usage of the phrase 'the living God' will
be explored. Other than 2 Corinthians 3. 3, Paul only uses the phrase three
t imes:
'And in the very place where it was said to them, "You
are not my people," they will be called "sons of the
living God"' (Rom 9.26).
For they themselves report concerning us what a welcome
we had among you, and how you turned to God from idols,
to serve a living and true God (1 Thes 1.9).
What agreement has the temple of God with idols? For
we are the temple of the living God (2 Cor 6. 16a).
The Romans passage is meant to be a citation of Hosea 1. 10, and, since
that passage has already been discussed, the Thessalonian text will now be
considered. Here the standard Old Testament contrast between idols and the
living God is apparent. Faith in the God of Israel (v. 8) and receiving
the gospel of Christ (vv. 5-6) are the steps to irtio"cps<psiv (a technical
term for conversion). The turning toward the living God necessarily
requires a turning away from idols.
The authenticity and integrity of 2 Corinthians 6. 14 - 7. 1 are of
course disputed matters. 70 Though there are problems with this passage, it
269
is not unreasonable to think that Paul may indeed have written it. However
that may be, the opposition between ' idols' and ' the living God' , so
familiar in the Old Testament, must be noticed. 'And it is impossible to
mistake Paul's horror of idolatry; see 1 Cor v. 10, 11; vi. 9; viii passim;
x, 7, 14, 19; xii, 2; Gal v. 20; Col iii. 5; 1 Thess i. 9. Fornication and
idolatry are both impossible for a Christian because of his exclusive
relationship with Christ.'71
The text of 2 Corinthians 6. 14 - 7. 1 goes on to show that the living
God is a god who dwells with and walks with his people in such an intimate
fashion as may be described in family language (father/children, v. 18) as
well as cultic language (vadc;, v. 16). Thus, both the passages in 1
Thessalonians 1 and in 2 Corinthians 6 emphasize the living God in contrast
to idols and in relationship with his people. The notion of implied
existence and personal relationship, so common in the Old Testament,
surface again in Paul's use of this phrase. Noticeably absent though, is
any long tirade against idols to prove their futility, or elaboration on
the works of God as proof of his reality. One might assume that the new
converts were familiar with such arguments and only a mention was needed to
remind them,
For the notions of the speaking and acting of the living God, though,
one must turn to 2 Corinthians 3. 1-3. 'The living God' for Paul is an
acting God, Part of God's labour may be seen in the establishing of the
Corinthian church. Through the proclamation of the gospel, <1 Cor 2.4)
they had turned to the Lord (em expels iv, 2 Cor 3. 16). These believers
were gathered together into a church, and the existence of the congregation
was visible proof of the work both of Paul <v. 2) and of God (v. 3).
'The living God' is also a writing God. His communications are
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carried out, in this instance, by the Spirit, who writes upon tablets which
are fleshy hearts. Just as the living God had communicated both orally and
in writing to Moses (Dt 5.26), so also the living God communicates to the
Corinthians orally by the preaching of Paul and in writing by the Spirit.
For Paul, whenever believers gather, the living God is writing a letter,
communicating by means of his people with 'all men'.
In contrast to the author of Deuteronomy, Paul speaks of the communi¬
cation of the living God without reference to 'the fire, the cloud, and the
thick darkness' (Dt 5.22), just as his mention of the living God in opposi¬
tion to idols requires no such polemic, as was delivered by the Hebrew
prophets. This is true of his epistles at least. There is the
possibility, though, that this further elaboration of 'the living God' may
have been a part of Paul's oral instructions to the churches.
With reference to the use of the phrase 'the living God', it is clear
that Paul continues to use it as the Old Testament writers had done, to
refer to a real God whose existence is assumed, though unproved. The
living God is a revealing God, making himself known to his people through
actions and discourse (both oral and written). In addition, the living God
is a personal God with whom believers may by faith enter into a personal
relationship, with father/child language being the predominant or at least
a predominant means to describe it.
The phrase, 'the living God' , is a metaphor. It was used by, though
it did not originate, with Paul, who stood in a religious tradition that
used metaphors to _communicate its experience and knowledge of God. The
sense of this metaphor is determined by the various contexts in which it is
used. It does not mean a God who is a living organism, like those found on
planet earth. These connotations never arise in the contexts. Rather, the
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sense of the phrase, 'the living God', is that God has revealed himself to
man in terms that he can know and understand, God's self-revelation occurs
in personal terms - a person who exists, speaks and acts. What God is in
his essence is perhaps unknowable, but the record of the self-revelation of
God, in Jesus of Nazareth and in history, as written in Scripture, uses the
metaphor of ' living persons' to talk about the reality and activity of God.
The question of reference, or of metaphorical truth, is certainly
appropriately raised at this point. Ricoeur opens the question of
reference by means of the issue of sense.72 He states that the sense of
the literal interpretation of metaphors is absurd, and thereby the literal
referent is abolished. But because the statement (or phrase) opens itself
toward a metaphorical sense, this interpretation proposes a correlative
metaphorical reference also. J. M. Soskice criticizes this proposal of a
dual reference, 73 She insists that metaphor has only one sense. The
alternative is nonsense. Likewise, there is only one referent, that one
thing which the speaker is talking about, for it is speakers, not words or
expressions, which refer. 7/1 Speakers refer in a given context, she claims,
and the reference, even of a metaphorical expression, becomes clear when
the complete context of the utterance is considered. Furthermore, 'a
reference can be successful even if the description in the referring
expression does not actually fit the referent; for example, in context, the
utterance "The man drinking the gin and tonic" can successfully refer even
though the man referred to may in fact be drinking soda water.'7®
There is some truth on both sides of this discussion. Soskice is
correct to argue that, in a given situation of discourse, it is the speaker
who refers, and that, on most occasions, the speaker has only one referent
in mind, She also rightly maintains that an inaccurate description can
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still refer successfully. But all of the above propositions are valid only
in a situation of oral discourse. For it is only in oral discourse that
there is a personal speaker who refers. In written discourse there is no
speaker - only a text. Also the one referent intended by the speaker
becomes known to the hearer not only by the words employed but also by the
context, including the location where the conversation occurs. The
request, 'Hand me that roll', will both mean and refer differently,
depending on whether the speaker is in a bakery, a bathroom, a
photographer's studio, or a paper factory. In an oral discourse, the very
location may determine the intent, but in written discourse the referent
will remain ambiguous unless the text contains sufficient information about
the physical and other surroundings of the dialogue. Furthermore, in a
live encounter of discourse, an inaccurate description may refer
successfully for a number of reasons: a gesture, a demonstrative or
personal pronoun, or tone of voice may combine with the speaker's words to
establish the referent. But in a text, there are only the words. So the
proposal of Soskice is valid, though it is more applicable in oral than in
written discourse.
The theory of split sense and split reference advanced by Ricoeur is
better suited to dealing with written texts. Surely it is speakers who
refer in oral discourse, but Ricoeur rightly notes that the speaker/writer
is (often - and in Paul's case, always) absent from the reading of his
text. There is no longer a speaker to refer. There is only the inscribed
remnant of his discourse. And how well it refers depends on how well it
was written, how well it is interpreted and on whether the interpreter was
the original interpreter to whom the writer meant to write (e.g. one of
Paul's Corinthians) or some other. In this situation, either the words and
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expressions refer, or there is no reference at all. The problem of
reference becomes greater when (1) there is inaccurate description (which
may have been successful orally but can hardly be so in writing), (2) there
is an ill-described environment in the text (when that environment is
crucial to understanding), and (3) when the sense of the text is subject to
various interpretations. All of these factors may de-stabilize the
reader's assurance of identifying the intended referent. In such a
situation, the reader is justified in considering the literal sense of an
utterance and what its reference might be. If that fails, he goes on to
see if a metaphorical sense and reference of the statement will accord
withihe flow of the text. This process of allowing for a dual sense and
reference of metaphorical expressions is appropriate, because when the
speaker/writer is no longer available (as is the case with biblical texts),
then the reader must answer these questions on his own. And sometimes the
answers are not self-evident. This is when interpretation is necessary.
Underlying Soskice*s critique of Ricoeur is her awareness that the
process of double sense and double reference can be and has been abused.
She points to S. McFague as an example. 7e But the possibility of its
misuse is not sufficient grounds for the abandoning of a theory. Instead,
it is a call for its conscientious application.
The category of reference pertains to Paul's use of the phrase 'the
living God' in at least two ways. First, there is the question of
identifying the referent. Second, there is the question of determining the
ontological status of the referent.
With respect to the first issue, there is no question that 'the living
God' refers to the god who is the father of Jesus. In the New Testament,
it is safe to assume that this is always the referent of o 0s6q, unless
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there is a clear indication to the contrary (e.g. Ac 19.37; 1 Cor 8.5; 2
Cor 4.4). When Paul says, 'the living God', there is no need to seek a
split reference, rejecting the literal and retaining the metaphorical.
There is only one true God for Paul (1 Thess 1.9), and this is 'the living
God'. Furthermore, in the passages in which Paul mentions 'the living
God', he is not trying to identify a god, though he may be distinguishing
this God from idols or other 'gods'. Rather, he is saying something about
this God. He is affirming, along with the Old Testament writers, that
Yahweh, the God of Israel, is the living God. He is re-stating his faith
that this God is always accessible to those who call on him and that this
God can be known and encountered in terms of a personal relationship. In
the case of 'the living God', the referent is easily identifiable. It is
the sense which requires explanation.
The second issue concerns the ontological status of the one whom Paul
calls 'the living God'. There is little question that, for Paul and the
early church, 'the living God' referred to an extra-textual, extra-
linguistic, extra-terrestrial deity. In modern times, some seek to deny
this position and re-define God. One such attempt is that of Cupitt, in
The Long-legged Fly; A Theology of Language and Desire. He employs a
thorough-going reductionism, and he bases his approach on a radical
linguistic structuralism. He states early in his book that "... our
language is indeed our world. . .\7~7 which means that he acknowledges no
reality beyond that which an individual has experienced and expressed
linguistically. Indeed, what is brought to language is not reality but
only one's experience of reality. He wishes to hamper the centrifugal
force of language. This tendency is confirmed later when he writes:
'
... the meaning of signs is always ' sideways' and
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differential, not referential. Every sentence in one
way and another takes up, comments on, and counters or
develops a previous sentence. All thought is trans¬
acted in signs and is hermeneutical or interpretative.
The movement is not from one level to another, from
sign to an independent signified, but always horizon¬
tally from sign to sign.'73
When such a radical structuralism is applied to theology, it eliminates the
possibility of any reference to an extra-linguistic reality. 'The living
God' no longer refers to a divine being apart from the world and humanity.
'The living God' thus has no existence apart from the words which one
utters about such an entity. Such an enterprise is man 'creating' god,
thus reversing the whole tradition of Christian theology, which acknowledges
a Creator God, distinct from and superior to humanity and his creation.
The present writer strenuously rejects all such attempts to reduce 'the
living God' to a man-made sign, whose only value is to distinguish itself
from other signs such as Peter, Paul, and Mary. It would be very difficult
(if not impossible) to accept as 'Christian' any theology which denies the
existence of, or the possibility of man's knowledge of, a God who exists as
an extra-linguistic reality.
Though certain of Ricoeur's tenets may be construed so as to link him
with such a structuralist view of language, he would nevertheless reject
such a conclusion. eo His insistence on a tripartite system of
signification, (sign, signifier, signified), should safeguard his theory
from being pressed into the service of such linguistic approaches.01
Furthermore, he mentions 'extra-linguistic reality' as the whole basis for
language. 3:2 'We presuppose that something must be in order that something
may be identified. '03 His view is that because there is a world, there is
language to talk about that world.Thus language, for Ricoeur, is funda-
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mentally referential, He would not accept the view of Cupitt that language
creates the world in which we live.
So, with reference to the truth of the metaphor, 'the living God', it
is justifiable to affirm with the biblical writers that there is a God,
that God is other than and superior to humankind, and that the true God is
the living God. There is a 'living God', and it is the God of Israel, the
father of our Lord Jesus Christ, The Christian interpreter of Scripture
can identify the referent of 'the living God' as Yahweh, though the meaning
of 'living' when predicated of God requires some clarification.
'Life' is a metaphorical attribute of God, Paul also uses 'life' and
'death' metaphorically to speak of man and to describe man's relationships
to sin, to law and to God. A thorough discussion of life and death in the
whole corpus of Paul's writings would be a major undertaking,ss and would
detract from the present purpose, which is to examine this antithetical
pair as it occurs in 2 Corinthians 3 and to spell out their metaphoricity.
Occasional reference will be made to other Pauline and New Testament
passages, but the primary focus is on 2 Corinthians 3, especially verse 6,
in which Paul writes: x6 yap ypappa artoxTevvei, to 5£ ltveOpa ^wortoietL
This is surely a metaphorical statement. But Paul can also use life and
death in a more literal sense.
For we do not want you to be ignorant, brethren, of the
affliction we experienced in Asia; for we were so utterly,
unbearably crushed that we despaired of life itself. Why,
we felt that we had received the sentence of death; but
that was to make us rely not on ourselves but on God who
raises the dead; he delivered us from so deadly a peril,
and he will deliver us; on him we have set our hope that
he will deliver us again (2 Cor 1.8-10).
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This probably refers to a persecution in Ephesus, and it seems that Paul
was imprisoned there and sentenced to death (am6xpvpa). e,,s He was certain
that his hour of physical death had come, and he despaired even of life
itself. 137 But somehow he escaped the death sentence and was set free to
continue living.,3e He was rescued 'by God', the God who raises the dead.
Though Paul is perhaps also alluding to the death of Jesus as a redemptive
event, the primary sense of death here is that Paul was condemned to die a
criminal's death. But somehow (by God) he survived instead. His physical
life (thumping heart, pumping lungs) continued. This natural life, for
Paul, is always seen by Paul as given by God and ending in death,133 except,
of course, for the case of those who are still alive, when Jesus returns.
To live (<f(v), in the Pauline epistles, is more than simply to be
alive. It is intentional and directional - one leads life in a certain way
or in a specific sphere or by a certain power. Thus, one can live 'in sin'
(Rom 6.2) or 'in faith' (Gal 2.20), for self or for God. 30 Likewise,
'death' as a natural phenomenon is the cessation of life's bodily func¬
tions. It is viewed as punishment for sin. Since all have sinned, all
must die this physical death (Rom 6.23).31
These rather literal senses of life and death are more or less clearly
understood. They serve as a starting point for a consideration of their
metaphorical usage. Such a metaphorical event occurs in Galatians 2. 19-20.
eycb y&p 5i& vdpou v6pco angBavov, Yva 0e£S C^ctcd. XpiaxoS
auvecrxatipmpax • (,& 66 oox6xx 56 ev spot XpiaTdq-
(6 66 vDv aapxx, ev mxcrxei1 C& xfj xou uvoO xoO
9eo0 xoU crYajtfjcravxdq pe xax mapa66vxoq eauxov um6p epofl.
When Paul says that he has been crucified with Christ, this is not
historical fact.32 If it were factual he would not have been able to write
the epistle to the Galatians in which this statement appears, for one
278
cannot write when one's hands are nailed to a cross. Rather, it is a
fiction, a fiction which he uses to 1 redescribe reality'. Metaphors
redescribe reality, sometimes by means of fiction. 'I have been crucified
with Christ' is a metaphor.33 Fiction is neither necessarily true nor
false. Fiction is that which does not correspond to an actual, empirical
state of affairs. It may be true if it describes or re-describes reality
on another level,534- That is exactly what this metaphor does. It is a
statement which is literally false, but metaphorically true.
Paul had not literally died nor had he literally been crucified as of
the time of the writing of the epistle to the Galatians. Yet it was 'true'
that Paul had died by means of crucifixion, as he asserts 'with great zeal
and vehemence of spirit. ' 3S The ontological vehemence of this metaphor
requires that it be taken seriously, though not literally. In what way
could Paul have said that he died? He is speaking metaphorically, of
course,3® 'In the usage of Paul, "to die to" a thing is to cease to have
any relation to it, so that it has no further claim upon or control over
one.'537 A dead man need not obey the law. A dead man need not do anything.
Paul is a dead man. He no longer eats and breathes for the law. He is no
longer compelled to obey the Old Testament injunctions, nor does he feel
compelled to compel others to observe the Mosaic regulations, including
those concerning circumcision, diet, and table fellowship.'3®
How did Paul die to the law? There are several interpretations of 5ia
vopou. Burton suggests that 'dying through the law' means that the law
'
... taught him his own inability to meet its spiritual requirements and
its own inability to make him righteous, and thus led him finally to
abandon it and to seek salvation in Christ.'33 Thus dying to the law is
'abandoning the law'.'100 Others interpret 5ia vopou in terms of 5i6f xoO
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crajj.a'ccx; xou XpiaxoB (Rora 7. 4), 101 The believer dies by means of an
'identification' with Christ'102 or 'faith union'103 with Christ, who bore
the sin of his people and endured the penalty for it.
The comment of Luther is enlightening:
'... I am dead to the law; that is to say, I have nothing
to do with the law. Paul could have uttered nothing more
effectual against the righteousness of the law, than to
say: I am dead to the law, that is, I care nothing at all
for the law: therefore I am not justified by it.'104
Luther avoids any mystical interpretation, and, instead, emphasizes the
ignoring of the law and apathy toward it. Both Lightfoot and Burton come
very close to this with their talk of 'abandonment'. All of these notions
are implied in the modern metaphor, 'dead to the world'. As stated
earlier, this phrase suggests inattentiveness or indifference. The reader
'dies to the world' by choosing to ignore it and to concentrate on
something else. This is near the meaning of Paul's dying to the law. He
chose to ignore it as a means of salvation and to commit himself by faith
to Christ instead. 105 He abandoned the law and became apathetic in his
observance of it. Paul died to the law by consciously choosing to abandon,
ignore and disregard it. Instead he transferred his loyalty to Christ. He
became attached to and attentive to Christ, whom he had previously ignored
and even persecuted (1 Cor 15.9).
He died to the law, so that he might live to God. loe Paul says that
he was dead. Now he says that he lives. The dead man is alive again.
There is life after death. But Paul was alive all along the way. The
death was a 'fiction', which allowed him to re-describe life on a
metaphorical level. Life is now no longer a biological event, but rather a
religious phenomenon. 'Religious' refers to one's relationship to or
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interaction with God. If Paul is now dead to law and alive to God, then
previously he had been alive to law and dead to God. To be dead to one's
god is the worst of all possible religious situations. It is difficult to
understand how diligence in observing a law of divine origin can become
fatal. The common explanation is that conscientious law observance often
(if not always) is a 'vice' which separates one from God.10'7 It is
plausible to conclude from such an explanation that striving for obedience
is actually worse than disobedience itself. But the problem of the law in
the Pauline epistles is too large to be discussed here,10® and, if pursued,
would distract from the present purpose, which is to explore Paul's use of
life and death as metaphors.
Paul became aware that he was dead to God through the revelation of
Jesus Christ (Gal 1, 12, 16). The solution, for Paul anyway, was to die to
the law. The result was that he began to live with reference to God. To
be 'alive toward God' means to be aware of God, to pay attention to him.
At some point, Paul realized that he had been hostile toward God because he
had been rejecting Christ and persecuting the church (1 Cor 15.9). So,
instead, he joined the church, accepted Jesus as the Christ and became
friends with God. This is another way of saying he became alive to God by
entering a personal relationship with God on the basis of trust.
If 'death' is an abandoning, then 'life' is an embracing. Qsffi (,f\uQ
means God received Paul with open arms, or they hugged each other. At least
Paul says that he shook hands with God's people (Gal 2.9) and kissed them
(2 Cor 13. 12).
Life and death are good words for Paul's theology, because they are
grounded in human existence. Men live. Men die. Death is final - it is
the end of life. But not in Paul's narrative world where, life and death
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take on metaphorical value. Paul died to the law and then began to live
toward God. His life took on a new direction. He changed loyalties from
law to God, 'Death' is a fiction for re-describing Paul's new decision to
abandon the law, just as 'life' is a fiction for re-describing his new,
intimate relationship with and commitment to God.
It is possible to say more about the use of life and death in
religious language. Jesus is reported to have told a story (Lk 15.11-32)
about a wealthy father who had two sons. 103 One day the younger son asked
for his share of the inheritance. When he received it, he left home and
spent it all. Finding himself impoverished, he returned to his father, who
welcomed him back and said:
'This my son was dead, and is alive again;
he was lost, and is found' (Lk 15.24-).
Even without any knowledge of Jewish manners and customs in first century
Palestine, most readers can understand the plot reasonably well. 110 But
this declaration by the father about his dead and alive son, while not
necessarily dumbfounding, is still somewhat odd. Taken on the literal
level, it is patently false. The boy was never dead - he had pulse and
breath throughout the story. And he was never lost - he always knew where
he was (geographically anyway, though he may have been separated from
himself psychologically and/or disoriented morally). He also knew how to
get back home.
But that which is false on the literal level invites a consideration
of its truth value on the metaphorical level. The son was dead metaphor¬
ically. 11 1 From the father's point of view, the son was dead in that he
ran away from home. He had abandoned his family. The son was inaccessible
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for relationship and unavailable for communication. Just as a deceased
person is departed from his friends and family and is no longer available
for fellowship and conversation, so also was this son to his father. The
father's comment is a statement about the condition of the son, but it is
also a description of the state of affairs involving the father and his
son. The word ' death', with its many significations, sums up in a word
this relationship, or rather the purported non-existence of this
relationship. Though metaphors are never fully translatable,112 the dead
son, in this parable, means something like the son who is alienated,
absent, silent. The dead son is the son who abandoned his place in the
family and then for a while became indifferent to that family. Death may
be partially translated as alienation, absence, silence, abandonment,
indif ference.
When the father says the lad is alive again, he is not being entirely
truthful, for on the literal level the son had always been alive. A more
accurate statement about the condition of the son would have been, 'My son
is still alive. ' Yet in the narrative world of the parable, where language
often has metaphorical value, the story teller can suspend the ordinary
sense of language and lead the listener to believe the unbelievable.
Having declared the departed son 'dead', the father can now refer to the
returning son as 'alive again'. In the narrative world of parables,
'death' is not always terminal. Live persons can be called 'dead', and the
dead can come to life again. The metaphors of life and death redescribe
human relationships by denying the ordinary vision of the world and then
redefining it.113
'Life' describes the condition of the son, but it also denotes the
existence of new possibilities for the relationship between father and
283
son. 114 The returning son is no longer unavailable for interaction, and he
gets hugged and kissed by his father. 'Life' involves embracing. Instead
of absent and silent, the son is now home and making merry with his friends
(v. 24). In place of alienation there is now reconciliation. Communi¬
cation between living persons can now take place. Life, then, in a reli¬
gious context, refers to situations in which people are accessible to one
another for personal relationships. Life suggests presence, fellowship,
and communication.
'The parables present their own autonomous world.'11® To the listener
who has been drawn into the world of this parable, the special use of
'life' and 'death' has theological implications. The parable destabilizes
the common notions of 'death' and 'life', and then it redefines them in
terms of one's orientation to God, In a parable, this misuse of language
is permissible, proper, even preferred. Metaphor is efficacious. It
communicates. It says something significant in a powerful way. It
unleashes a wealth of significations at the mention of a single word.
Terms like life and death illustrate that metaphor is often a parable in
nuce. This is, perhaps, one reason why metaphorical language is so
effective in a religious context. It enables the speaker to articulate his
experience by providing him with a vocabulary for the depth and the power
of his convictions.
The use of life and death in both Galatians 2 and Luke 15 provide a
background for viewing these terms in 2 Corinthians 3. The antithesis of
life and death is a recurring emphasis in the epistle,11® and it is
especially prominent in 2, 14-3, 11,117 Paul, in 2. 15-16a, combines an
•olfactory metaphor'113 with life and death to talk about his proclamation
and its results:
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For we are the aroma of Christ to God among those who
are being saved and among those who are perishing, to
one a fragrance from death to death, to the other a
fragrance from life to life.
The notions of aroma (eumSfcc) and fragrance (oojjiij) may have arisen in
connection with the incense and other spices carried along during the
triumph of a Roman general, the smell of which meant joy and celebration
for the victors and death for the vanquished. 119 The odour may allude to
cultic practice or to passages in the Old Testament wisdom literature.120
Whatever the context (s) Paul may have had in mind, he insists that his
preaching, like the aromas, has radical effects. At this point, his
preaching is like that of some Old Testament men:
'See, I have set before you this day life and good, death
and evil' (Dt 30. 15).
'Behold, I set before you the way of life and the way of
death' (Jer21.8).
Thus preaching brings life to some and death to others. 121 Those who
accept Jesus as the Christ and trust in him for salvation receive life from
God. To those who oppose and reject, death is the result. 'In Christ' is
the remedy for sin; if it is taken, it is a life-giving medicine; if it is
refused, the apostle's ministry acts like deadly poison. 12:2
In 3. 1-3, letters of recommendation are discussed, and Paul climaxes
this discussion with a clear contrast between the powerful and energizing
writing of the Spirit of the living God and the rather lifeless and inert
record left by humans writing with ink. A secondary contrast points up the
distinction between living human hearts as an appropriate place for the
Spirit to write and the deadness of the physical materials upon which men
write. Thus this paragraph continues the contrast of life and death begun
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in the previous unit.
The antithesis of life and death reaches its climax in 3.6: to yap
yp&ppa oaroxxdvvsi, to 5£ nvsupa C^orcoxsT. Tpappa does not stand for a
'literal' interpretation of Scripture as over against nvsupa, which would
represent a 'spiritual' interpretation.123 Nor is it 'a technical term for
the "Law" (ypacptj, Scripture),' as Bernard suggests. 12A Neither is ypappa
to be reckoned 'das innere Prinzip des alten Bundes. ' 1253 fpdppa for Paul
is, however, related to, though not identical with, vopoq and 5ia0f}xr). The
letter which was carved in stone (vv. 6-7) is 'a clear reference to the
Decalogue, '123 which formed the basis for the covenant law. 127 It is the
letter, then, as part of ' . . , the old dispensation, which threatens
death. ' 123
The letter, though, '... is not fully synonymous with the law.'123
There are certain distinctions. Paul can state o p£v v6po<; Syioq (Rom
7.12), but he never says (or even implies) this of ■ypdp.pa. In fact,
Kasemann says, in his discussion of Romans 2.27, 29, that Paul '... always
uses "letter" in this depreciatory, negative way, and always as something
which is obsolete for the Christian because it belongs to the old aeon.'130
rpdppoc should be understood not as identical with the law but rather
as an aspect and use of the law. As an aspect of the law, it refers to
"... the Mosaic Torah in its written documentation and is identical with
scripture as a whole.'131 It sets down in writing the oracles of God, and
it codifies all of the theocratic legislation. rpdppa is a written code
with a divine pedigree.
rpdjj.|jia is also a particular use of the law. The law, being inert, is
a document which is subject to a variety of uses. It can reveal "... the
sacred will of God, which calls men to obedience and to that degree is,
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according to Romans 3.21, a witness to the gospel of God's righteous¬
ness. 13:2 It also exposes the utter sinfulness of sin, and thus func¬
tions as a warning to humanity not to dabble in it. Finally, the law
points forward to the coming of Christ and of the new covenant. For Paul,
the possibility of this Christological orientation '... consistently
determined his interpretation of Scripture. ' 133 This is how Paul actually
uses the law. But sometimes how he uses the law does not harmonize with
what he says about the law.
It is in the negative uses of the law, however, that the significance
of Ypocppa is to be found. It too often leads one to attempt to achieve a
righteousness of one's own and to justify one's self by works of the law.
Even worse, sin can seize the law and through it deceive and put to death
those who know the law (Rom 7. 11). The law which was meant for life
resulted in death instead (Rom 7. 10), because it was powerless to give life
(Gal 3.21). The law is 'letter' when it is misused in this way, "... by
driving men into transgression and hybris, by causing sin and death.'13'1
The law is * letter' when it is abused by becoming an end in itself and thus
failing to achieve its goal, that of pointing humanity to salvation in
Christ. 13S When Paul uses YP&PP9 he is viewing the law as a system of
works righteousness, as a perversion of the divine purpose, and as an inert
object which is taken over by sin and energized for evil intentions.13e
It should be noted that the view of YP^PP9 9nd vopoq which Paul is
attacking is not necessarily the view held by all or even some of his
Jewish contemporaries. It is either Paul's understanding of their view or
his own view of the law situation. In any case, a written law (the Jews'
or anyone else's) need not necessarily lead to legalism and a perversion of
that law, as some writers might lead one to believe. The New Testament
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records portray many godly men and women who show no trace of this
infectious legalism (e.g., John the baptizer, Mary and Joseph, Elizabeth
and Zechariah, Anna and Simeon).
Paul's special use of Ypdcppa is not itself metaphor, but is more
properly called metonymy, the figure where a part names a whole, as in 'all
hands on deck'. But when Paul writes, xd y®P Ypappa anoxxdvvei, he is
speaking metaphorically. The letter, as a mark engraved on a stone tablet,
is not capable of inflicting death, though a good blow to the head with the
tablet itself might come very near it.
'The written code kills' does not give the same sense as 'I died to
the law, ' even though both are concerned with death. The latter expresses
the voluntary decision of a person to abandon the law and to become
indifferent to it. 'Death', in this instance is a beneficial event, for it
frees one to become alive toward God. The former statement, though,
conjures up a situation in which ypappa is a powerful adversary which
overcomes a helpless person. Tpdcppoc is the donor, and man is the unwilling
recipient. This kind of death, in contrast to that of Gal 2. 19-20 is not a
good happening.
A rather extreme explanation of xd ydcp ypappa cbtoxxdvvEi is offered by
Kasemann:
Just as the law is perverted when it is turned into the
demand for works, so it perverts the man who falls in
with this demand, and delivers him up to the power of
death by setting him at a distance from the creator who
gives and receives. 137
K&semann, understanding letter as law perverted, assumes that law always
and necessarily results in legalism. His approach fails to explain how it
is that someone who, in good faith, 'falls in with this demand,' is so
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weakened that he unwillingly comes under the sway of death. He also fails
to show that there is a reasonable connection between someone's attempt to
obey the law of the creator and the consequential distancing of that person
from the creator.
A more moderate explanation is that of Furnish, who contends that xo
yap ■ypajj.poc catoxx^vvei means that the law is an unwilling accomplice of sin
and death. Sin is the real culprit. It exerts a fatal attraction on the
law, and then it uses the law to effect the death of 'the one who presumes
to find life through the law, 1133 The weakness of this explanation is that
Furnish uses law, letter, and commandment interchangeably, even though he
maintains that there is a distinction between them. Also, he fails to
harmonize his view of the unwilling accomplice with his statement that the
letter is an enslaving power. 13,3
The beginning of a more satisfactory solution is the comment advanced
by Collange:
La loi tue - selon 1'enseignement paulinien - parce
qu'elle revele le peche et qu' elle ne permet pas d'ac-
complir les exigences divines,1AO
This comment is started in the right direction, but a few corrections and
additions can make it even more attractive. First, it is important to
clarify that Paul says it is the 'letter' (not the 'law') which kills. The
law indeed defines and reveals sin. But the law is weak. It has no power
to enable its adherents to keep the commandments. The law is like a map.
It can direct you to your destination, showing you the route to be taken.
The law is not like a car. It cannot actually take you to your destina¬
tion. The law in this weak and ineffectual state is what Paul calls
ypappa. Fp&ppa kills rather indirectly, in that it creates a hazard (sin
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which results in death), it warns of the danger, but it cannot rescue one
from the predicament. The observation of Lightfoot is worth repeating at
this point, 'The law then exercises a double power over those subject to
it; it makes them sinners, and it punishes them for being so, ,,d1 But Paul
hesitates to say 'law' when he is speaking of this punishing (death-
dealing) function, This he terms 'letter,' It is the letter which kills.
The letter kills in two ways. First, natural death is understood as a
consequence of man's sin and fallenness. All have sinned, and all will
receive death as the wages of their sin. The letter pronounces this
verdict on all transgressors. Second, the letter kills because it makes
humanity dead toward God, By revealing sin and the sinfulness of humanity,
it establishes a gulf between sinful man and holy God. The letter does not
build a bridge to span the gulf, but rather it maintains the separation.
When death is understood as separation and alienation, then it becomes
clear why Paul says the letter kills. It does not make one alive toward
God. It does not bring one near God. It just tells one how far from God
he really is. The letter kills because it alienates man from the living
God, who is the source of life,
'The written code kills, but the Spirit gives life.' The 5£ here has
adversative, rather than continuative, force, and, even though it is a weak
adversative particle, the contrast is clear enough. Flvsupa should not be
understood as ',.. gOttliche Substanz, sondern als Gottes Gabe, die
eigentlich jeder Christ besitzt. '1The gift, though, in the Pauline
epistles, is not regarded as an object, but rather as a person. 'Primitive
Christianity understood by "spirit" the divine energy of miracle and
ecstasy,'1"-3 It is true that power was a distinguishing feature of the
early believers' experience of the Spirit, but Paul also designates other
290
less dramatic functions of the Spirit, such as the bestowal of freedom (2
Cor 3. 17) and the ministry of intercessory prayer (Rom 8. 26). A provi¬
sional understanding of Spirit would be a powerful person whom God sends to
be with those who trust him.
The Spirit of God is a metaphorical expression. IlvsDpa can also mean
'breath' or 'wind'. rivsOpot 8so0 can signify 'breath of God', which is
another way of referring to the living God. God is breathing. God is
alive. This unusual notion inspired a nineteenth-century hymn writer:
Breathe on me, Breath of God;
Fill me with life anew,
That I may love what thou dost love,
And do what thou wouldst do.
The breath of the living God is a powerful life-giving force. It has a
vivifying effect upon whomever it falls,. When the breath of God is in a
believer, it is indicative of the nearness of God and of the vitality of
the recipient.
The wind is a meteorological phenomenon with a wide range of
capacities. A light breeze on a hot summer day in Fort Worth or in
Jerusalem can be refreshing. A slightly stronger wind can turn the blades
of a windmill and therby be converted into mechanical power, for grinding
grain or pumping water out of a well. A circular wind like Hurricane Hugo
can be deadly and destructive. Such a wind has power. The wind cannot be
seen. Neither its origin nor its destination is known. But its effects
can be observed. Wind, when predicated of God, is metaphorical. For the
early Hebrews, it was a concrete way of talking about the power of God.
They felt the force of a wind blowing across the Negeb, making it impos¬
sible to see their flocks of sheep. They saw sudden windstorms swoop down
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on the lake of Galilee and wreak havoc on the boats. Wind is power. The
wind of God is the power of God. God's 7tveCjj.cc, in addition to suggesting
his nearness and his vitality, also connotes his power.
The verb C<£ottoietc can mean 'to make alive, to give life to, to bring
back to life that which was dead, ' When Paul says the Spirit gives life,
he implies that God is breathing on those who have been killed by the
letter and is bringing them back to life. Such a feat requires power. The
excellency of this power comes from God, not man (2 Cor 4.7; cf. 1.9). The
same Spirit <2 Cor 4,13) which raised Jesus from the dead also raises
Jesus' people from the dead. Of course, these believers were never physi¬
cally dead nor physically revived. Death and life are metaphorical fic¬
tions for describing the work of God with humankind. When a person trusts
in Jesus for justification, then God breathes on the person of faith. God
comes close to the believer, reversing the alienation and separation
brought about by the letter.
God does not abandon those who trust in him. He will never leave nor
forsake them. To help pass the time during this 'eternal' relationship,
God communicates with his people. 'It is clear that Paul thinks that men
can put their ears beside God's mouth and that they can read God's corre¬
spondence; it is clear that God may be modelled as speaker or writer. ,1AS
What is exhalation from God's point of view is inspiration from man's point
of view. The Spirit makes alive. The Spirit encourages believers by
breathing words of hope (2 Cor 3. 12) into their ears. The Spirit raises
the quality of their life by bringing them freedom (v. 17), The Spirit is
constantly changing believers for the better, transforming them from glory
to glory <v. 18). The Spirit at work in a Christian is God acting
creatively (again). The letter kills, but the Spirit makes alive.
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Whatever sin does, God undoes and redoes. The Spirit makes Christians come
alive by filling them with the breath of God, and by empowering them to
live a life of obedience to God and of service to humanity.
In conclusion, then, the Old Testament consistently portrays Yahweh as
the living God, in utter contrast to other gods and man-made idols.
Rather, he is a God who speaks to his people and acts powerfully on their
behalf. The living God is the giver of life, as the Elijah narratives so
clearly depict, and a personal God, as seen in the Psalms. When Paul
speaks of the living God, he also has these Old Testament themes in mind.
He opposes the living God to idols (2 Cor 6.16; 1 Thes 1.9) and portrays
him as one who communicates with his people (2 Cor 3. 1-3). God is not dead
to the world. 'Life', understood metaphorically, is an apt term to
predicate of God, since it suggests existence, action, communication, and
power.
'Life' and 'death' may be attributed metaphorically to man, to express
his relationship to God. When anyone is paying attention to sin, law, or
other deities, he is alive to sin and dead to the living God. Paul shows
that the solution is to die to these entities (or non-entities), that is,
to abandon or ignore them. Then one can become dead to them and alive to
God. The antithesis of life and death is powerfully expressed in 2
Corinthians 3,6: 'For the written code kills, but the Spirit gives life.'
The written code (ypappcx) is not identical with the law, but rather it
signifies the law in its weakness and lifelessness and in its collusion
with sin and death. The letter kills when it becomes an instrument of sin,
and thereby alienates man from God. But the Spirit breathes new life into
everyone who believes in Jesus. He restores man to a close relationship
wih God. The Spirit shows himself through his powerful action and his
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personal communication with God's people.
Life and death are among Paul's most frequent metaphors for




This investigation began with the suspicion that biblical texts are
supercharged with a surplus of meaning. In order to subject the intuitive
notion to critical enquiry, a particular text <2 Corinthians 3) was
selected for examination. The result of this study is to confirm the
original hypothesis, that 2 Corinthians 3 in particular and biblical
passages in general are open to new interpretations. The excess of
signification which they 'contain' can more fully be spelled out by giving
careful attention to certain hermeneutical factors,
2 Corinthians 3 was chosen as a 'test' passage for several reasons.
It abounds in figurative language. People who are 'letters', missionaries
who are 'waiters', and men with 'shining faces' - all of these along with
the rest of the chapter seemed to be requesting, indeed requiring, further
explanation. Has all that can be said about the religious language in this
passage already been said? The present writer, after his first pre-
critical reading of the text, replied, 'No'. There were still questions on
the table which had not been satisfactorily answered. There were still
historical critical issues upon which a consensus of opinion had not yet
been reached. There were also new questions waiting to be asked. How
could the language of 2 Corinthians 3 be translated or transformed so that
it would be meaningful for today's readers? What was the real force of
this passage? How could it more forcefully be expressed? These were some
of the initial concerns that prompted the present investigation of 2
Corinthians 3.
But what was to be the way into this text? What approach to
interpretation could be useful in dealing with these concerns? The general
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theory of interpretation expounded by Paul Ricoeur seemed promising in the
early stages.
The theory itself has several advantages. It is eclectic. It
incorporates features from several different disciplines, including
philosophy, history, literary criticism, and contemporary hermeneutical
theory. Such an amalgam had the potential for preventing an overemphasis
in any one area which might lead to a unnecessarily distorted view of the
text. Furthermore, Ricoeur's theory had a sensitivity toward language
which was compatible with biblical texts. His recognition of the
importance and power of symbols and metaphors made his theory suitable for
interpreting biblical passages rich in such language. Finally, his view
that meaning is constituted on three levels - word, sentence, work - opened
up a variety of ways for analyzing 2 Corinthians 3.
The decision was taken to implement this theory, to apply it to a
particular text.
The primary sources for Ricoeur's hermeneutic which have been used
here are Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning and
The Rule of Metaphor. The former book provides the theoretical groundwork
for the interpretative notion of the 'world of the text', which has been
the subject of Chapter Two. 2 Corinthians 3 was regarded as a 'world' with
characters who acted and who related to each other. It was also regarded
as a text which projects to the reader a world, a way of living. The Rule
of Metaphor guided the investigation in Chapter Three, in which Ricoeur's
theory of metaphor was reviewed and then applied to three different
metaphors in 2 Corinthians 3.
A summary of the present work will now be provided.
Chapter One introduced the topic of interpretation as a general
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problem. It was defined as a process of expounding the meaning of a text.
It is a process in that it involves the ongoing contributions of both past
and present readers. Past readers treasure and preserve texts, and they
offer interpretations which serve as starting points for later readers.
Each new reader construes for himself the meaning of the text, taking into
account the interpretative tradition as well as his own personal concerns.
'Expounding' was taken to be a dialectical event, in which a nai've pre-
understanding of the text gave way to a critical explanation, which in turn
was followed by comprehension, or a more mature understanding. Expounding
'meaning' requires a concern for the interests of author, text, and reader,
for all three contribute to the formation of meaning. A text is a work of
discourse which has been committed to writing. It is recognized as a work,
the product of human labour.
Interpreting an ancient text, like the Bible, is especially
challenging because of the distance between its author and its reader - a
spatio-temporal distance, as well as a linguistic and cultural gulf. But
the effort is worthwhile, because the Bible is ultimately about one God -
the same God worshipped by ancient Israel and the Christian church - and
about his dealings with humanity, which is in much the same predicament as
it ever was. Ricoeur proposes to recognize the distance between the reader
and the writer of the text, and then to deal with it productively through
appropriation, making one's own that which was previously foreign. Such a
programme is possible, in part, because the meaning of great texts
(including the Bible) has an ideal content which can be identified by the
original readers and re-identified by later readers.
Grasping the meaning of 2 Corinthians 3 is particularly challenging,
because, first of all, there are lexical problems. KaTOTttpf C,u>, for
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example, has been translated in this work as 'behold/reflect', a
recognition of its own multivalence as well as of the several levels of
interpretation which 2 Corinthians 3 as a whole permits. The
interpretation of the whole depends in part upon one's understanding of its
structure. Is this chapter a midrash on Exodus 34 (Windisch, Schulz,
Georgi)? Or is it rather an apologetic argument which alludes to several
Old Testament passages, including Exodus 34 (Furnish)? Or is it a part of
a larger passage (2. 14-4.6) which exhibits a cyclical or concentric pattern
(Lambrecht)? The best possible solution at this time seems to be a
modification of Furnish's proposal. The passage (especially verses 7-18)
is not properly a midrash, because it does not seek to exegete a given text
(Ex 34. 29-35) by means of a running commentary. The passage does seem
rather to contribute, more or less indirectly, to Paul's apology/polemic
vis-ci-vis certain intruders/opponents. But there are midrashic elements
present, though, such as Paul's comments about Moses, the glory, and the
veil. 2 Corinthians 3, then, should be regarded as the work of a writer
who was steeped in the Hebrew scriptures (and LXX), who, even with no
scroll before him, could quote (misquote?), allude to, or interpret the
scriptures freely and easily. Paul, through 'the artful manipulation of
language* (to borrow a phrase from John Stuart Mill), interprets the Hebrew
Bible Christologically, and uses it to promote and defend the work he feels
he has to do.
In order to deal with the problems of interpreting ancient texts, the
hermeneutic of Ricoeur is employed. The central category of his theory of
interpretation is the 'world of the text'. The world of the text provides
the reader a new vision of reality, a new way of orienting himself in the
world, a challenge to actualize his own possibilities. The world of the
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text projects a mode of existence. The text beckons the reader to
appropriate its world, to make it his own,
The world of 2 Corinthians 3 is a world where persons live. Chief
among these is God, God is creator, creating a universe, a new creation
through Christ, and a family for all of his 'children' to live in, God is
father of this family. He is a good father - strong, fair, dependable. He
assigns chores to his children, and he helps them perform them. Jesus is
the eldest brother. He is pre-eminent among all the children. He is also
lord, in which case his younger brothers are his slaves. But they do not
mind. They willingly become his slaves. If Jesus is the oldest brother,
then Paul is next oldest, or he acts like it sometimes, at least in regard
to the Corinthians. He is forever telling them how to sort out their
problems and how to behave. Though he is their brother, he acts more like
their father. Sometimes he calls himself their father. But he is also
their slave, not owned by them, but working for their benefit. As a slave
of Christ, Paul goes where he is told and does what he is commanded. He
does not decide his own itinerary. But he does decide the itinerary of his
workmates. He sends them out as his emissaries, to deliver his letters and
to smooth out trouble in his churches. Paul himself is an ambassador, and
he dispatches others as ambassadors as well. Paul is not idle. He is
forever talking about his 'work'. One example of his workmanship, the
result of his labour, is the Corinthian church. This congregation is a
building for which he has laid a good foundation. It is a field in which
he has sown the seed. It is a letter which he has written. Paul has done
the work of an apostle, and he wants to be recognized as an apostle, not
least by the Corinthians. But the best of all possible authors is God. In
fact, for Paul, God is best of all.
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God is superordinate in all of his relations with men. Paul is always
subordinate to God, but he alternates between superordinate, equal, and
subordinate in his relations with the Corinthians. The Corinthians have a
rather passive role in the text. They are indeed the addressees, the
recipients, the readers of a letter, but they are also themselves a letter.
They are a letter which has been written by Paul and are therefore evidence
of Paul's apostolic activity. As such, they serve to recommend Paul to all
men, or at least to those men who take time to read and know the letter.
The world of 2 Corinthians 3 projects God as the ultimate, superordinate
authority, the father, with all of the brothers (and sisters C by 2 Cor
6.18, at least!) as equals, though some are more equal than others, since
they have a responsibility for building up the churches.
The theory of metaphor put forward by Ricoeur is long and elaborate.
He re-interprets Aristotle in such a way as to avoid falling into the trap
of an ornamental theory, which states that metaphor is simply substituting
an improper decorative word for the more proper (though less elegant) word.
By emphasizing Aristotle's notion of eiricpopd:, Ricoeur is able to undermine
the sterile substitution theory and to erect an explanation of metaphor
which takes notice of the movement or transference of meaning. Ricoeur
also borrows from the pioneering work of I. A. Richards, who proposed an
'interinanimation' theory of metaphor, in which metaphor is seen less as
the improper usage of a word and more as the result of the interplay of all
the parts of the sentence. Ricoeur's theory was summarized in six
propositions:
1. Metaphor is a phenomenon of predication, not naming.
2. The phenomenon of metaphor occurs at the level of the
sentence, not at the level of the word. Thus, there are
metaphorical statements but no metaphorical words.
3. Metaphor reveals a hitherto unnoticed kinship between
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seemingly alien categories.
4. True metaphors exist because of a tension between the
literal and the metaphorical interpretation of a sentence.
5. Real metaphors are not translatable. They may be para¬
phrased, but their innovative meaning can never be fully
verbalized.
6. Metaphors generate new information about reality. The
unusual predication stimulates the reader to perceive new
relationships and new insights.
Ricoeur calls his doctrine of metaphor a 'tension' theory, because it
recognizes two different kinds of tension involved in the interpretation of
metaphors. First, there is a tension betwee the literal meaning and the
metaphorical meaning. In a literal interpretation, the words do not make
sense, as they are commonly understood. The literal sense self-destructs
in nonsense or contradiction. This necessitates a search for a
metaphorical interpretation to rescue the sense of the sentence. A second
tension is between the literal reference and the metaphorical reference.
In the literal interpretation of a metaphor, the literal reference is
abolished along with the literal sense. But since the sense of every
sentence presupposes and drives toward a reference, the metaphorical
statement must have metaphorical reference to correspond with its
metaphorical sense. Thus the meaning of a metaphor (whether it be a
poetic, theological, or some other kind of metaphor) cannot be reduced to a
mood or a feeling, but rather it must be accorded ontological status. A
metaphor says something about reality.
Three metaphors from 2 Corinthians 3 were selected in order to apply
the theory of metaphor proposed by Ricoeur. The metaphors of 'letters'
were the first example. In verse 2, Paul says of the Corinthians, 'You are
our letter'. The literal interpretation of this metaphor breaks down,
because people are not letters. This is an aberrant attribution. But the
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metaphorical interpretation rescues the sentence, by affirming that these
persons are like letters. The ontological vehemence of the metaphor pushes
the reader to discover the resemblance which makes the metaphor work. This
resemblance is revealed in the hitherto unnoticed similarity between people
and letters, The surplus of meaning in this metaphor allows for two
different but related construals. The Corinthian 'letter' may be regarded
as a letter of recommendation. Since commendation is a prevalent theme in
the immediate context <3. 1-3) and in the epistle as a whole, the notion of
a living letter of recommendation is easily established. But 'you are our
letter' can also be interpreted as ' you are the result of the work we have
performed. You are our workmanship, our craftsmanship.' This
interpretation would coincide with another of Paul's arguments in the
Corinthian correspondence, namely, that he is an apostle because he has
done the work of an apostle.
In verse 3, Paul writes, 'You are a letter of Christ.' The notion of
Christ writing a letter (subjective genitive) is as metaphorical as the
Corinthians constituting a letter about Christ (objective genitive). The
subjective is preferable here, since the context is more concerned with how
the letter is written than with what the letter contains. To say that
Christ wrote a letter is a means of redescribing the congregation at
Corinth. They are a church not because of what they have done but because
of what Christ has done. The metaphor suggests that the Corinthians (and
all other believers as well) should consider themselves as the literary
production of a divine author. This is another example of the power of
Christ in bringing forth a new creation. In order to bring forth this
'document', Christ employed the services of his servant Paul. Christ wrote
the letter, but Paul was his assistant in the process.
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The second metaphor to be examined is 'glory'. To speak of the
radiance of a man's face is not a matter of literal fact, though this
fiction may be a metaphorical redescription. The language of glory and
radiance gave the biblical writers a means of talking about the
inexpressible - a direct encounter with the divine. The 'glory of Moses'
face', a metaphor introduced in the Pentateuch and affirmed by Paul,
suggests that Moses had had a rare experience of beholding the divine
glory, that he had been in close contact with God, closer than the ordinary
man is allowed. 'The glory of the Lord' is metaphorical also, as is almost
all talk of God. This is an attempt to talk about God in terms of the
model of the honoured and respected man. Such a man has glory - fame,
renown, good reputation. God has a good reputation among his people. They
sing praises to his name and give him gifts. But glory also spins off
notions of power and majesty. These are characteristics of a king, which
is another name for God. if God is a king, as the biblical writers
suggest, then he is a unique king, in that he is concerned about the
welfare of all of his subjects. Even when they are suffering, the glorious
power of the king helps to sustain the people. 'Glory', when attributed to
God, opens up many possibilities of discourse. It is a word which allows
men to articulate their understanding and experience of God.
The third and final metaphor to be considered is the antithetical pair
of life and death. 'Life', when predicated of God, especially by the Old
Testament writers in the phrase 'the living God', is another conversation
starter, when humans want to talk about God. The survey of the Old
Testament usage of 'the living God' reveals that the phrase first
distinguishes the true God, the God of Israel, from the false deities,
those of the other nations. It also signifies a personal God - one who
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speaks to his people and one who acts graciously on their behalf. The
living God is the near God - one who is present with his people.
Death, on the other hand, connotes indifference, alienation, lack of
personal relationship. When one dies to the law, he becomes indifferent
toward it. When one dies to sin, he terminates his relationship with it.
Paul's understanding of God seems to be that when one dies to sin and law,
then one comes alive toward God. The road to life passes through death.
For Paul, the pioneer of the path from death to life is Jesus, who died but
was raised from death to life by the glory of the Father (Rom 6.4).
This 'new' life has already begun for believers, because the Spirit
causes us to be alive (2 Cor 3.6). The Spirit is also the power which is
currently transforming believers from glory to glory (v. 18). It is the
Spirit which is instrumental in the writing of the epistle of Christ on the
heart. 'Spirit' is another metaphorical name for God. It suggests the
breath of God, that which makes God alive. God is known to be alive among
his people in part because these people have the Spirit. The Spirit of the
Living God is the Spirit which makes men alive. Spirit is thus in some
ways an organizing metaphor for 2 Corinthians 3. riveOpa is a term which
appears in all four 'paragraphs' of the chapter. For Paul, rcveCpa is a
significant means for talking about the activity of God.
Though the Christian's talk of God is mostly (if not completely)
metaphorical, it is not therefore necessarily incoherent or fanciful,
because, according to Ricoeur, metaphors refer. They say something about
reality. When we talk about the ' living God' , we are pointing to an extra-
linguistic, extra-terrestrial reality. What we say may not have the
logical force of a syllogism or the convincing power of empirical evidence,
but it may be true nonetheless. The world of the biblical text projects a
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picture of the living God. And metaphor gives us the ability to begin to
speak and to continue to speak, about this God, who is the creator of all
things and the father of all believers.
Having completed the investigation and summarized the results, it is
appropriate to reflect critically on the overall project.
The notion of the 'world of the text' as proposed by Paul Ricoeur is a
useful interpretative notion. It arises out of his reaction against an
overemphasis on historicism as the dominant element in hermeneutics and out
of his sympathy for and partial agreement with the tenets of structuralism.
Without rejecting the value of historical critical research, the Ricoeurian
interpreter would stress instead the internal structure of the work and the
interplay of its various components. He would temporarily bracket out the
world behind the text in order to examine more carefully the world of the
text. Such an interpreter would proceed on the assumption that the meaning
of a text may be found in the content and the structure of the text itself,
quite apart from any consideration of its historical context.
The implementation of the 'world of the text' in the present
investigation permitted partial suspension of reference to real people and
events so that the roles and relationships of various 'actors' could be
examined. For example, the more historically-orientated problems of
Pauline chronology and of the textual integrity of the epistle were de-
emphasized. Instead, Paul was considered as he appeared in the text in
relation to God and the Corinthians. This approach contributed new
insights to the understanding of 2 Corinthians 3, such as Paul's portrayal
of himself as being equal to, superior to, and even inferior to the
Corinthians.
Ricoeur's notion of the 'world of the text' is compatible with the New
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Criticism, French structuralism, and the ideology of the absolute text. It
works out rather well when applied to modern narrative texts, especially
novels. David Copperfleld, for example, can be read, enjoyed, and
understood (at least partially, anyway) by persons who have little, if any,
knowledge of nineteenth century England. This is true in part because the
novel presents a world of its own, and it provides enough information about
that world to make it understandable. The text then tells a story complete
with beginning, middle, and end.
But the application of the 'world of the text' to New Testament
epistolography is problematic. The letters refer not to a make-believe
world of fictitious characters but rather to the real world and to real
people. They do not tell a complete story. Instead, they represent one
stage in the unfolding of a larger story, a story about God and his people.
This is a story which has not yet been completed, neither in Paul's time
nor in ours. To some extent, then, the epistles make sense only when
viewed in their historical context and in relation to the social and
cultural and religious milieu in which they arise.
For this reason, the investigation of the world of 2 Corinthians 3
continually collides with the ideology of the absolute text. The world of
this text and of the Pauline epistles in general is not simply about a
world designed by the apostle. Rather, this text is grounded in the real
world — it arose out of it, refers to it, and continually leads the reader
back to it. 2 Corinthians 3 alludes to the presence of intruders and
opponents in the Corinthian church. It was written because Paul had begun
a good work, in Paul's view at least, in Corinth and because he continued
to be concerned about the believers there. Even Paul's language and
concepts are formed by his drawing upon the literature of the Old
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Testament. Thus, 2 Corinthians 3 continually refers beyond itself to other
persons, events, and situations, and it alludes to other peoples and
documents. It is not a self-contained entity.
For these reasons, the study of 2 Corinthians 3 under the rubric of
'world of the text' alone does not completely satisfy. Questions of a
historical nature continually arise, and the world behind the text always
looms on the horizon of the world of the text. Therefore, it must be
concluded that Paul Ricoeur's theory of the 'world of the text' is a useful
interpretative category, but it is not fully adequate by itself for the
study of the New Testament epistles.
The concept of the 'world of the text' is helpful, then, in that
allows the reader to bracket out 'history' and to focus for a while on the
'text'. But when applied to New Testament epistolography its value is
limited in that it is sometimes difficult to delineate and to distinguish
between the world of the text and the world behind the text.
The present investigation attempted to make this distinction by
bracketing out historical reference and by concentrating instead upon
actors and upon their roles and relations. This approach is, of course,
only one way in which the concept of the 'world of the text' may be
implemented. Other possible methods would include, to mention a few, the
linguistic approach, which would investigate Paul's drawing upon the
language of the Old Testament as well as his own creative use of language,
and the cultural approach, which would analyze the cultural codes and other
cultural factors which bear upon these texts.
One advantage of utilizing the category of the 'world of the text' is
that it portrays the text as projecting a world from itself to the reader.
The critic is discouraged from reading into the text his own prejudices and
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opinions. Rather, he is challenged to open himself up to the propositions
and claims of the text. The final stage in Ricoeur's theory of
interpretation is the reader's reception and appropriation of the world of
the text into his own world. In this way, the meaning of the text is
thrust into the world before the text. When the world of the text merges
with the world of the reader, the process of interpretation is complete,
though it is not final, for the biblical text is often capable of a
plurality of interpretations. This multiplicity of meaning is more
compatible with the 'world of the text' approach than with the historical
critical approach, because the latter looks backward for the one original
meaning of the text while the former looks forward to the possibility of
new meaning as new readers in new environments encounter the riches of old
texts.
The other major aspect of Paul Ricoeur's theory of interpretation
which is discussed in the present work is the theory of metaphor. The six
tenets of Ricoeur's theory of metaphor were discussed and then summarized
(p. 153). The first point, 'Metaphor is a phenomenon of predication, not
naming', is foundational for the further development of his theory. Yet
this basic point conflicts at times with Ricoeur's emphasis on the 'is, is
not, is like' character of metaphor (see page 168), which implies that
metaphor is a naming process. Thus it appears that Ricoeur has proposed
two different though related definitions of the essence of metaphor.
This is not surprising, in light of the fact that there are different
kinds of metaphor. The most commonly discussed is the 'A is a B' format;
for example, 'you are our letter'. On this type of metaphor, the 'is, is
not, is like' approach works well, and the accompanying notions of dual
sense and dual reference are applicable and appropriate.
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But there are other kinds of metaphor. For example, 'a letter written
on the heart' is clearly metaphorical but does not fit the 'A is a B'
format. Nor are the concepts of dual sense and dual reference relevant
here. Soskice's critique of Ricoeur is at this point worthy of
consideration. She is correct in saying that in a metaphor of this type
there is only one subject, one referent — the letter. This metaphor can
not easily be interpreted on the order of 'is, is not, is like'. It is
clearly a metaphor of predication and is best interpreted with reference to
the six tenets listed on page 153. Such a metaphor can only make sense
when the whole sentence is subjected to a work of interpretation.
Metaphors of this type do on a small scale what texts do on a much larger
scale — they project a world which leads the reader to think, to explore,
to become articulate. They do more than camouflage the identity of the
referent. They challenge the reader to understand new possibilities and to
make new connections between things.
Besides a difference in the format of metaphor, there is also a
difference between a spoken metaphor and a written metaphor. Ricoeur's
theory of the interpretation of metaphors works quite well when one is
dealing with metaphors contained in a written text, for much time is often
required to apply the tenets of Ricoeur's theory. A reader has the
opportunity to stop his reading, ponder similarities and differences, and
then continue reading.
This approach does not work so well on metaphors presented orally,
because the speaker, of course, continues his message, and the listener
does not have the luxury of mulling over all of the possibilities of
meaning suggested by the metaphor. In oral discourse, either the meaning
of the metaphor comes through quickly and fairly effortlessly, or it is
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lost. A listener simply does not have time to apply a method as
sophisticated as that of Ricoeur. Thus, Ricoeur's theory of metaphor is
better suited to the interpretation of written texts than to the
understanding of oral discourse.
This point has some bearing on the interpretation of the Pauline
epistles. 2 Corinthians was, of course, composed as a written document.
But originally it was probably read aloud to the congregation by a reader,
so that it was heard as oral discourse and not seen as writing by the
original addressees. Only in later centuries was the epistle in such wide
circulation that it would have been read as a visual experience. Thus, a
theory of reading metaphors, such as that of Ricoeur, would probably not
have been applied by the Corinthians. To apply such a theory now would
possibly yield a somewhat different understanding of the text from that
achieved by the first listeners.
Ricoeur's notion of the dual sense and dual reference of a metaphor is
a helpful contribution to the understanding of metaphor. Ricoeur would
most likely agree with Soskice that each metaphor has only one referent.
While Soskice asserts that there is only one referent, Ricoeur's theory
explains how the reader comes to identify this referent. His theory goes
through the two steps of rejecting the literal referent and then grasping
the metaphorical referent, a process which sometimes is completed instantly
in the mind of the reader but at other times involves a span of time and a
recognizable effort. Soskice is correct to assert that each metaphor has
only one true subject, and Ricoeur does well to point out how the
interpreter arrives at his understanding of that subject.
Ricoeur's theory of dual reference is, of course, a reaction against
those who would maintain that a metaphor is ornamental and not cognitive
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and not at all referential. His theory allows one to go beyond the
obviously correct denial of the literal referent and achieve instead the
identification of the metaphorical referent. Such a two-stage procedure is
not necessary in those cases where the subject is fairly obvious, but it is
a helpful tool in other cases where the referent is more concealed. The
theory of dual reference is yet another implicit claim by Ricoeur that
metaphor is cognitive and not merely ornamental.
Paul Ricoeur has developed his theories of reference even further in
his three volume work, Time and Narrative. Drawing on his conclusions
about the referential power of metaphor in The Rule of Metaphor, he applies
them on a wider scale to certain selected novels. At this point, his
theories of metaphor and of the world of the text converge. While metaphor
conveys sense and reference on a small scale, he asserts that narratives
project meaning and reference on a larger scale. Both metaphor and
narrative are concerned with depicting truth, and both propose a world
which the reader is invited to examine and inhabit.
In conclusion, it may be stated that the interpretation of 2
Corinthians 3 may be enhanced by developing and maintaining a sensitivity
to both the world behind the text and the world of the text. These two
worlds are related yet distinct, though the distinction is at times
difficult to establish.
The interpretation of 2 Corinthians 3 demands a sensitivity to the
world behind the text, because it is full of references to historical
characters, such as Paul and the Corinthians, and Moses and the Israelites.
This text functions like a window, giving the reader a glimpse of this
ancient world. But the view is neither clear nor complete. Numerous
different interpretations are the result.
311
The world of the text of 2 Corinthians 3 has been explored by means of
reference to some of the actors mentioned in it and to their actions and
their relationships with each other. God appears as the dominant figure in
this text, and Paul is his designated assistant, a role that consists of
both service and authority. The Corinthians are the persons under his
authority.
The interpretation of 2 Corinthians 3 also requires a sensitivity to
religious metaphor, for the passage is replete with figurative language.
It speaks of letters written on stones as well as on hearts, of people
whose faces radiate light, of dead people who are alive, and of living
people who are dead. Such discourse challenges a reader's interpretative
ability. The theories of Paul Ricoeur, though sometimes difficult to
understand and to apply, have proved to be helpful in coming to grasp
something of the meaning of an enigmatic passage written by Paul of Tarsus.
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